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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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January 14, 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

The following summarizes discussions which Ambassador Houghton and I had with Minister of Defense Guillaumat, with his Generals Lavaud and Martin participating to some extent.

In a casual way that related to M. Guillaumat's mining engineering activities in Indo-China we discussed the present situation in Laos. M. Guillaumat was familiar with the problem there and agreed that the present situation is producing unsatisfactory results. He said, however, with his budget limitations he saw no way of increasing French participation. I mentioned General Heintges' visit and the conclusion we had drawn that if our military assistance to Laos was to be effective it would be necessary to substantially increase the level of military training, both in respect to discipline and operational capability and in respect to the handling of material. I touched briefly on General Heintges' proposal to take in twelve battalion training teams in which perhaps ten Americans would be associated with four French officers and NCO's, and also mentioned the eighty or so Philippine experts now in the country. M. Guillaumat indicated a generally sympathetic attitude toward the objectives of General Heintges' program but said he understood their Foreign Office found difficulties with it in relation to the Geneva Agreement limiting the build-up of combatant forces in the area. He asked if we had opened up the subject with their Foreign Office and I indicated that we had and that we would pursue it there with any support he felt he might be able to give us.

Mr. Guillaumat did not mention the matter of deploying first generation IRBMs in France and I did not raise the question. He did, however, mention that his government was anxious to cooperate in a second generation solid propellant development project and said that they were having discussions of this matter with Mr. Meili. Aside from the satisfaction I expressed in their interest in this matter and an assurance of U.S. cooperation with the project, I left any elaboration of it to the further discussions which I am sure Mr. Meili will be having with them.

M. Guillaumat spoke of the two squadrons of F-100 aircraft they have received and said they had been very disappointed that they had not been permitted to receive training in the LABS tactics; also that they had been told that their 20mm ammunition would not be available until fall. It was not clear whether this was because of U.S. shortage or because of

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inadequate storage facilities in France. I agreed to see what we could do in the matter of prompter delivery of the ammunition.

As for the LABS training it seemed likely that this was tied into the pending agreement for bilateral cooperation under Article 144b of the Atomic Energy Act. In order to make progress in this area, I suggested to the Minister that this phase of the bilateral agreements be separated and consummated promptly in order to clear the way for full training in the F-100 aircraft utilization.

In this connection, I mentioned that we were very much disappointed at the delays that had occurred in the broad questions pending with the French such as the question of storing atomic weapons in France for their and our use. M. Guillaumat indicated that while he and the military were just as anxious as we were to make progress in these areas there were broad political questions pending between General de Gaulle and Mr. Dulles which would have to be settled on that level. Further discussion of these broader questions seemed inappropriate but I was left with the impression that M. Guillaumat's advice to his government would be constructive and favorable from our standpoint.

The atomic submarine was discussed briefly. M. Guillaumat gave me to understand that they were working out the security problem by the device of putting naval officers who were technically competent in charge of their Atomic Energy Commission (Commissariat) operations in this area so that the French Navy would assume responsibility for the security of classified information we would be turning over to them. M. Guillaumat said they originally thought that all they needed was enriched uranium but had come to the conclusion that they could make much faster progress if they could receive full information on the design of the atomic submarine. There was no mention of the possibility of their Commissariat obtaining additional quantities of enriched uranium for longer range submarine reactor development work. It was understood that best progress could be made by separating out the nuclear submarine agreement from other pending atomic matters.

There was no discussion of other NATO cooperation questions such as integrated air defense, implicating being that these were in the broad category of subjects to be covered by General de Gaulle and Mr. Dulles. I would feel confident that the French military, including the Minister of Defense, would be generally of our point of view about these matters. I am sure I left with M. Guillaumat the impression that we on the military side feel some urgency in getting them settled.

It should be added that our conversation throughout was in the best of spirit, with the French perhaps showing some dissatisfaction with the

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way some of their work had been held up by our failure to provide information on material as promptly as they had hoped and with a similar show of dissatisfaction on our part with progress on some of the fundamentals of our relationships.

s/Donald A. Quarles

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