

OH 538

MacArthur, Douglas II

Oral History Interview

by:

**Mr. Mack Teasley
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library**

**August 6, 1990
Washington, D.C.**

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER LIBRARY

Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of

Douglas MacArthur II

In accordance with the Provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Laura MacArthur of Ottignies, Belgium, hereinafter referred to as the donor, do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interview conducted with my father, Douglas MacArthur II, on August 6, 1990, and prepared for deposit in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions:

(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been completed by the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

(2) The tape recordings shall not be available for use by researchers during the donor's lifetime. After the donor's death, access to the tape recordings shall be for background use only, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom.

(3) During the donor's lifetime the donor retains all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in both the transcripts and tape recordings shall pass to the United States Government. During the donor's lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts (but not the tape recordings) without the donor's express consent in each case.

(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the Library to researchers upon request.

(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to institutions other than the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

Laura MacArthur
Donor

May 15, 2006
Date

Allan Weinstein
Archivist of the United States

6/12/06
Date

This is August 6, 1990, and this is an oral history interview with Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II at his residence in Washington, D.C. The interviewer is Mack Teasley of the Eisenhower Library.

TEASLEY: I thought I should start off by asking when you first became associated with General Eisenhower. I assume when you were the political advisor's . . .

MACARTHUR: I first met General Eisenhower about 1933 or the beginning of '34. After I passed my examinations for foreign service in 1932, we were in the depths of a deep depression and the Congress did not appropriate any money for any foreign service officers so the Department of State told us to go out and find something to do for a couple of years. I shipped first as an ordinary seaman on a small freighter and we flew out to the Indian Ocean and back, or around the world. About two months trip then I came back. I had been in ROTC, graduated at Yale, and I got word when I got back. I got a notification that they were taking on reserve officers, for active duty for tours of six months. So I joined and was assigned to Fort Hoyle and then several weeks later I was sent to the regular army captain to take over a CCC company and so I was in the army from spring, late spring of '33 until October of '35 when the State Department finally got some money. And I used to go and call on my uncle, who was chief of staff, General Douglas MacArthur, at that time. He was deeply concerned about the morale of younger, junior officers in the army because at that time you could be seventeen years in the army, a graduate of West Point, seventeen years in the armed forces and still be a first lieutenant. Al Gruenther, who was General Eisenhower's chief of staff, was a first lieutenant when I met him. I was a second lieutenant in the reserves, Mark Clark had just made captain. But to get back to your question; I used to call on my uncle because he wanted to find out how the younger

officers were feeling and taking this "hump" of 4,400 captains and 11,500 officers. One major general died, one brigadier moved up, and one colonel moved up and a major moved up.

[Laughter] First time I went to call on him, at his request, I was greeted in the outer office by Major Eisenhower, who was on his staff and then he told me that he had a very high regard for Major Eisenhower. He was one of the ablest and brilliant younger middle-grade officers in the army at that time. So I met General Ike first as "Major Ike." I didn't get to know him well, but I knew his brother Milton better than I knew him. I don't think I saw him again until Normandy. In '44.

Q: And you came over, you had been interred by the Germans . . .

MACARTHUR: Well, after brief tours in Canada and Italy I was assigned to the embassy in Paris in February of '38. The war clouds were clearly rising over the horizon at that time. I got there in February of '38, you remember the occupation of the Rhineland by Hitler that went unresisted, occurred in '36. I'd been there only five weeks when the Anschluss came and Hitler took over Austria in March of '38. Sent me down to do a report. I was diplomatic courier, carrying a pouch. I spent two days there doing a report on the Austrian reaction. Then in September Hitler took over the Sudetenland of Germany, '38. Then in March of '39 he gobbled up the rest of Czechoslovakia and then started the movement on Poland. So in Paris at that time there was a sense of inevitability just like a Greek tragedy, of one event leading to another event to another event and then finally the tragedy. In a sense, as I look back on it, when war finally

came there was almost a feeling, people had been living under tension which gradually mounted on the Polish thing and after all these various aggressions that had gone unanswered, there was almost a feeling of relief, well, at last, you know, the waiting is over, it's here. Of course, the people in France thought that they were invincible, imagine how with the Maginot line and the state of their forces. But the concept was really a World War I concept of entrenched positions and not the war of movement that the German general staff had designed and which General Patton, in his own way, back when I transferred from field artillery, went down to the 3rd Cavalry when I was in [unintelligible] and Lieutenant Colonel Patton was commanding officer of the 3rd Cavalry at Fort Meyer and he was constantly preaching armored cavalry, not horses, but armored cavalry and more movement and so forth. So, the only other interesting thing that happened to me during that period, I had some interesting trips to Germany and other places. The ambassador used to use as his courier the junior officers in the political section of the embassy, which was extremely interesting. I made trips to the southern rundown, to Italy and Greece and Turkey and back up to Yugoslavia. In August of 1939, about mid-August, I was picked to be the courier carrying a special letter from President Roosevelt to the president of the Presidium for Stalin. Because unbeknownst to anyone except a few people at the very top in our government, Charles E. Bowen, Chip Bowen, who was one of our very distinguished young diplomats had made a great, close friendship, friendly relationship with the young second secretary in the German embassy in Moscow. Chip was in our embassy there. This we don't even hear about. He had secretly informed him of the negotiations going on, the secret negotiations between Stalin and Hitler, the Stalin-Hitler pact. At that time, after the gobbling up of the rest of

Czechoslovakia in March, '39, I think it was, the British and the French finally decided to send in a delegation to Moscow to negotiate a treaty with the Russians, a non-aggression pact, which would have features to help deter Hitler. Because their fear at that time was that if Hitler's back door was open, all their concern was that if Hitler felt that his rear was secure, that is, the eastern front, falling on eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was secure, then he would feel free to go ahead and attack Poland and take on the British and the French in western Europe. So they sent this mission at the end of June, beginning of July and the Russians just played with them while they were secretly negotiating with Hitler. So I got there and was met by Chip and he said he had a diplomatic reception that night for us to meet [Jonathan Hayright?]. When we got there and pretended to be drinking and having fun, old friends getting together. Chip told him quietly that I had come with a letter and he said you've come too late, it was initialed last night. And he described it, the three Baltic states going to Hitler and the eastern part of Poland, a hunk of that going to the Soviet Union. And this, of course, we knew immediately meant war but he added one other thing that only came back to bite me a bit later when I was in Iran a few incarnations later. He said that the Russians were brutally insistent that we accept the clause which we refused to accept. Which in translation read, "the area to the south of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Persian Gulf was the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union." I've never forgotten that translation. So I was bundled on the next plane back to, the next train, there were no planes flying out of Europe in those days, you had to travel by train, with instructions to stop off in Warsaw and tell Tony Biddle, our ambassador there, to expect an attack within two weeks, same thing with our charge d'affaire there in Berlin. I remember I went in and said I had a very

top secret message to get in and he had a large crystal vase and when I said I had a message to give him he started beating on this vase and he said, "I'm convinced that the Germans have succeeded in wiring up this embassy. We'll go out and take a walk and you can tell me about it outside where we can walk and so forth." And then I got back to Paris, I had a doubled-encoded longer message than the brief one that had been sent from Moscow. And sure enough, in the morning I got back about three days before, I think the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was announced on August 23, although it was the middle of August, about the 16th or 17th when it had been initialed, agreed to. And sure enough, on the first of September the balloon went up and that was that. So then we went through the period of the "Phony War," *la drôle guerre*, that's what the French called it. And then Hitler mounted the major assault in May, poked through at Sedan and as the Germans advanced on Paris the advance was delayed a bit because they turned and went to the coast to isolate the British, break through the British wing of the front so that they could pick up the British. Which they did not succeed in doing because of that marvelous evacuation at Dunkirk. But as they advanced on Paris the French government decided to retreat. The ambassador, Ambassador Bullitt and Bob Murphy, at the last decided to stay in Paris when the Germans came, with Bob Murphy, Hugh Fullerton who was the head of the economic section, all the top people except Freeman Matthews who was later associated with General Eisenhower as a political advisor to [unintelligible] at Gibraltar during the North African phase. So I was one of three people named to go with the French government. Doc Matthews, who was the head of it, Woody Wallner, who is dead now, [unintelligible], myself and then we were to pick up Tony Biddle, who had been ambassador to the Polish government in exile, located in

Anger further down toward the Loire valley area. So I went with the government to tour and then called in our final appeal to President Roosevelt for military assistance and then on to Bordeaux where the German-French armistice was signed and the Petain-Laval government was established in it's so-called "free zone" and headed for the capitol in Vichy and I was assigned with Art Matthews to our old embassy in Vichy. In Vichy, of course, when France fell at the beginning there was no organized resistance. The only people who had a resistance capability - the Communist party - were partners with Hitler in this endeavor. The first few months of that summer, not until the early autumn came along, sometimes single people or a couple of them would come in and say, "We've got a little group who got information that we can pass on. What information would be helpful to you in the American Embassy to pass on to the British?" And so these individual little resistance groups sprung up and people joined them. And we had close contact with a number of these different groups. Some of them had people in Laval's headquarters in the Hotel du Parc and they told us about German demands and his reactions. Some of them would give us messages or information on troop movements, particularly German troop movements, air movements, but particularly we were interested for the British in movements in the French ports, submarines, surface raiders, things like that. Then we got Albert [Lavay?], my friend [Lavay?], who was the customs agent at Confront just inside Spain, the Spanish-French frontier, and as things progressed he got Colonel Donovan to furnish sending sets, [unintelligible] material for the French to work [unintelligible]. He brought most of those through Albert [Lavay?]. And by the time that the landings in North Africa occurred in November of '42, we had a rather extensive contact on an individual basis with people from

different [unintelligible] several of them later actually became prime ministers of France, foremost De Gaulle, first defense minister after the British in Paris [unintelligible], George Bidault, who was foreign minister and then later prime minister, Joseph Laniel and a Dr. Mazze in Brittany who was a big risk-taker. Laniel was known to me. So when we landed in North Africa the Germans burst into the embassy and took us away and we ended up interned in Germany. That was in November '42, where first we were put aside by the French so that the Germans could pick us up to move us from Vichy to Lourdes and then [unintelligible] sent a detachment to bring us back to Germany. And we were there until March '44 when a strange agreement was finally worked out with the Germans for those of us. Our members had been augmented by some Red Cross people that they had picked up in France near Oberon who were working in so-called non-occupied France, our vice-counsel and two [unintelligible] and some other people. We were exchanged in '44 then I came back and went into the department and then Colonel Donovan's people at OSS suggested that I get turned over to them and be parachuted into Normandy before D-Day because I was the only one they personally knew, I had a lot of debriefings about Mazze and Laniel and a lot of these people. I knew these people but the Department, ours said fine, but the Department said no, that I really couldn't contribute anything to the success or failure of the landing.

Q: Had you had parachute training or were they going to give you that?

MACARTHUR: They were going to give me training that was the reason they approached me in

March after I got back within two weeks, they were going to give me that training. I said no, a lot of resistance people were going to be very important politically when France was liberated and it's much more valuable to have somebody who's worked for them on a first name basis and knows them well rather than having anyone who's going to contribute anything in fire power. The resistance people were going to be hard to handle, to cooperate anyway and you've got an operative there. So then I was held up and then went over eventually to London and then into Normandy on General Eisenhower's staff as assistant political advisor for French resistance workgroup. Worked with G-5, General Jimmy Coombs who was a former foreign service [unintelligible].

Q: You joined the contingent in London before the invasion then?

MACARTHUR: Yes, I joined SHAEF.

Q: SHAEF.

MACARTHUR: SHAEF, London. The invasion had occurred when they sent me over. In other words, I was no hero. I went in after it was secured and had our beachhead but before the breakdown and then I went into Normandy and I participated in the liberation of Paris on August 25th of '44.

Q: So you were a Foreign Service officer attached to headquarters or how do you . . .

MACARTHUR: Well, I had the assimilated rank of colonel and was assimilated, I was in uniform but without the colonel's [unintelligible], the insignia, but I was a member of the staff. I was on attached duty from the Foreign Service on General Eisenhower's staff as a civilian to be assimilated rank colonel. And then the night before, the day before rather, Monty was going to liberate Brussels, Bedell Smith called me in and said, "MacArthur, General Eisenhower wants you to go up and see how Monty handles the liberation of Brussels. I'd been present at the liberation of Paris so I went up camouflaged as a colonel, in that uniform. Brussels was liberated by the British and just as we had General Leclerc [unintelligible] the [Free French] 2nd Armored Division to lead the way into Paris the British had a General Piron, a Belgian brigade that had been formed in London, people that had escaped and gone over there and they encouraged them. They were all in British uniforms too except they had Belgique on their left shoulder pad. I was about the only guy in an American uniform and I had the greatest success in my life because there were beautiful girls on the boulevard who embraced this uniform and I had the good luck to be inside it. So when I went back to Paris I was reassigned to the embassy but as SHAEF embassy liaison with General Eisenhower's headquarters.

Q: You were with G-5?

MACARTHUR: Well, actually it was not G-5. When we liberated Paris they set up a liaison

group with the French, General Eisenhower did. I've forgotten the general, the major general who headed it, but it was a liaison group outside of G-5. And it was the special liaison with the French government and so forth and so on. As I was going to say, I knew intimately the French minister, whom I'd met, ran back [unintelligible] during my Vichy days he'd come over from, you know, foreign minister and defense minister, the CNR, Conseil National de la Resistance, which was the senior body of the French resistance. There were fifteen people, I knew six of them. I had worked with six of them so I was sort of assigned to head up the political section that worked on the French problems and information about them and so forth. It was a very interesting time because I had one great advantage that my colleagues who came in from North Africa because we'd had a diplomatic mission near the Free French under [unintelligible], they came up eventually from North Africa about two weeks after the British. But I'd been in France before the war, during the occupation, and then I had one advantage that none of them had, I'd been locked up by the Germans. I was in the French eyes a déporté politique, a fellow who had worked with the Resistance and been deported and so forth and so the French couldn't really say to me, "You Americans don't understand how we suffer and everything else and so forth and so on," which was one of the things that they occasionally, some of them tried to pull on me. So it was a very interesting time and knowing all these people, the secretary general of the foreign office who ran the show [unintelligible], Bidault, and [unintelligible] who was an intimate friend. He had escaped and he was in Vichy and he was responsible with Stass Ostrorog. About four days before Pearl Harbor I got word from them that they were inside the ministry and kept us informed of all German [unintelligible] and things that were happening elsewhere [unintelligible].

Ostrorog, Stanislas Ostrorog, who had a distinguished career, by the way. They brought this telegram they had just gotten in from Saigon saying that the French in Saigon, the Japanese moved into Saigon [unintelligible] saying that Japanese ships of various kinds were loading combat, fully equipped, combat troops and equipment for, obviously, an amphibious, or landing operation some place south possibly in Malaysia, Singapore, or the Philippines. We got that message about three days before Pearl Harbor, got it off and sent in on a one-time pad but it didn't seem to change anything.

Q: Did you have any interaction with General Eisenhower when you were on the staff there?

MACARTHUR: No, General Eisenhower, I saw him, I was presented to him and so on but I was run entirely by Bedell Smith and here's something that you [unintelligible] that I only saw General Eisenhower, as a figure, moving out of his office and going someplace and going back.

Q: That probably changed then when you came back to SHAEF?

MACARTHUR: Well, it did change. No, it changed before that. This was in Normandy and during the thing, and then when I was back in the liaison job in the embassy job in Paris in October of, when I was withdrawn from the command of SHAEF and went back in the embassy to head up political section but continued to be liaison with the SHAEF liaison office. Then I did see him, and in fact, on a couple of occasions I went with the ambassador. One when Harry

Hopkins was coming over before the Yalta conference the one with the Soviet Union [unintelligible] under the instruction of the President to see General Eisenhower. The general had a dinner at Brown House, the presidential house in Paris there, for Harry Hopkins [unintelligible] and Duff Cooper, the British ambassador, Jefferson Caffrey, Bedell Smith, General Ike, and we spent the evening, dinner and after dinner, in discussions about the Russians. I remember one question in particular, I can't remember if it was General Eisenhower or Bedell who asked the question or whether it was one of the British

[Interruption]

MACARTHUR: He said, "Harry, what does President Roosevelt really think Stalin will be up to after we've won this war, in view of his [unintelligible] has happened." Going back to the Molotov-Ribbentrop position before. And Harry Hopkins, without hesitation, said, "Well," he said, "the boss thinks that we've done so much for him that we can make a good democrat out of him." Well, that shows how far removed Roosevelt and Hopkins were from any understanding about what make Stalin tick. But on a couple of other occasions there were lunches or dinner there when there'd be some senior official over and General Ike would have the American ambassador and myself to these things. So I knew him, I knew him only casually.

Q: On those occasions when the conversations were going on, what was your impression of his grasp of the political realities of that time period?

MACARTHUR: Well, I'll come to that a little bit later, if I may, when I have more, I obviously was one of the lower people on the totem pole at these things, wasn't sounding off. But President Eisenhower, General Eisenhower knew an awful lot, and I might as well rather than wait, General Eisenhower learned the hard way about international relations and what makes alliances work and the problems that come up with friends and allies the hard way. He worked under three of the most difficult, temperamental bosses that you can imagine, commanding their forces in both war, and later in peace, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Charles DeGaulle. There can't be three people in the whole world that you learn more about the problems that come up in alliances and the businesses of national pride or one thing or another or the businesses of individualism and one thing or another. So he learned the hard way. I was not exposed to that then but I was intimately exposed to it later. I served in Paris until 1949 and then I was sent to Brussels and was there only about eight or nine months when I was brought back to Washington to take over the division of Western European affairs, WE, we called it. And then while I was there heading up the Western European division, which handled all that stuff with the Benelux countries and France and so forth. Not Britain, we had a separate section for Britain. We decided to set up, the department decided to set up a special office of European regional affairs, EUR-RA, which was the backstop, NATO and European integration on the economics side. And Ed Martin, who was a brilliant man with a great economic background and senior fellow in the department, was the director of that office, and I was made deputy director with specific responsibility of backstopping NATO, and our contribution to NATO. So I worked in the five-sided building, Pentagon, for several weeks with the Joint Staff under Al Gruenther, who was

then director of the Joint Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the first NATO force [unintelligible] which says something about our military because I remember our first rough cut which I told them wouldn't, couldn't possibly ever wash. There was 157 divisions. It was reduced, believe me, but everybody had his two cents worth to put in. So I spent a lot of time working with the Joint Staff and occasionally I was brought in to comment or brief or do something with the Chiefs of Staff. And then I was responsible, of course, for coordinating on NATO meetings when the Council met and then in the Brussels meeting of December 1950. At that meeting it was decided to set up an integrated command under General Eisenhower, a SACEUR, a Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and establish a headquarters outside of Paris. And I got back and General Eisenhower was then, let's see, he was at Columbia, I guess.

Q: Yes.

MACARTHUR: And he came down and he was accompanied by Al Gruenther who was going to go along with him because it had been agreed that General Eisenhower, who'd communicated to him the fact that he'd been selected and he accepted, he said he wanted to make a quick trip in January through NATO country. And I was asked, because I had been head of WE and the RA jobs to coordinate the trip and go along and get all the briefing books prepared and I knew virtually all the foreign ministers and defense ministers, prime ministers; NATO was smaller then. So I went along and there were about eight of us. There were General Eisenhower, Colonel Gruenther, who was to be his chief of staff when we set up the headquarters, P.D.

Carroll, Colonel Carroll, "Quality" Carroll, who was sort of an Andy Goodpaster type at that time, quite young, died a number of years ago, Craig Cannon, Lieutenant Colonel Craig Cannon, Major Bob, or Captain Bob Schulz, who was sort of a personal maid, you know, they do all that stuff, myself, and Dick Wallers, who was a major, and I was responsible before the trip to get together all the briefing books, briefing books on . . .

Q: Each country.

MACARTHUR: Each country with the personalities of prime minister and the political situation, military situation, forces and so forth. General Eisenhower really didn't enjoy reading briefing books. He disliked it. He would glance through them for statistics but then he wanted to be briefed orally so that he could ask questions [unintelligible]. So he looked over the books, which were ready, prepared about it four or five days before he went. And then as we went from one country to another we would get the books out again and then have an oral briefing where . . .

Q: Was this on the plane?

MACARTHUR: On the plane, yes, flying from one place to another or if we'd drive in the late evening, if there was going to be a dinner, early in the morning, you'd have an oral briefing before you'd start. And he was a very strict visitor. We spent about one day in each country and then came back and then we got back and I got a, he was very kind and complimentary about

how it had gone. Dick Walters and I had the job, every night because there'd be always a dinner, prime minister's dinner or something like that and before that General Clark would meet with the prime minister along with a couple of his people, Dick Walters and myself usually, and Al Gruenther. And Dick Walters and I, there'd been earlier a meeting with the defense minister and the foreign minister and the prime minister so each evening when we got back after dinner, about 10:30 or quarter to eleven, Dick Walters and I would divide up the work and we'd do the memorandums of conversation. We had two enlisted men, yeomen, excellent stenographers, and we would then dictate a summary of the talk and the points that the other guy had made, what the Germans said and so forth. And then we would go to bed about 1:00, we'd be finished by 1:00 or 1:30 or so. And then the enlisted men would have the job of going back and cranking out what we'd said so that the next morning it was available for us to look at, for General Howe to look at. And I did it the traditional way of, Dick Walters, you know, he's just like a human tape recorder. He's got the most fantastic memory. And he got in every pause, paragraph and everything. This was sort of helpful for the record too because sometimes they'd raise questions that General Eisenhower said, "Well, I'll give that some thought and get back with you." So we had the record and then we would pull together what had to be done and work when we got back to reply to these guys and send word to them and so forth.

Q: How was General Eisenhower in the meetings?

MACARTHUR: He was terrific. He was terrific. He had the presence that you need for that sort of thing. He was a victorious commander, with a [unintelligible] allied forces. He understood the basic fundamentals and would repeat it to me often. I had him say to me, "Doug, for an alliance to be worth anything there are three basic principles that have to be involved: one, it has to be based on sovereign equality. It has to be based on both sides saying that they are on equal footing. Two, there has to be mutual respect; and three, each party must see the treaty or the alliance in the first instance serving it's own enlightened self-interest, not somebody else's self interest, it's own enlightened self-interest." Under these principles, which he had learned, as I said, under those three tough taskmasters, he was an extremely, and which he observed in his conversations and his demeanor and everything else, he was an ideal guy to start off the SHAEF tradition. He was fantastic. What time have you got?

Q: Ten to eleven. This thing will stop at probably ten after.

MACARTHUR: Yeah, that's all right. Let's go ahead. So then we got back and then he thanked me warmly for my help in the trip and that was the end of that I thought. And then about a week later Secretary Acheson said he was having a meeting with General Eisenhower and General Gruenther that morning, with General Eisenhower before getting ready to take off. Secretary Acheson of course had gotten copies of General Eisenhower's full agreement and all the papers that Dick Wallers and I had done about everything that had been said so he was fully aware of the results of trip, the initial part. So they came in and they had a talk about the various problems

and one thing or another. Then General Eisenhower said, "I'm going to ask a favor of you, I'd like to take Douglas MacArthur along with me as a political advisor." Acheson said, "General, if you want him you can have him. If he doesn't behave throw him out of your airplane at 10,000 feet without a parachute." So then it was suggested that, I think it was Mrs. Eisenhower suggested it, that Wally, my wife, and myself go over on the same ship, the Queen Mary, I think it was, if I remember correctly. So we all went over together to set up SHAPE, play bridge and have fun on the trip. We had a good suite and came out for dinner two times and so forth. He was still such an important figure that he would have been swamped if he'd spent his time roaming around the deck. Then we arrived in Paris and set up our first headquarters in a hotel just off the Champs-Ely sees which had been owned by the German Imperial family before WWI. And my wife and SHAPE started . . .

Q: Were you the head political advisor?

MACARTHUR: I asked the General how he wanted, I'd set up the business where I'd get a summary something like the Secretary of State's morning summary, and then the department told all the NATO countries and everything else to repeat it, everything from the Paris embassy for me that was of interest, directly or indirectly, to NATO countries. We were headed into the period of decolonialization then, where President Eisenhower understood so well what happened in decolonialization halfway around the world with the British or the French or the Belgians down in Africa or the Dutch out in Borneo and what's now Indonesia and the like. But all these

European countries, what happened could affect their economic, their political and their other interests and could have an indirect affect on SHAPE, on NATO.

Q: He understood that very well?

MACARTHUR: Oh, he understood it completely and that's why he said he wanted to be it and then he said that he would like . . . I said I'll prepare a summary for anything I get with the telegrams every morning and he said, "No, I'd like you to come in, you do your own little summary but I'd like you to have an oral briefing and bring the telegrams along in case I want to see them. But I want to be orally briefed so we can bat things back and forth and I don't want to read 'telegraphese'." So we had a regular routine. I'd go down to the embassy at 6:45 and pick up the telegrams and then I'd go to my office and my secretary would be there at 7:15 and I would dictate a little summary, usually try to keep it on one page, maybe four or five lines to a subject because there was some stuff in there was no point in bothering the General about, it was either irrelevant or it had been repeated to us. And then I'd go in and give him the little thing and then I'd brief him orally on it to a greater extent than just the sentence or two or three that were there.

Q: This would have been later in the morning?

MACARTHUR: Eight o'clock.

Q: Eight o'clock.

MACARTHUR: Eight o'clock every morning until about a quarter to nine, forty-five minutes alone. And I always sent a copy of the thing to General Gruenther, of the summary with the backup telegrams. Al liked to read and sometimes he'd want to read the telegrams too. So I used to greet him absolutely alone every morning and about forty minutes and then he would go on and have his staff meeting. The other thing that we did . . . he was very good about, when a foreign minister, everybody came down to Paris in those days, would beat their way to his door. Defense ministers, foreign ministers, sometimes prime ministers would come out. You know, the Cold War was getting colder and colder, or hotter and hotter depending on the metaphor. And he would frequently have them out for lunch. Mr. Churchill used come over and the fellows, and every week there'd be at least a foreign minister or a defense minister or a prime minister or somebody from the French side that wanted to see him, see the thing. And he'd have them for lunch or have them for a meeting and he was very kind and used to invite me to all these meetings, usually it'd be General Gruenther and myself. If we needed any interpretation always Dick Wallers, who is, you know, unbelievable in all languages. And it was a very pleasant relationship. On occasions, he and Mrs. Eisenhower would have Lauren and myself out to play bridge. The two ladies got along extremely well together and it was a very warm and friendly relationship. I want to mention just a couple of things that came up that stuck in my mind. I mentioned one of them, the fact that he was, well, in his presidency, when he became President, he was the first President for well over a hundred years that had any firsthand and real knowledge

of international affairs. We'd had a policy of isolationism since the beginning of our birth as a nation and Presidents didn't know anything. Eisenhower went in with a remarkable understanding of international affairs and forces. Not just the military and not business, the economic side, the political side and how economic difficulties would affect the political, but also the resources and assets that could be devoted to the defense through the NATO, SHAPE, and NATO forces and the like. And it was great fun, these morning briefings because I remember once he said to me, I was briefing him on the Middle East. He said, "Doug, when was the last time a Secretary of State went to the Middle East on a business trip?" I said, "General Eisenhower, no American Secretary of State has ever gone to the Middle East on a business trip." He said, "My God!" He said. "A whole defensive strategic posture is based on the tripod concept. North America - Canada and the U.S.; NATO Europe and Japan. And two legs of the triangle, the European leg and the Japanese leg are heavily, heavily dependent on Middle East oil and we're also becoming increasingly dependent." He said, "They're desperately dependent and if things go wrong in the Middle East," he said, "it could chop off two legs of the tripod and the tripod collapses." The sequel to that story is that when I got home after I was on the high seas, Eisenhower left in June '42 to come back and run for the presidency. Dean Acheson had sent him a telegram saying that Truman wanted me to go to Vietnam as ambassador. General Eisenhower sent me back a telegram which he purposely didn't show me until after he'd sent it because he said he didn't want it to be affected by anything that I might say or anything else. He wanted it to be his appreciation. And it was that General Ridgeway didn't have great experience in Europe and he felt that I should stay there in fairness to NATO for at least two to two-and-a-

half months to be able to go around with General Ridgeway; I knew all the people, the cabinet ministers, the defense ministers, and prime ministers and people, get an appreciation and then I could go ahead. So I finished that the end of October and headed home to go to Vietnam as ambassador. I got to New York and got word that the President-elect would appreciate seeing me in his headquarters at the Commodore Hotel. I went up there and after he asked me about how Ridgeway was doing and how NATO was going and how SHAPE was going and so forth, then he said, "You know Foster Dulles, don't you?" And I said, "Well, I've met him. In fact, when he came over to Paris for an occasion, in mid-49 or something I was assigned to sort of look after him. But," I said, "I don't know him well." And he said, "Well, as you know he's going to be my Secretary of State." He picked up the telephone and said, "Foster, would you come in?" So he came in and General Eisenhower said, "I've been talking to Doug about various things." And he said, "I've already told you I want you by the end of January. I'm inaugurated in on the 21st. I want you to take off on a quick one-day trip to each NATO country simply to reassure them of my continuing and abiding interest and so forth." Then he said, "Foster, I haven't talked to you yet about this. The second thing I want you to do, the second trip I want you to take is a trip to the Middle East." He said, "We've never had a Secretary of State who's ever been to the Middle East." And he said, "As you know, better than I do because you're an expert in foreign affairs, the Middle East is of vital, vital importance to us and our allies." And he said, "I think Doug can be helpful in arranging that. He can certainly set up your Middle East trip, your NATO trip, because he's done it for me when I was SACEUR. He did it all right. He coordinated all my trips." So then he turned to me and he said, "Doug, you know, I don't know

too many people very well in the State Department now." See, I'd been away from State Department for a long time. He said, "I know you're going, you're slated to go, to Vietnam as ambassador but you're so like an old shoe," he said, "and I'd appreciate it if you would stick around and we can decide later what you'll do but I'd sort of like to have you around because I don't know many people on the same basis that I know you and the department." So I said, "Mr. President, that's an honor [unintelligible], of course." So he said to Foster, "Would you call up the department to say that we decided that Doug will be working in the State Department with the White House and have them settle where it'll be at, the title or whether [unintelligible] or scrub the Vietnam assignment." So Foster Dulles got a hold of Doug Dillon, who was then Under-Secretary. Doug Dillon told me later it didn't come as a complete surprise. And so then I was assigned to the department.

Q: You were counselor?

MACARTHUR: I was counselor but they hadn't formalized that yet. That was the idea. But what General Eisenhower said was that he'd like me to be, there'd be things coming up and they had in mind counselor but they hadn't definitely decided on the title. It was a presidential appointment requiring Senate approval.

Q: Isn't that the equivalent of today's ambassador-at-large or something?

MACARTHUR: Well, they didn't have it in those days, they didn't have ambassadors-at-large. I was sort of floating so I went back, I had the counselor's office and . . .

[Interruption]

Q: You assumed the duties in the Department of State as housework but I was going to go back just one step, if I could, and ask you, you stayed on for a while at SHAPE when General Ridgeway

MACARTHUR: I stayed on and Eisenhower left in June and I left at the end of October.

Q: And you indicated in your remarks that there was a difference in experience, international experience, or expertise and so they wanted you there for some continuity, I think.

MACARTHUR: General Ridgeway had had those with little experience in Europe.

Q: He came from Korea, didn't he? Or where did he come from?

MACARTHUR: Well, he had been in the Far East and Korea and, where he did extremely well. He was a combat soldier but General Ridgeway had none of the background and experience that General Eisenhower had as a Supreme Allied Commander, commanding NATO forces, forces in

WWI in both war and peace. It's true, he did have a command in the Far East under the United Nations but that's quite a bit different. He was what you might call a soldier's soldier. He did not have President Eisenhower's breadth of understanding about the intricacies of an alliance which go far beyond just the military part of the total equation, the economic, the social, the political, and all the things that go in and affect the different national components of a unified force. For example, General Ridgeway decided, or Mrs. Ridgeway decided that she wanted to go down to Spain. Well, at that time Spain was under Franco. Several, I think the British might have had a labor government at that time, in any event, several of the NATO governments had socialist governments. For General Ridgeway to go down and vacation in Franco's Spain would have raised a firestorm. So when he told me that he planned to do this thing I said to him, "General Ridgeway, you can't do that unless you want to start a real, real firestorm, political firestorm in several of the NATO capitals." I said, "There's very strong feelings on the socialist party even where they're not a majority. And in some places there are coalition governments and in other places there are straight socialist governments and it'll just tear it." So he was not very happy with my comment but he came back about three days later and said, "What if I just go to Majorca?" I said, "Majorca won't raise any problems as long as you stay out of continental Spain." I said, "If you go on vacation to Majorca I don't think it will be picked up but if you go into Spain, inevitably it will, and of course Franco's government will try to exploit your presence there, showing support for him and one thing and another." So he ended up by going to Majorca. I mention that not only because with General Eisenhower it never would have happened. I mean, he would have known long before I did that the composition of governments and that sort

of a thing, with Franco and the present state of disrepute that he was in would have created very major psychological and political problems for him as Supreme Allied Commander.

Q: So he was more politically astute?

MACARTHUR: Much more politically astute. General Ridgeway, as I said, was a fine, decent kind of a guy which you'd like to have command your forces or command you in combat but he didn't have General Eisenhower's experience under those three teachers, rather difficult teachers, I mentioned; Roosevelt, Churchill and DeGaulle. To understand the multiple aspects of what can be construed a domestic political situation, what that will have on the leadership or the government of a country and, in turn, the effect that will have if the cause of that, of a lot of turmoil is the Supreme Allied Commander.

Q: Were there any differences in his day-to-day operational style?

MACARTHUR: Oh sure, General Ridgeway had a totally different thing. With General Ridgeway I'd go in and leave him a memorandum and sometimes he would glance and then say he'd see me later. His was a totally different business. He was used to reading papers, staff papers and one thing or another, and so with him my modus operandi changed from a forty to forty-five minute morning meeting with General Eisenhower where the briefing was largely oral with a one-page sheet with the subjects with a couple of sentences on them and where there was

a lot of back and forth and queries on his part about, what about this or what about that or what's our position with respect to some place in southeast Asia or wherever it might be. So General Ridgeway was more, what you might call, operated more simply as a soldier and not as what you have to be if you're a Supreme Allied Commander of allied forces of important friends and allies. He took everything from the military point of view. His assessments of one thing or another were from the purely military, or largely from the military point of view and not from the political, social, economic point of view, which you have to have to understand and move.

Q: You mentioned Southeast Asia and that reminds me that Eisenhower was very soon thereafter, as President, confronted with Dien Bien Phu and intervention question and his views reportedly are that since France had refused to come clear with its colonial interests, or declare an end to colonialism, that that was part and parcel of our . . .

MACARTHUR: I'm glad you brought that up because I hadn't thought about . . .

Q: At that time he was sort of getting immune to . . .

MACARTHUR: I was here as counselor of the department when the French sent General Ely over. Dien Bien Phu was surrounded and I was the department's expert, if you will, on France, or counselor, and General Ely came over and asked us to intervene at least with air forces to break or help break the stranglehold that the Viet Minh, as it was called then, had on Dien Bien Phu,

they had it surrounded. So President Eisenhower called a small breakfast meeting at the White House and that meeting was attended by the Secretary of Defense, and Admiral Radford, the Chief of Staff, Andy Goodpaster, Secretary Dulles, myself . . .

Q: Was Allen Dulles there?

MACARTHUR: And I believe Allen Dulles was there too, to discuss this French request. And the President wanted the views of everybody there and I remember that Admiral Radford . . . the President made quite clear that he was not enthusiastic but wanted their views before he made the final decision. And Admiral Radford spoke up and said that he had two carriers standing about two hundred miles off the coast and he could put carrier-borne aircraft that could put a pattern of carpet bombing around Dien Bien Phu where the Viet Minh had the French encircled. And I remember the President said, "We've got our own pictures, or some pictures that we got of Dien Bien Phu and the area around it, its jungle area." And Admiral Radford said that he could go ahead with this carpet bombing. He was all prepared to do so. And Eisenhower said in effect, "Have you lost your mind?" I don't think he used those exact words but, in effect, that's what he said. He said, "We know from pictures, we know the terrain. We know that it's like a jungle around Dien Bien Phu. You put your air carrier bombers in, they bomb and the fellows simply pull back and head into the jungle, we don't do any really serious damage to them. There isn't any concentration in the open that you can get at." And then he said, "When your planes go away, they move right back in." He said, "If we go in with carrier-borne aircraft or aircraft of any

kind we have committed the United States to military participation in that war." He said, "Aircraft will not do the trick." He said, "For the reasons that I've explained, aircraft will not do the trick." He said, "Then we have only two choices left." He said, "One choice is to retreat with our tail between our legs because it hasn't done any good, and it hasn't broken the siege; and the other choice is to go in since we've committed American prestige and if we retreat with our tails between our legs it will send a signal to all our allies that we're not very dependable. We promise a lot, but we can't deliver. It will have a devastating effect on some of our other relationships, alliances." "Or," he said, "we go in with ground troops." And he said, "As long as I'm President we will not go in with ground troops into Vietnam." And that was the end of that.

Q: Had he mentioned nuclear weapons at all at that . . .

MACARTHUR: At that particular time, I know at one, on one occasion Radford mentioned, I don't remember who at that time or not, but I know that Radford, not as a proposal but as one of the options that was open, we could use a small nuclear weapon on Viet Minh concentrations further away where we could do a lot of damage. And that one the President rejected and so did the Secretary of State. They both rejected that as being absolutely impossible to carry out and at the same time maintain a position of leadership because the fallout from the bombs . . . although we might call them small, what we call small bombs, were about 10 or 20 tons the size of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs and that there would be devastation and tremendous casualties on the part of the civil population as well as the military. But I don't remember that being in the

context of that particular meeting. I remember the issue but I just don't remember when it, when that one came up.

Q: I mentioned that I'd been at a history conference at the University of Maryland, the SHAEF organization, and one of the papers presented there was entitled "Eisenhower versus Dulles" and the fact that Eisenhower, the real hawk at Dien Bien Phu. It was saying that the conventional wisdom among historians is that John Foster Dulles was the hawk . . .

MACARTHUR: That's not true.

Q: . . . and that Eisenhower was the restraining force but this scholar sort of turned it on its head and said that Ike was the real hawk . . .

MACARTHUR: Well, he did turn it on its head because I was present at that breakfast and, as I said, there was only about eight or ten of us there: 'Engine' Charlie Wilson, I guess was the Secretary of Defense then, he didn't have much to offer but he did most of the speaking for the military; Dulles, myself for the State Department. I think Andy Goodpaster, I believe he was secretary to the Cabinet or something at that time, that I remember. And Allen Dulles, I think, was there too. But Eisenhower, I'll never forget, when he said, "We have only two choices; one to retreat like a dog with its tail between our legs because it's been totally ineffective and the effect that will have on the morale of our other allies elsewhere; or go in with ground troops. We

will not do it as long as I'm President." He made that very clear. And Dulles never advocated going in, but he didn't oppose it either. He let sort of Radford run with the ball on this one.

Q: My feeling about that is that Eisenhower's often, you can find documentation where he's talking about these military options, but he was a realist in the military arena and knew what it would take to be successful, and so he always mentioned it in this worst-case scenario, but it was never really a viable option as far as he was concerned.

MACARTHUR: No.

Q: Whereas Foster Dulles may have thought a partial military action would have been justified whereas Eisenhower wouldn't have gone for that.

MACARTHUR: Mr. Dulles was sometimes intrigued. I was very fond of Foster Dulles. I travelled about 80,000 miles a year with him sometimes, got to know him extremely well. But Mr. Dulles also was a man that liked to be challenged. His small morning staff meeting was just a few key people. He would come up with an idea that he'd been turning over and he'd sort of think out loud with us. That was the meeting we had the Under-Secretary and the geographic assistant's secretary, counselor in those days, and the policy planning staff. He'd come up with some things that Bob Bowie, who was a – you might want to interview if you haven't – was head of the policy planning staff. Willy Merchant, who is dead now, was a tremendously able fellow,

had the Secretary's respect. Herman Phleger, the legal advisor who was from California who is now a career person. But we used to, the Secretary would come up with some kind of an idea and we'd shoot it down in flames. I mean, I remember Herman Phleger kept saying, "You can't do that, Mr. Secretary. It ain't legal." Or Bob Bowie arguing against it or myself arguing against it and so forth. I mention this because several years later I was out in Japan and I was up to my neck in negotiating the U.S.-France security treaty. I came back for some consultations. I met with the secretary and I had a, as I say, a very close relationship with him, and he said, "Doug, would you consider coming back as Under-Secretary of political affairs in Japan?" I said, "Well, Mr. Secretary, I thought after four years of me you'd have enough of me forever and ever." I said, "Why in the world would you want me to come back?" "Well," he said, "Freddie Merchant is going to Canada as ambassador, Bob Bowie's going back to Harvard, Herman Phleger's going back to California, and I don't have anybody who tells me when I'm wrong." And he said, "I sometimes have thoughts or ideas of things, but" he said, "this is a very complex, very complex world. Every secretary of state needs somebody to challenge him and point out when they think he's wrong." He said, "The Secretary makes the final decisions but no Secretary can operate if he doesn't have people to challenge thoughts that he may have if they believe that they are not the right path to follow." So he was a man who we used to wrangle with. I say wrangle, it was good-natured wrangling if you will, but behind it there was really a strong feeling that this path or that one is not the ideal one for us to take. But in the business that we were talking about, the Dien Bien Phu business and that sort of a thing, I think he was probably intrigued by the idea of an American intervention because he had been one of the moving forces behind the concept of

the SEATO treaty, Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, which was designed to prevent or help avoid having a militant, Communist Vietnam expand on the domino theory and take over, you know, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia and the rest of southeast Asia. So he was intrigued with that. The SEATO treaty, of course, was a misconceived instrument. I negotiated it for the United States. And under the Secretary's instruction, guidance, I drew the first draft of the treaty. We modified as we went along.

Q: It was an attempt at encirclement but also . . .

MACARTHUR: No, no.

Q: . . . to ensure there was multilateral action as required.

MACARTHUR: No, it was an attempt to build up an alliance in Southeast Asia that could oppose Vietnamese Communist expansionism, Vietnam supported by the Soviet Union and so forth. And the great fallacy was that the principle people that were for it were the former colonial powers: France, Britain, the United States and the Philippines, and [unintelligible], and Thailand, and who else do we have?

Q: Was Australia in there?

MACARTHUR: Australia, New Zealand. But Anthony Eden blew it because without clearance with the people we . . . I chaired a working group here initially in Washington before we got down to negotiations, we had these meetings with ambassadors there and laid out a draft for them to consider and one thing and another. But Anthony Eden on his own invited Pakistan, India and Burma to be a part of this thing. That isn't really Southeast Asia, that's south of it. And India and Burma turned it down cold and Pakistan accepted, but for the wrong reasons. It accepted because it wanted to get allies against India and then we went through a process where I went out to Manila and negotiated all but one or two final points and then they had a meeting of the ministers, Secretary of State, and foreign ministers. And the Secretary put in a reservation saying that aggression in terms of the preamble and article so-and-so of the treaty, insofar as the United States was concerned, is Communist aggression. This led [unintelligible], the Pakistani prime minister to walk out of the room saying he wouldn't play and so forth. Well, eventually he was persuaded to sign the treaty but this made it clearer than ever that they, as far as Pakistan was concerned, they couldn't have cared less about Communist aggression. They wanted allies in the next go around they had with India. So it was flawed by a leading role that was taken by the predominantly colonial, two great predominantly colonial powers in the world at that time, Britain and France. ASEAN which is the, if you want, sequel or different option has only people from southeast Asia in that area in it and that's the value of ASEAN as compared to SEATO which was flawed from its initial concept.

Q: I think this same scholar at this conference mentioned that he thought the French, or that

Dulles wanted the EDC so much and that he was really just sort of horse trading with France to get them to give up colonial ties in Vietnam for the EDC, I think.

MACARTHUR: Well, let me say a word about the EDC.

Q: . . . the rearmament issue, too, I suppose.

MACARTHUR: You know, our whole support of European integration was largely based on the desire, and indeed the Marshall Plan was designed with the sense in that end to get Europe to give up its endless rivalries and wranglings but in particular we were concerned about the future of Germany. And this was before President Eisenhower was elected but it was very much a central theme in the Eisenhower administration. And the idea was that European integration, one of the great values that we saw was, if you had full European integration involving Germany the threads of Germany, which in the past had created a lot of problems, would be so thoroughly, if you had complete integration, woven into the threads of the other European countries that you would have a fabric and then even if Germany again suffered from some rather destabilizing leadership the cost of Germany trying to unravel its particular threads from a fabric of Europe, the economic cost and the social cost and the whole cost of the whole business would be so much that Germany wouldn't be able to detach itself and go its own sweet way as it had in 1870, 1914 and 1939. So then the problem came up of manpower, I say then, in this period, and the fact that we had to have a German contribution to the forces, the Allied forces, the NATO forces. And we

just, you know, we just couldn't do enough with the capabilities of the different countries, financial, economical resources and capabilities. And that quite aside from that, Germany was in one of the geographically most key positions and that its defense was important to its people and that it should make a contribution. Well, this of course, sent the French right up the pole and then there were all kinds of things. If I remember the EDC, the original idea came out of a talk from one of the French people saying well, break this thing down into small units so that there isn't any German army, you know, you have maybe a battalion level or maybe regimental level, you have different units and different things and put them into divisions and so forth, the dangers that the French foresaw after 1870 and 1914 and 1939 would be alleviated. I don't believe it came from a formal proposal but I think originally it was a French idea as a possible way of preventing the emergence of a strong German harmony which would be a part like the other national units of the defense structure. And then, of course, the French shot it down in flames. They weren't having any part of it. At that time, as I recall, no other proposal had been put up that would meet the objective of the EDC and there was a lot of strong feeling about shooting this thing down with nothing valid to replace it. Mr. Dulles certainly shared those strong feelings. I think the president did. I know he was struggling, trying to pull Germany into this thing and weave it into a European fabric, but we surmounted that cap. I was interested, though, what you said about this conference you attended, that they had a misconception about the president's role in Dien Bien Phu. Just 180 degrees off the beam.

Q: The historian who presented this took a lot of flak from the audience afterwards. The other

historians didn't agree with his thesis at all but he was pretty serious about it.

MACARTHUR: I don't know where he got his stuff.

Q: That was what the other historians said.

MACARTHUR: Yes.

Q: They felt that he had misinterpreted some things.

MACARTHUR: We were sympathetic to what the French were doing then. We sure as hell didn't want to see Vietnam go down. I mean, during that period when I was counselor I visited Laos and Cambodia . . .

[Interruption]

MACARTHUR: . . . victory there which we were much impressed with the domino theory, you know, that if Vietnam went then it would be Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand and all of Southeast Asia would go. Because if southeast Asia went the choke point for us in the tripod structure or strategic concept of North America, western Europe and Japan, the choke point for Japan for oil and raw materials coming in and things going out was the South China Sea. And if

you had that in the hands of an unfriendly power, and the problems even then were the Communist-supported business in the Philippines, both edges of that thing were in the hands of the Communist power. What the hell would Japan do? And what would we do if you had that sort of a proposition, maintaining some sort of a position in that part of the world with respect to our ANZUS obligations, Australia and New Zealand. So I think one of the things that Mr. Dulles saw at that time, which was erroneous, and he was not alone by any matter of means. He, and we as a government, tended to view Communism, particularly with respect to the Soviet Union and China, as a steel hard ball with no fissures in it and that here were one in Asia and one in Western Europe, in Europe, were bent on expanding Communist power so that eventually Communism dominated the world. And we didn't understand thoroughly enough in that period of time the fissures in the Chinese-Soviet relationship. Now it's true that some of those fissures didn't really emerge until after the, what was it, the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in '56 or '57 . . .

Q: I think '56 is the date that's kind of given for the Sino-Soviet split.

MACARTHUR: Fifty-six, and of course, from then the Soviets went into a slightly different mode, saying peaceful co-existence, which meant domination by everything except an overt attack on NATO, which would lead to mutual destruction with what was available at that time. So the view of Communism as a single-headed monster that was out to expand and strangle and take over the rest of the world, China with a major responsibility for [unintelligible] to the Far

East and the Soviet Union as far as eastern Europe and expanding into Africa and elsewhere and other continents, that they would take the lead in that. That was sort of an image that we had.

Q: And along with that there's been a recent scholarly article by a Professor Robert McMahon who is at Florida or Florida State, I'm not sure which . . . maybe even served some time as a State Department historian recently, but he wrote an article on diplomatic history, that's in the journal that SHAEF publishes.

MACARTHUR: Yes.

Q: He talks about in the third world how the government, our government, quite often assumed, didn't allow for any differentiation between Communist parties in different countries, in other words, that sort of overlooked the nationalistic makeup of maybe some of these, the monolithic view of the Communist . . .

MACARTHUR: Yes.

Q: And maybe that's part and parcel of this same issue.

MACARTHUR: Well, yeah.

Q: That was the times too.

MACARTHUR: We have seen one example that was foreseen by only one person that I know of, Bill Leonhart, who was the Under Secretary in the embassy in, came back about '46, '47, when Tito was considered an integral part of Stalin's boys in the block. Bill Leonhart wrote a very interesting article, he was in our embassy in Belgrade, on why there was a real possibility, not a probability, a possibility of Tito splitting with Stalin. This was almost a year before it happened, it happened just for the reasons he said. But basically at that time, as I say, we saw Communism as a single steel hard block with no fissures in it determined to expand and so forth.

Q: You were very much involved in the major power summits and conferences that went on during the Eisenhower years, the Bermuda Conference, and the Minister's meeting in Berlin, Geneva.

MACARTHUR: Yes. You know, the job of counselor is a funny job in the department. Every Secretary of State uses the counselor's position in a different way. And when I came there, perhaps because I had coordinated some of the president's trips at SHAPE and then he suggested to Mr. Dulles that I be charged with his initial trips abroad and then this led to, I sort of inherited a job that was coordinator of plans and policies for these NATO conferences and our meetings with the Soviet Union, which involved heavily, obviously, NATO. We never went into any conference in those years without having our own ducks in a line and then getting a NATO

working group or something, that we could they go over it so they would know, they wouldn't be caught be surprise by what they were doing and they could have their input. And then eventually we'd . . . the process was a very simple process in one sense and I'm glad you raised it because the president made a very, very important point back from the very beginning. The process was that there would be an interdepartmental committee of the interested ministry: State Department, Defense Department, Treasury Department, CIA would have representation on it, it would be at the assistant secretary level, and then Commerce perhaps if there were some economic or commercial things coming up. Whatever you needed in there that had a direct interest in it. And then we would try to thrash it out . . . well, I've started the second step. The first step would be within the department itself, if it were a meeting of NATO, it would be western European people, the policy planning staff, the various people within the department, one would cover the military view or regional affairs or liaison with the Pentagon. When we got our State Department position lined up and cleared with the Secretary, because there'd sometimes be disputes within the State Department and we'd have to decide. When we had a State Department position then we would move to interdepartmental needs, which meant in the department, I chaired the [unintelligible] meetings. The assistant secretaries would be there with an advisor or two. And there we'd put our paper on the table and then it would be discussed and then they'd go back and then we'd meet again approximately three or four days later when they'd cleared it up and down in their place and at the various things. And we would move along until we had something thrashed out. If there were disagreements, which on occasions there were between particularly State and Defense, then it would go to the two secretaries to be solved. But when

this business started out the first conference I presided over early in the Eisenhower administration, the President and I went over to Mr. Dulles and the President said he wanted me to coordinate the policy plans and policy for the meeting. And then he said, "Doug, there's one thing that I won't have." He said, "The purpose of getting a U.S. position is to get a U.S. position." He said, "I know your bureaucratic language when where there are differences you smother those differences with general language and then every department goes its own separate way." He said, "That's the sure road to disaster." He said, "I want, when there are disagreements, I want first to find out if the two secretaries or three secretaries, if Treasury is involved or somebody else, can iron out their difficulties. If they can't I want those issues brought with clear, separate and distinct positions that differ to me. And then I will decide what our position is going to be." He said, "The last thing in the world that we can afford is that wonderful bureaucratic language that you guys are so great at inventing where it's nice and general and it means everything to all people and each one goes his separate way." He said, "That's no way to go." When I was there in those four years I can only think of one or two occasions when it had to go to the President because the Cabinet members, and there were, I think there were two occasions, they were both Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State, going to the President for these differences and the President decided and you marched or you'd get somebody in there who would march. So this was a big improvement over recognitive language, everything to all people, you know, that we used to have before.

Q: That was probably more traditional in the past? It wasn't just the Truman administration, it

must have been . . .

MACARTHUR: Oh, no, I think it was traditional, historically. I think bureaucrats are good at that, having been a bureaucrat for many years I speak with some knowledge.

Q: Was the Bermuda Conference the first major conference that . . .

MACARTHUR: I can't remember.

Q: It wasn't '53 . . .

MACARTHUR: It was one of the first ones because it was before our meetings, yes.

Q: Was Churchill . . .

MACARTHUR: And of course, this one was a particularly interesting one for me because Laniel and Bidault, the French prime minister was Laniel and Bidault was the foreign minister. I had worked with them both in Vichy days and knew them intimately, really intimately, they were both close personal friends. And poor Laniel got ill and Howard Snyder, the president's doctor, had to take care of him and Bidault took over. Bidault was an arrogant little man. I would say arrogant in the sense that he, Laniel who was a very decent, nice guy but was not very versed in

international affairs, Bidault scarcely concealed his scorn for his prime minister at the conference table which didn't exactly enhance his image. But these conferences had finally, you know . . . you develop a framework to do this thing, the procedures, the state department's position and then the developing government position and then a working group with the representatives of the other people that are going to meet. This is for NATO and, or bilaterals with a particular NATO country or some other country and then, of course, when you move up to meetings with the Soviets, that's something else again. You go through more or less the same procedures. That is, your U.S. position, and then discussing it with your allies. Because the summit, the '55 summit was a quadrilateral summit. We had the British, the French, ourselves, and the Russians at that summit at Geneva, one of the early summits. And, of course, before that in '54 we had some meetings with Molotov and Gromyko and company but we did the same thing. And then we would have the meetings themselves at the summit meeting or foreign ministers meetings with the Soviets, it was a multi-lateral, not a bilateral. Then we'd go over what had happened, we'd go in with a common western position. Which generally held although sometimes got a little bit shaky for domestic political reasons or something else, that sort of bickering. But they generally held and then after the meeting was over we had our working group that would prepare and get ready after we had checked back with our own head men, secretary of state, or the foreign minister and discussed what had happened. We'd then go into another working group meeting preparing for the next day's meeting, sometimes the same night, sometimes early the next morning. So that when we went in there the Soviets couldn't pick us apart and get us wrangling with each other because we knew that these meetings we're going to be presenting a solid front,

this was of prime importance.

Q: These were mostly foreign ministers meetings with, Dulles would have been present?

MACARTHUR: Yes.

Q: Dulles, but not the President necessarily.

MACARTHUR: No.

Q: The President would have been at the summit?

MACARTHUR: The summit is the only for the President.

Q: When, you were at a couple of the summit meetings at least weren't you?

MACARTHUR: I was at all the summit meetings during the Eisenhower administration. I was at all the meetings at the foreign minister level with the Soviets, too, except one which dealt with Southeast Asia.

Q: What is your recollection of Eisenhower's performance at those, in terms of, he'd sit next to

John Foster Dulles and maybe . . .

MACARTHUR: Well, I think the President, at the Geneva summit, the president had Eisenhower on his right and he had me on his left. And we also had Harold Stassen who put in his two or three cents worth whether he had coordinated with Mr. Dulles or not. We'd have the Secretary of Defense . . .

Q: He has a book out now. Have you seen that? It just came out this last week.

MACARTHUR: Well, I think I was seated on the Secretary's, or the President's left because I'd been chairman of our working group and our representative on the international allied side and knew all the procedural and technical and other things. I think I was also there to be the lightning rod for somebody else while Mr. Dulles was on his right hand advising him and of course, we'd have the advisors and people. You've seen pictures of the summit, there are advisors [unintelligible]. But the one thing that the President, I think, did not want and Mr. Dulles did not want would be to get conflicting advice from the left ear and the right ear. So we handled it that way. I wanted to say one thing about the preparation for these meetings. At the beginning, the President had a lot of respect for Mr. Dulles who spent his life preparing himself to be Secretary of State, among other things. He had been a very successful lawyer in a very prodigious and prestigious law firm in New York. But when I first knew him they had a good, close relationship but it was not terribly informal. When we prepared for, I guess it might have been that Bermuda

Summit or something because it was the first, in any event it was the first summit meeting the President was going to attend. I'd been coordinator of plans and policies and then the Secretary said that we'd go over when we had our ducks all lined up. He'd go to the White House, he and myself to meet the President. And on the way over, in the car, he said, "I want you to handle the briefing on this. I'll make comments." I said, "Mr. Secretary, I wouldn't think of it. I mean, Jesus, you're the Secretary of State." And he said, "No," he said, "you briefed Eisenhower for over a year and a half every morning. He's used to you. And I will say that I asked you to make the presentation as the coordinator who put all these things together, knows the different views that have been reconciled and then he'll comment on them. I'll comment on them after you've made your presentation and then [unintelligible] the President." Well, that's the way it went the first time but the Secretary was really very good. You can see why he was a very good lawyer. And that rapidly passed away where I would go over with him that he would do the presentation, then we'd leave books for his advisors to look at and so forth. But when we would discuss the position we would take with respect to friends and allies on perhaps a NATO meeting, almost invariably the President would say, "That's fine. I like that idea. I think the basics are right. But why don't you just shift the emphasis a little bit on this because I think it would appeal more to the British," or the French or to whoever it might be and so forth. And almost invariably he improved our presentation. He had this sort of innate sense about things. He didn't deal with the nuts and bolts, change this nut and put a different kind of bolt there. But on the general business of how you approached the thing and how you presented it to them and the rationale and one thing or another, he really had always something useful and helpful to add. And this is

something that so few people know about him. You know, I think he's one of the most underrated Presidents in this field. When you look at his record over those years he did damn well in the field of international affairs, damn well.

Q: I think historians are getting a greater appreciation and new books are coming out about the hidden-hand Presidency.

MACARTHUR: Well, and with it all, you know, he had, I mean, he had a presence but at the same time the President had a warm human side to him that was extremely helpful in these meetings and things.

Q: I just heard recently, too, that he and John Foster Dulles may not have started off that close, or that warm a relationship. The first year was a little difficult or something.

MACARTHUR: Well, this is where I mentioned when Mr. Dulles didn't feel he knew him well enough when we went over to brief the President on the first time when the President was going to participate in an international meeting and Mr. Dulles said to me, "You do the briefing." It was exactly that point. Now this developed, of course, into a very, very close relationship later and the subsequent times the Secretary, and Bill Leonhart went over with him usually, but he would handle the whole briefing and everything. Mr. Dulles was a little bit nervous the first time because he knew that I'd been briefing the President alone for forty minutes in the morning, all

that period of time at SHAPE, and he hadn't and he knew the President was used to me in the capacity of briefing and it was exactly what you said. While the president had great respect for Dulles, his opinions and views and his capabilities, there was not that closeness that developed. It took about a year or so for that intimacy to develop to the point where it was there.

Q: In the discussions that you had with John Foster Dulles and then the observations of your seeing his relationship with Eisenhower, do you think that he always respected Eisenhower's opinions, that Eisenhower was definitely . . .

MACARTHUR: Absolutely. Mr. Dulles, and I should have mentioned this, Mr. Dulles . . . a trip we took abroad . . . I'm not just talking about conference. Maybe we were doing business in the Far East or Southeast Asia. Maybe we were going to the Middle East like we did in May and then on to Southeast Asia. Every night when we finished our day's business and we got back, ending up with a dinner maybe with the prime minister or the foreign minister, this and that and the other thing, Mr. Dulles, personally, would sit down with his secretary and dictate a personal telegram to the President outlining exactly, not going into all the nuts and bolts, but going into the basics and his impressions and so forth. He was meticulous about this. He respected the President and he's the only Secretary of State I've ever known that did that. He was absolutely meticulous about it. He was there to serve the President and when the President's decisions were made, there it was.

Q: From your perspective you could see that Eisenhower was definitely involved heavily in the foreign policy of the U.S.?

MACARTHUR: Yes, but he wasn't one of these people like Jimmy Carter that wanted to fiddle with all the nuts and bolts because the day for a President, the day isn't long enough. If it were seventy-two hours for a day it still wouldn't be long enough for a guy if he were getting into all the nuts and bolts. The basics and fundamentals and the principles involved and the basic positions you took the president was involved in but he was not involved in all the nuts and bolts. It was the basic positions and that's the way it has to be. If you're in a meeting and a nuts and bolts questions is raised by somebody you've got the advisors in the bureau, you have somebody there who knows the nuts and bolts answer to something that is relatively unimportant in itself but may be a link to something else that somebody else attaches importance to. The President . . . one thing though, he did not like to read long position papers. And that's understandable. I didn't discover it, but I learned that.

Q: He was a very critical writer or editor and maybe he thought there was too much waste in a longer paper, too much background and he liked to give . . .

MACARTHUR: I think you're exactly right. I think so many of those briefing papers, you know, Jesus, you've got a paper twenty-eight, thirty pages long. It's got a lot of stuff in it that is not new to him at all and it takes time. So we tried to keep our briefing papers, the size of them,

to essential points. And we'd leave them with him and I know that he looked at it them sometime. In fact, I know that he glanced through most of them. But he liked to talk and discuss because if you're reading something and you want the Secretary of State, well, what about this or why not that, or something like that, you know. He liked to give and take in the discussion part of a position. If there were some aspect that occurred to him that hadn't occurred to us which he felt the emphasis might be a bit different on. And of course, insofar as the treaty of cooperation and security that I was the negotiator for with Japan which is the basis of our business now, President was indispensable in that endeavor. If you'd like I could say a few words about that.

Q: Yes. Before we get to Japan I'm just going to ask about Christian Herter. Did you notice a difference in the State Department or maybe, you were in Japan when that changeover occurred but the relationship between Eisenhower and the State Department . . .

[Interruption]

Q: We were talking about Herter and Eisenhower.

MACARTHUR: Well, Eisenhower and Dulles ended up so closely together, sharing views and thoughts very often. Over that period of development from the President first assuming the Presidency with all the heavy responsibilities of foreign affairs across the board to go with it, it was an unusually close relationship. I think it would have been very difficult; Chris Herter was a

very decent human person, an attractive personality. But I think it would have been very difficult for anybody to follow in Dulles' footsteps. Because as I say, he had been in there from the Commodore Hotel and before the President assumed the Presidency and then he set down with the President [unintelligible]. Chris Herter was a very decent, fine man. I am not in a very good position to judge the relationship because as I say, I was in Japan, halfway around the world. I didn't have the feeling that it was as close as the relationship which had developed between Mr. Dulles, I don't mean that the President didn't have respect for Christian Herter, I think everybody that knew him did. But my impression, and it's only an impression, was that it wasn't quite as close and there wasn't the historical background of all those years that they worked together in foreign policy problems, Mr. Dulles and President Eisenhower.

Q: Did you notice a difference as an ambassador in the relationship, in your relationship with the State Department as Secretaries changed?

MACARTHUR: No, I didn't. I didn't. Of course, there was a difference in my personal relationship with the two because I knew Mr. Dulles so well. You know, I travelled those seventy to eighty thousand miles a year on those trips he took all over the world. I think I went on every trip he ever took except one to Latin America. You know, when the day's over and everything is up and you lift the aircraft wheels and you're on your way, it could be in the evening and we're going to perhaps sleep on the plane to the next destination. Mr. Dulles said, "I think it's time that we all had a drink." And we'd all gather in his cabin and we would have a drink

and talk about the events of the day, when you're living in an airplane and travelling around. Once we had the President's airplane, once we had the Joint Chiefs of Staff airplane with bunks and everything else and we were flying across the Pacific in it. In those days, you know, we were whirlybirds. It was before the jet age and trips took a lot longer to get from one place to another. But Mr. Dulles was not without a sense of humor, that's something. You know, he had that sort of austere, Presbyterian nose that he looked down at. I remember once we were very busy, I mean, he was an infatigable worker, worked every Saturday and Sunday. Sundays he used to have his meetings over at his house. Bob Bowie and myself [unintelligible] other people. But once we were preparing to go off on a trip and it's a tedious business if you're a coordinator of plans and policies because he would lay down certain deadlines for the position papers and everything. First to be gotten to the secretary so he could glance over them and be sure they were in keeping and then to go into his books so that if you're going into several countries, you know, he can refresh his mind it's all there. Very frequently in the bureaucracy the deadlines, you know, were four-thirty or five o'clock in the afternoon so you can get them put together by nine o'clock or ten o'clock or eleven o'clock that night. Papers don't come in, some do and some don't. And then the next day they don't come in until this and that and the other thing. We were headed off on a trip one day and we were, because of the time difference and the time that a propeller-driver aircraft took to cross the Atlantic and Mr. Dulles had said that he wanted me to take Saturday off because I hadn't seen much of my family and we were going to leave Saturday afternoon. And so I said yes, but I knew it was impossible because the papers weren't all there yet, they hadn't been put together and the ones he had made changes in hadn't been corrected. So

I had to go down there [unintelligible] eleven that night. Saturday, actually. And then something came up and the secretary thought I was home, called up my house and my wife answered, and this voice said, "Can I speak to Mr. MacArthur?" My wife said, "Who's calling please?" The voice said, "Secretary Dulles." She thought it was one of Mr. Dulles' aides. So she said to the voice, "You go tell Secretary Dulles that Doug MacArthur is down in that goddamn Department of State where he is every morning, noon, night, weekend," and so forth. And the voice said, "I'll convey that message to the Secretary." And I was sitting in my office, papers were coming in. It was about eleven o'clock in the morning and we were going to leave at four in the afternoon and I picked up the telephone and said, "Yes." And this voice said, "Doug, this is Dulles. Go home at once, your homefront is crumbling." And then President Eisenhower was not without his [unintelligible]. I was having lunch in the executive dining room and the message came that I was to join the President and the Secretary by 1:30. I joined the Secretary and the President in the President's office right away quick. There was a [unintelligible] waiting downstairs to take me up. Went over there and the President looks at me and says, "Doug, you're leaving for Paris in forty-five minutes." He said, "I've had Wally," my wife, "called. She'll meet you with a suitcase with your clothes at the airport. There's a car waiting to take you. Now I want to tell you what we want you to do." And it was tied up with Vietnam. All of the French had wanted us to intervene and everything and we were not willing to. The Prime Minister at that time was Laniel who was my friend in the Resistance days, and they ordered me to go over and say why we couldn't [unintelligible]. We weren't prepared to make available a very substantial amount of military equipment and so forth for the French forces. But they called me up and said I was

leaving in forty-five minutes. That's the way it went.

Q: And your wife would be meeting you at the airport with your suitcase.

MACARTHUR: Yes, and then, what she did, she got mixed up and I arrived in Paris the next day, I was in sort of an old beat-up suit. The wrong coat and the wrong pants were in the suitcase. And then another time the president wanted me to go over when the French were being very difficult to see my friend Chaban-Delmas, the speaker of the National Assembly. Jacque Chaban-Delmas, who was prime minister of France at another time. He was the youngest general in the French army. I knew him at the time of German occupation and the liberation. So, you know, something had to be done rather quick.

Q: You went to Japan in early '57?

MACARTHUR: Yes. I went to Japan in early '57. I got there and I, when I arrived there I had a rather unpleasant situation where a young GI named Girard had shot a poor old rag-picking woman on the range and killed her. This had clearly happened not in the line of duty. He was thoughtless, he had disobeyed orders to unload his rifle when he was off duty for lunch and he just picked it up and was sighting it. He told me he had forgotten to unload it and it killed her. And this clearly, in my judgment and in the judgment of the Japanese government, was not a business committed in line of duty and so forth. And the military were extremely insistent that

he be tried in a military court, U.S. court, not in a Japanese court. The Japanese were just equally insistent that he be brought to trial before Japanese court. We got ourselves under the State of Forces Agreement and it was clearly the case for the military, themselves, said it was not in the line of duty and he had disobeyed his orders. The military put up a big business so I called back home and talked to the President. The President saw immediately that you can't have a State of Forces Agreement and when it's violated say I'm sorry we won't observe it. And that isn't the way that you can make an alliance with . . .

Q: That was a sovereign nation . . .

MACARTHUR: So the President took a position on this, and he sent me over to the Armed Forces Committee, the Pentagon had been working on it and get them all churned up and I got them to understand the situation and so forth.

Q: On Capitol Hill.

MACARTHUR: Capitol Hill, yes. Armed Forces Committee of the House which the Pentagon had worked on. So that worked out all right and that was a very happy occasion. Actually, Girard got off a hundred times better than he would have under an American military court. He got three years suspended sentence and was expelled from Japan and that's all that happened to him, whereas in an American military court he would have spent some years, at least four or five

years, in the hoosegow.

Q: In Leavenworth.

MACARTHUR: After I'd been there a while it was quite clear that Japan was headed back to assume a very important role in the world.

Q: Can I just ask you about the Girard case?

MACARTHUR: Yes.

Q: Was there, the Japanese government, they were pleased with the way the case worked out but does that leave a permanent ill feeling there?

MACARTHUR: Well, I think it helped me in one sense because they knew that I had supported it and they knew that the military was putting up a strong resistance to the idea. And I think it did help the idea that I was at least being fair and objective with them as they saw it. So about ten days after I got there Mr. Kishi was made prime minister. They'd had a change in government. And I developed a relationship with him which, perhaps in part, was due to the outcome of the Girard case because the court had finally decided he was prime minister. So accordingly he got some of the benefits for this. We developed a very close and friendly

relationship and where he could talk with frankness and not so much indirection as sometimes happens. I'm a great admirer of the Japanese people. I think they're extraordinary quality but they're different. They're proud of that difference. They're the only nation in all the world that from the beginning of time, when, according to legend, some goddess came down and gave birth to the first Japanese, first emperor, their society has developed uniquely in their islands. It has never been affected by the melding influences of other societies, religions, philosophies, brought in either through massive integration into a country or by conquest. They've sat there in their islands developing their own unique way. They're different, but proud of being different. They're proud of today of being different. They think of themselves as different, this one has to understand. In any event . . .

Q: Had you been there before?

MACARTHUR: I went there first as a boy, twelve years old, with my father on my father's ship. He took a ship. In 1921 the Japanese minister of the Navy invited the Secretary of the Navy, the U.S. Secretary of the Navy and the Annapolis class of 1881 to visit Japan as guests of the imperial Japanese navy. And you ask why in the world did they do that? They did it because we forget, as Americans do, that just a little bit over a hundred years ago Japan was in feudalism. When the Emperor Meiji came back in 1867, '68 over to the Tokagawa shogun, shoguns had been ruling Japan for over fifty years, started modernizing Japan. Their army then, and navy, their army was bows and arrows and spears and swords and all that. Then he knew he had to

modernize so he sent young men abroad to get skills and come and bring them back to Japan. Among them was a man of a noble Japanese family, [unintelligible] family. He was sent to learn to speak fluent English and then go to Annapolis and he went and he graduated, he went in the early '70s and went to Annapolis and graduated in the Annapolis class of 1881. 1921 he was the minister of the navy so he invited all surviving members of the class of 1881 with their wives to come to Tokyo as guests of the imperial Japanese navy and my father was picked by the Secretary to command the ship that took them all out, the naval transport [unintelligible]. And the Secretary had a boy about my age and wanted to take his boy along but didn't want him to be the only boy, you know, and so my brother and myself took part and that was my first impression of Japan. At that time I remember several things: one; the night before the Admiral arranged for us to arrive on the fourth of July. And the night before I slept in the queen deck during June, July, on the trip out there. A long trip from Norfolk through the Canal, San Diego, Hawaii to Tokyo, to Yokohama. We were going to make landfall early the morning of the fourth and so I got up about 4:00 in the morning and I slept in the queen deck [unintelligible] and asked permission to go up on the bridge and I went up, the captain granted my request. I went up the bridge, went out on one of the wings and coasting along on both sides of us were two, long, low-lying grey destroyers, Japanese destroyers, two on each side, four, escorting us in. They had only two stacks, much shorter than our stacks, they were low. And I said to my father, "Too bad the Japanese had those old-fashioned destroyers, our destroyers have those high stacks, four of them sticking up." I said, "It's too bad the Japanese have those old-fashioned destroyers out there." And my father said, "Sonny, never underestimate the Japanese. Those ships are ten years in

advance of our destroyers." He said, "We still have four stacks because we haven't been able to design something that gets the four boilers out through two and the silhouette is much lower so it affects the wind resistance and one thing or another." He said, "Never underestimate the Japanese." So I went there but that's when I decided that I wanted to go into foreign service. And then I went out as counselor a couple of times with Mr. Dulles. We went on trips to the Far East. He stopped off in Japan. Mr. Shigemitsu was foreign minister then and he's the man that first raised in 1955, on a trip here, the possibility of amending or changing the U.S.-Japan treaty. Because the original treaty was signed by Mr. Dulles and Prime Minister Yoshida in 1951. The original, it was a straight military security treaty. And it was signed when Japan did not have a single man under arms and they asked us to undertake the responsibility, a heavy responsibility, of defending them in the event of aggression. In the middle-fifties the Soviet Union was on an expansionist binge and we undertook that. But in writing this treaty, which Mr. Dulles negotiated, the treaty was quite one-sided and enabled us to do all kinds of things without even consulting the Japanese because if you've got information or attacks or an early warning business, well, then you can't spend a lot of time unless you're going to take terrible losses, take it on the chin, going around trying to find somebody to consult with and get an agreement on particularly in a society like the Japanese where the decision-making process is not by majority vote or consensus. It sometimes takes a long time. By the time I reached there, Japan was on the way back to status as a major player in the international world, economically, industrially they were coming back. And they had, as contrasted with '51, they had their self-defense courses by that time. And it was a totally different ballgame. And then Mr. Kishi approached me after I'd been

there about six or eight months and asked to see me alone. And I went with just my interpreter and he had his, told me that he felt the time had come when we should renegotiate the treaty and make it on a more equal basis. Under the present treaty we could commit Japan to thermal-nuclear war without even consulting them. He wanted no misunderstandings and needed the protective umbrella of American power. But the Japanese opposition in the Socialist party and the radio broadcasts in Japanese from both Vladivostok beamed on Japan and from Beijing were attacking the treaty and saying that the United States was trying to militarize Japan and they were going to recreate some kind of a military system and so forth. And the unequal features of this treaty led to socialist propaganda in Japan. I thought about this for a while and he spoke to me again about it. I gave it serious thought and then I agreed with him and in agreeing with him I remembered some of my conversations with General Eisenhower at SHAPE that if a treaty was to be meaningful and enforceable it had to be based on those three principles; sovereign equality, mutual respect and each country seeing the treaty in its own enlightened self-interest. So after considerable thought Mr. Kishi said, "However, we'll have to honor Article IX of our constitution." That's a so-called no-war article, it says they can't have any military forces or anything like that. We had insisted on that in their constitution but when we got into trouble in Korea the Japanese then invoked the United Nations charter which gives every nation that's a member the inalienable right of individual and selective self-defense. So they had this self-defense force, small, fifty or sixty thousand ground force, sixty-five thousand ground forces, I think, at that time and an air force and a small navy. So sent a message, Top Secret Burn Before Reading, you know those things, to the President and the Secretary saying that I felt the time for

us to give serious consideration to either revising or having a new treaty. And then I was asked to come back to Washington and when I got back there, the Secretary wanted to see me, we had a meeting at the White House with the President on this thing but he wanted to see me right away. So I went to the headquarters there, the Department, and the secretary greeted me formally and then he said to me, "Doug, what's wrong with that treaty I negotiated in 1954?" I said, "Mr. Secretary, you're a great lawyer and you were such a good lawyer you got 95% of what you wanted for your client." I said, "Things have changed and it's just today too good to be true." A little pride of authorship there. I'll come back to this in a minute, it was an amazing story. So we went over to the White House and I laid out this telegram, two or three pages of basic briefing. The President asked me a few questions and one thing or another and he said basically, "I agree." And he mentioned again the three principles; sovereign equality, mutual respect [unintelligible]. He said if a party feels a treaty is not in its own self-interest or if a treaty is working against its own self-interest then it's unenforceable unless you land the marines. There's no way we can land the marines. And I pointed out that if the thing ever got out of hand, that our bases were such that they could be interdicted by simply cutting off communications, road and rail and everything else to our various bases. And that could be done by mobs who were simply trying to build up hostility and American reaction. So the president finally said, "I agree." "But," he said, "on one condition." He said, "We cannot go back to the Japanese unless we are fairly well assured that we've got a framework for a new treaty that the Foreign Relations Committee, leadership of the Senate on both sides of the aisle all agree." I had made a rough cut of a draft treaty but the principles laid down were not in the rough cut that followed. But the principles, which I said that

the treaty would have to be based was: one, it would have to be fully consistent with our other treaties in the Pacific, and NATO. Because if we had a treaty that was inconsistent we would run into immediate or contradictory problems with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; and the second condition was we had to accept Article IX of the Japanese constitution, we couldn't do violence to it because we had been responsible for that article, but furthermore, if we did it would look indeed as if we were trying to militarize Japan. The President agreed. So then I went over and saw the chairman, I think it was Bill Fulbright, Mike Mansfield. I saw the top three people on both sides of the aisle in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I saw the majority leader and minority leader of the Senate and I saw the speaker of the minority leader of the House. And Bill Fulbright put it best, I guess. I got agreement from all of them that we could negotiate within this framework consistent with our other treaties, that we would honor the Japanese Article IX of their constitution. And Fulbright said, "Well, there's no way any of us can say we give approval in advance to a treaty because we can't approve a treaty until we know what the hell is in it." He said, "On the basis of the framework in which you negotiate, we certainly feel that it is an adequate framework. Go ahead and see what you can do." So I went back to Japan, and this is where the amazing part comes in. I thought Mr. Kishi would be very pleased with this so I went to him and he was pleased. But then he said, "I have a little trouble with Yoshida-san." Mr. Yoshida was negotiating the treaty with Mr. Dulles. And I said, "What's your trouble?" He said, "Well, you have been very enthusiastic and two of the factions that are important, the Liberal Democratic Party and a series of factions, a sort of hang over from feudal days. It's not a political party in the sense that we know it as a grouping together of factions for immediate and .

[Interruption]

MACARTHUR: . . . was feudalism before the major restoration of 1967, 1968 where they, the feudal lord had his samurai swordsmen, the ones with the most swordsmen were the most effective ones and were the leaders. So the present system politically is sort of a throwback to that where you have a Liberal Democratic Party, basically middle-of-the-road conservative party, and they have their political samurai swordsmen, those are the members of the Diet that support them, that individual leader. And when I was there there were about seven or eight factional leaders, two of them were known as Mr. [unintelligible] Boys, Mr. Yoshi's Boys. So obviously he had a domestic problem within his cabinet because the factions are represented within the cabinet. Then this Mr. Yoshida came aboard, so I called up Mr. Yoshida and said I'd like to come down and see him and he invited me for lunch the next day. He had a little house behind the dunes at Oiso. And I got on an Army chopper and choppered down and I went up and he came down and briefed me at the little gate of his cottage down there. After the usual greetings he said to me, "What's wrong with that treaty I negotiated?" Exactly Mr. Dulles' words. So both those gentlemen had a little feeling of pride.

Q: Out of authorship?

MACARTHUR: Out of authorship. Yoshida said it in perfect English, he'd been ambassador at the Court of St. James's, he was flawless. So we got on and got moved ahead. But the military,

of course, understandably from their viewpoint they didn't want to lose any of these special rights and privileges, they had to do almost anything that they wanted. But the President, who knows the Pentagon better than any President we ever had, felt there was no problem, because there was no problem there. Tipped the sink back on one occasion, but they got over it and we got . . . I went out, this is the beginning of May, I was invited out by NHK, they did an one and a half hour documentary on the U.S.-Japan treaty, on the 30th anniversary.

Q: Is that their national television?

MACARTHUR: Yes, NHK is the Japan National Broadcasting Company, so they asked me to come out and spend a week out there and they did some stuff . . .

Q: That was the anniversary of . . .

MACARTHUR: It was very, apparently, I haven't seen it, it was in Japanese, of course, but I got several letters from friends in Japan saying it was a very good program and gave support to the idea that it had served the best interests of Japan over the years. See, it was set up so that it was good for ten years and then it could be denounced, abrogated by either side with one year's notice and it's still there. Although, as we move now into a new phase with the Cold War and particularly after, I think the Russians probably will give up those four little small islands that are causing so much trouble, the tail end, the very tail end of the Kurile. I think that Japan, as it

assumes an increasing role of leadership, world leadership, because it is a financial and economic superpower now. I think that our treaty relationship can be helpful, without any modification at all, to get Japan more into consultation on world affairs with our European and other allies. It's true, they are now in the Group Seven, in the OECD on economic things, they are in things. But Japan, as I said to them when I was out there because I saw a number of people and they asked me about this treaty, whether the treaty should be modified or changed or amended. I said I didn't think it needed any modification because I said, you'll recall when we drew the treaty, I drew the first draft of the treaty and we modified it and some of those things. But it is not a security treaty, it is a treaty of mutual cooperation and security, that's the big difference. And I took bits and pieces from the ANZUS treaty and our treaty with the Philippines, and NATO and other things but we start off with the preamble about contributing to world peace and stability and so forth and then purposely, and the Japanese fully agreed with substantive Article 2, we dealt with economic cooperation, which was more important now than ever. And we didn't get down to military cooperation until about Article 4 or 5, because I wanted and the President wanted, and the Japanese fully agreed, that this was more than just a simple military treaty. It was a treaty which embodied the very special relationship between our two countries, where we had mutual and common interests in the world as well as in the Asian rim of the Pacific that were valid and would remain valid in the field of economics and commerce. And we're an essential market for Japan. Japan is our largest market for agricultural products. Peace and stability in neighboring . . . the interesting thing is that Japan's neighbors have the same sort of fears and apprehensions and, "fears" is perhaps too strong a word, but same sort of apprehensions about

Japan, instinctive psychological concerns that the western Europeans have about Germany. Because a powerful and ruthless Germany has created a lot of devastation and Japan in the '30s and '40s did the same thing out there. We forget the rape of Nanking and instantly overrunning China and the Manchurian business and the rest of it. And they're the Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere in southeast Asia. And when I was there negotiating the treaty the Chinese Communist regime, Beijing on their radio broadcast in Japan, denounced me as a militarist that came from a long line of brutal and licentious soldiers and sailors and I was out to re-militarize Japan so they could be an American pawn in taking over the Asian rim of the Pacific and the rest of it. I was out there, I led a group of journalists out there about four or five years ago and I received a very warm welcome and that evening I gave a dinner and one of the people was a member of the Politburo, a colleague of Mr. Dang, and just before dinner, we had about forty people at this dinner, there were four tables of ten [unintelligible], his interpreter came up and said he wanted me to go into this little alcove-like room next to the place where the tables were and have dinner alone there. And so we went in and talked about the world and China and everything. And I said to him, "Mr. So-and-so," I said, "when I was negotiating the U.S.-Japan security treaty I was a villain, I was a very evil man. What do you think of the U.S.-Japan security treaty now?" I said, "It's been in place for about twenty-five years." And without a moment's hesitation he said, "We think it's an element of stability." I said, "Well, why do you think it's an element of stability?" He said, "Because as long as the United States is involved in the defense relationship with Japan the Japanese militarists can't run wild." It's very much the same sort of thing in Europe. The Europeans don't want Americans to get out. They want them to stay there.

Q: The Soviet Union has actually acquiesced and invited Germany . . .

MACARTHUR: They wanted us for the same reason. I think there's a general feeling, the psychological feeling going back to the past, which may be erroneous but it's there, and if you've got something in your mind or in your heart or in your breast that's gnawing at you, it's a reality whether or not it's true or not. The reality is that there is concerned nervousness about a united, strong Germany. And as long as the United States is in there and they're a part, and Germany is part of NATO, and it's in there with the United States, and the United States has forces there, then it's an element of stability and put that in there, the resurgence of ultra-German nationalism that [unintelligible]. It's the same sort of feeling over there, in South Korea, China, and so forth.

Q: During the administration was there a preoccupation with Europe? Was the Pacific or Far East neglected, from your perspective, do you think?

MACARTHUR: I don't think so because I've said earlier that I've felt that the, you see, we're an Atlantic and a Pacific power, both. Europe is an Atlantic one. We have a vital interest in what happens on the opposite rim of both the Atlantic and the Pacific, the western European rim of the Atlantic and the Asian rim of the Pacific. And President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles knew better than anybody that our whole security posture and strategy, if you will, our strategic concept was the tripod concept with North America, Canada, the U.S.; NATO Europe; and Japan. Because

there is no other way, without alliances on both sides of the opposite rims of the two great oceans, there is no way that we can project the deterrent effect of American conventional power. Sure you can say you have thermo-nuclear power but what you're talking about then is mutual assured destruction. You're talking about the end of the world in a certain sense. There's no way that American deterrent power of a conventional sort can be deployed from America's Atlantic or Pacific shores, the distance is too god-danged far. That's the problem we've got today in the Middle East. We've got no place from which American military power, deterrent power with what Iraq is doing, can be easily deployed to that area. We've got no place at all, no place to go. No Arab country has yet to do it. So the President, first of all because of his whole background and knowledge and contribution to the development of our strategic concept and the implementation of it and one thing or another, knew better than anybody else the vital importance of the Far East. And there was certainly no neglect on it and I was rather surprised when I was asked to go to Japan. I had let the President and Mr. Dulles know that I thought four years was long enough for anybody in a position in the Department, that you needed new blood and new things because I'd been in the bureaucracy long enough to know that inevitably you get into a sort of pattern, a ribbon pattern of thinking, a pattern of seeing things and one thing or another. And then they came up with the suggestion that I go to Japan, which was on the way back and where I represented our most important partner, friend and ally in that part of the world which was well on the comeback trail. We wanted to be sure it was on track.

Q: What were the major issues? An economic activist treaty was negotiated, there was textile

imports . . .

MACARTHUR: We had a problem. At that time Japan had a balance of payment deficit with us of about one billion dollars a year on trade, commerce. That was compensated for by the spending of our armed forces in Japan at that time. Today Japan bears most of the burden of the expense of maintaining our forces there. But at that time that one billion dollars, when you take the pay allowances and the spending of our troops and the facilities and one thing or another so that there was no tremendous trade imbalance at that time. But on the other hand, Japan on the comeback trail, a country whose whole policy was primarily and almost totally based that its recovery would depend on export, an export driven economy, where through their system were exercising restraints. They had great access to the American market but they were exercising restraints on imports from our country and from abroad, but particularly from our country because we were their biggest trading partner. And at the same time they were flooding our markets with textiles, that was before, when I was there Japan was one of the cheapest places to live in the Far East, it's unbelievable. So we had trade problems and we had the constant problem of the Socialist Party which was dominated by Moscow in Beijing. Communist . . . while it was a socialist party their whole policy was one hundred percent right down the line. The translations were virtually the made in Moscow or Beijing. That's changed now, happily. It's still a leftist party but the dominant position that the Communist propaganda had and the position that they took, position of the Socialist Party was indistinguishable from the position taken by the broadcast in Japanese from Moscow and Beijing. That's changing, has changed.

And with Mrs. Doi, the Socialist leader, you get somebody who's quite different from Asanuma, the man I had to deal with, who was a complete stooge of the Communists. But . . .

Q: One incident that did occur while you were over there was Little Rock. Did that have a fallout in terms of the, our treatment of racial minorities?

MACARTHUR: Which?

Q: In '57, the Little Rock incident when Eisenhower had to send troops into Central High School and I'm wondering if that had any . . .

MACARTHUR: Well, I'm sure it was exploited by the radio. I don't recall that with the average Japanese it made much of a dent, no. Now, we did have problems with textiles where they accepted "voluntary" quotas. I discovered through the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan that among other things, Japan then had one production line for automobiles, for passenger cars. They had a lot of trucks and van-type things. They had one line in Nagoya that produced 35,000 cars a year, that's all, modeled on the Ford line, which Mr. Ford invited the Japanese to come and helped them take blueprints of. I went down there shortly after I got there because I've always had an intense interest in the economic side of our relations with other countries because politics, domestic and foreign, are driven by economics with great revolutions driven by economic deprivation and disasters. And I went down there and they tell me with great pride that they'd

already eliminated two of the assembly stations that Mr. Ford had on his line and they were in the process of eliminating a third. And this was in '57 and they didn't start exporting cars in this country until almost twenty years later, in the seventies, early seventies. I said, "Well, how did you do that?" They said, "Well, we found that in certain places there were this part, and that part and sometimes a third part and they had to be put together so you had to manufacture the parts separately. Then you had to have the labor of assemblymen and then you had to put them together and we found that we could design a single part that was much more dependable that would do the trick and so forth and we eliminated both the manufacturing side of these separate things and the labor involved in assembling them." So, you know, let's face it, I don't know why we didn't think of some of these things.

Q: You had a preview of what lie ahead, it sounds like.

MACARTHUR: Well, one of the things I found, they were ultra-protectionists. You see, they had a thing that we used to call in the embassy Japan, Inc. Japan Inc. was the ministry of industry of trade that laid down policy and then the bureaucrats would design specifications that were unique to Japanese products. Or regulations, for example on cars. The president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan came and said, "We can't bring in any car from America," and they were producing, as I say, only this 35,000 a year, these little Toyotas. They were a far cry from what a Toyota is today. "We can't bring in a car because MITI's got a regulation that you've got to own the car personally for thirty months before you can bring it in."

It wasn't a question of tariff, it was this regulation. And this was the way they did it, by designing regulations or specifications which prevented imports while they developed their exports and developed their product for eventual export and then targeted a market. So I went to Mr. Ikeda, who was prime minister, and said to him, "Look, I can't take this. If you don't do it I'm going to recommend a hundred percent rise in the tariff on textiles." Which is one of their big exports there before it went off to the lower, to the NICs, the Near Industrialized Countries, lower wages and so forth. He said, "You know, you can't do that." I said, "Well, I'm sorry. Six weeks and if it isn't done I'm telling you quite frankly in advance that I'm going to inform the prime minister and I'm going to recommend a hundred percent increase in the tariff on textiles." And then I got word in about three and a half weeks that the rule had been changed.

Q: That probably happened more than once, that sort of thing?

MACARTHUR: Well, it was a highly protected market. I'm the first to say that we were not the most skillful people in marketing out there. And under the Japanese system where they're loyal to their company, you know, its life employment in those days. It is beginning to change now. You couldn't get any Japanese managers who would leave their company to go and work for you. I mean, our headhunters that we have over here that go in and see a guy in a company that's doing a great job and somebody else needs the guy and he's CEO and they do this and they do that and go in and make an offer and the guy switches over. Under the Japanese system it's life employment; loyalty and fidelity to the company. On the other hand though, when I was there

Sony had 775 employees. I don't know how many tens of thousands they've got now. It was founded by Ibuka and Morita. Akio Morita, I know him well. I saw him when I was out here in May. He invited me down to Nagoya and showed me a new line. But they founded the company after the war, '46 or '47. Their slogan was "Research makes the difference." And it does.

Q: Yes, it sure does. Was there joint Japanese-American concern about the economic development in southeast Asia? Any efforts in that regard?

MACARTHUR: Well, we were doing it. That was before the time that the Japanese had much of a subclass. They had a very definite interest in southeast Asia. They always have had, and in China, even with a Communist regime that was hostile to the government. That interest was a natural sort of hinterland and marketing place. That was before the NICs had fully emerged in the re-industrialized countries; that is South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, that have emerged as small industrial giants in their own way. But the interest was certainly there. And it's been there, with a country that sees itself as having to trade to live because it's got no raw materials, because it's got no energy. It's eighty percent mountainous and you've got half the population condensed in an area, total area, which is the size of California but of which only twenty percent is arable and livable. That's probably why the Japanese are so polite, if they weren't polite they'd kill each other, being crammed together that way. But the interest is there.

Q: What was the Japanese view of the Eisenhower administration, the Japanese's governments?

MACARTHUR: They thought very highly of the Eisenhower administration. The Eisenhower administration had shown understanding on the Girard case. The treaty had accepted Article IX of the treaty. And I'd like to say just a word about the failure of the President's visit to materialize.

Q: That's right. I wanted to ask about that too.

MACARTHUR: Because there was a great deal of misunderstanding. When the treaty was finally signed in the White House in January, Mr. Kishi invited the President to visit Japan. The President said, well, he accepted the invitation but on timing he didn't want to be there until after the treaty had been ratified. Because he didn't want to have an American presence injected into what by that time was quite clear would be a great effort on the part of the left to create problems in the ratification process. So Mr. Kishi thought and then said, "Well, if you come in June we're going to have the ratification process finished by the end of March, then April, May, and you come about the middle of June and everything. Sure, we'll have some demonstrations and some turmoil, but it'll all have quieted down." So that was the basis on which the president accepted the invitation. That the treaty would be out of the way, the ratification by the Japanese would be completed almost three months before he got there, hopefully three months, but at least two and a half months. If that there had been demonstrations they would have quieted down, there'd be no problem. So we went back to Japan. Well, under the Japanese system of decision making, as I mentioned earlier, the decision making process is totally different from ours. It's not by majority

vote, it's by consensus. And in the cabinet when I was negotiating the treaty, which took a long time, almost two years, that was one of the reasons why it took so long. One occasion, in a cabinet of twenty-four, two or three people have reservations and wouldn't say yes and everything stopped until they withdrew their resolutions and went along. So Kishi got back there and the thing was put into the Diet machinery and then what happened? The Socialists said they couldn't accept it and they refused to let it be brought to a vote. And days dragged on and February came and March came and the end of March came and nothing was happening. The debate went on and on and on, but endlessly but the Socialists would not agree to a vote on the treaty where they would be defeated. And under this consensus business they didn't agree or had to work out some fashion where they did agree to a vote, but they wouldn't agree. And so then we went on into April and I was getting extremely concerned because the modest demonstrations and there was the propaganda in the thing and Moscow and Beijing beaming in a lot of stuff. And finally we got into, I've forgotten the date, and Kishi then started getting desperate because the president's visit was approaching and so forth. And then Jim Hagerty and what's his name? Appointment secretary?

Q: Thomas Seaton.

MACARTHUR: Yes, came out and I sent a telegram to them before they came saying that we could expect demonstrations when they came in and I suggested that they land at Itazuke, one of our air bases. I'd bring them in from there and I got message back from Hagerty saying, no, he

didn't want to do that. He didn't want to sort of slide in through the back door and if there was going to be trouble, he wanted to see it. So, okay, I had a chopper stand by out there in case we .

[Interruption]

MACARTHUR: . . . thousands of people were marching toward the airport here and two thousand over there, fifteen hundred. We got to the airport, no problem, and got Tommy Scaton and Jim Hagerty into the car and we started back and we went under a tunnel which goes under one of the runways, and came out on the other side and there was a crowd of about five thousand people. And they were all chanting and everything and they got in front of the car and there was no way we could go on. Brought the car to a halt when they started hammering with sticks on the car and shouting and jumping on the roof. They obviously had instructions not to physically harm us because they could have. They could have turned the car over and done all kinds of things. And in fact, they were, one guy was dancing on the roof. There was an American correspondent right up there taking pictures of Hagerty and company and myself in the back. These guys dancing on the roof and one of the American correspondents put his hand up and the guy dancing on the roof jumped and smashed on his hand and he let out a yell and the Japanese dancing on the roof, I was told later, bowed to him in apology.

Q: That's very civil.

MACARTHUR: But finally the police arrived and they built a little cordon about as wide as from here to the bookcase. Just a thin line of police for this huge mass, by this time about ten, fifteen thousand people and there were choppers, a line of police over to the chopper. They were throwing sticks and things at the chopper's blades. And we finally got there and they could have, as I said, taken us at any time they wanted to but they didn't and we got in the chopper. We got back into Tokyo and as the blades wound down one of them fell off, which if it had happened a minute earlier we would have been eight hundred feet up in the air and that would have been the end of us all. I had recommended then . . . well, then we went on to the business of the . . . I can't remember the exact chronology of the thing culminating in when Kishi forced the vote through the House of Representatives, which came as an unexpected thing because that just wasn't Japanese, it wasn't consensus and so forth. But he got desperate and forced it through. Then there was a serious riot and a girl got trapped over that, by the rioters. And so I went to see Mr. Kishi and I said to him that the whole purpose of the President's visit had been based on his assurance that the thing would all be done by the end of March and here we were with the thing just several weeks away and I felt that the visit should be postponed. We won't use the word cancel. "I think the visit should be postponed." And Mr. Kishi said, "Well, is this the President's view or your view?" I said, "It's my view. I'm talking to you about it because I'm going to make this recommendation to the President and I wanted you to know about it. I think it should be postponed." And he said, "Well, I can understand. I want to know what the president thinks about it." So I sent a telegram off explaining what I had done and got one back very swiftly from the President saying that he approved of the position I had taken. That came in at night, and by

early the next morning a follow-up message had come in saying that, "I approve the position you have taken. If, in Mr. Kishi's judgment, the postponement of my visit will lead to the non-ratification of this treaty and the breakdown of security relationships and things, then I'll come regardless of the risks, personal risks and other things involved." Well, in retrospect I should have gone back to the President and said, "If I put this to Kishi he's going to automatically say yes, come along." But I didn't and I told Mr. Kishi that I had promised I would put it to the President and the President agreed that the situation was extremely difficult and not propitious, but if in Mr. Kishi's judgment it would lead to a breakdown of the whole security relationship, then the president would come. Mr. Kishi said, "I must think about it." Then he called me back, I think it was later that day or later the next day, I think it was, said that he had thought about it and he felt the President should come. So then I couldn't tell this to the press and the correspondents but I had recommended that he not come and the position the President had taken, it just wasn't the time to get all that into the public sector and I didn't think it was fair to the president either. But instead of getting better the rioting got worse. And Chris Herter was very worried about it and I said, "Look, I think that it's up to the Japanese," the position I took, "to call the visit off." I said, "If we call it off it will show a total lack of trust, confidence in Japan and so forth. And I think until the very end, it has to be cancelled at the end, they should be the ones to do the cancelling, or saying that they have suggested we call it off because of obvious reasons." I said, "We can tell them to say it's a postponement." Well, finally the thing got so bad that Mr. Kishi called it off. It was just a few days before, the President was in the Philippines. The interesting thing is that this was then Kishi resigned and new elections were

held.

Q: Was it as a result of the whole . . .

MACARTHUR: As a result of this business and the only issue within the election was the treaty.

Q: Had it been ratified in the meantime? Or he forced the . . .

MACARTHUR: It had been ratified, oh, I should have said that, when he forced it through, when he got the Liberal Democratic . . . See, what happened was, Kishi decided, finally, in desperation to ask his party to ratify whether the Socialists agreed or not. And so they, the party said yes. And then they went to get the speaker of the house to hold the business and the socialists had locked him up in a room in the bottom of the building so that he couldn't get in and convene the assembly. The police were then called in to liberate the speaker and a tug-of-war went on with the poor old man, he was an elderly man, until he was pulled across the threshold of the Diet. Once he was inside the vote was held and the treaty was ratified. But the Socialists, when they saw him go across, they all walked out. They walked right out so they wouldn't participate in the vote. But then they got the Socialist paper and they got *Asahi*, which was a very important paper, to publish the story saying that the Kishi government had called in the military and the police and physically thrown these guys out of the Diet building thus violating the most basic elements of democratic society and all the rest. So that was the kind of headlines

in the *Asahi* and, of course, immediately from the broadcast in Japanese from Beijing and from the Soviet Union. So there were all these riots and things running around. I used to go out, they'd have six hundred guards around the embassy, I used to go out on my rounds in a big crowd. I say big crowd, that's five to six thousand people outside the embassy. And as I drove out through the thing I would bow to them and they would bow back and then they would go on snake dancing. There was a strange business. But then the upper house didn't have to do anything under the Japanese system if the lower house is ratified the upper house can reject it and it will have to go back. But if they do nothing and a period of thirty days passes then the treaty automatically, the action is automatically approved by both houses. And so that's what happened. But poor Kishi was finished. He sat all alone until the final ratification, the final thirty days had passed and the treaty was ratified, and then he resigned. In the meantime somebody stabbed him in the leg which the Japanese considered a mortal insult. They stabbed him in the fanny, while stabbing him . . . He made a very courageous stand and his friends in the Liberal Democratic Party, which I said, is the grouping of a bunch of factions, each one with a leader who had ambitions to be the next prime minister. They all virtually, all but one or two, couple of them, sat there on his [unintelligible] stayed with him. And then the elections came and the Liberal Democratic Party, the elections being fought on only one issue, the treaty, came back with I believe it was thirteen more seats than they had before the elections were held. And the minute the treaty was ratified the snake-dancing and all the rest of it and everything had quieted down, you'd have thought nothing had happened. It was, in a sense, the media, the boob-tube which concentrates on action because that's what makes peoples hearts pound, they

portrayed these mobs and everything, snake-dancing, Tokyo was then a city of about nine and a half million people and there were probably at one time never more than thirty thousand people, forty thousand people, or something like that, involved in these things. But if you see them clogged up in a narrow area it looks like the whole world is coming. In the Ginza I'd go out and get away the embassy and the Diet building, you know, it was business as usual. But that isn't the way the portrayal of it was.

Q: In the western media . . .

MACARTHUR: Well, I think it's, you know, I think, when you have an action media, which is what television is, then you concentrate on action. And that gives you a picture. But the difficulty is that it may give you only a small picture of the total picture, the reality. But that's what people see and they take it as the whole picture. And I think that's the nature of the media. Who the hell wants to sit in front of the television and hear some guy pontificate for a half hour? He could be saying some very interesting things, you turn it over to another channel where the action is, where there's something going . . .

Q: A car chase.

MACARTHUR: That's right.

Q: But you do think that the Japanese government had a favorable attitude toward the Eisenhower administration?

MACARTHUR: Oh sure. No question about it. They were very desperately embarrassed about having to call off the visit. They thought they had lost a lot of face. And I think, when President Eisenhower died, the tributes paid to him and so forth in the Japanese press and media . . . I forget who they sent over now to the president's funeral. But no, he was considered a top flight human being and a friend of Japan.

Q: The crown prince visited, was that before you were there or was that after?

MACARTHUR: The crown prince came over . . . No, I came over with him.

Q: Okay.

MACARTHUR: He came over, I have a picture of him up there he gave me after the trip. The one with the President behind over there, one of Mr. Dulles and Mr. Kishi and all the staff, I'll show them to you later. The crown prince came over and I escorted him around on his visit here and his lovely wife, Princess Michiko, now the empress. And he, of course, speaks some English, which his father didn't. His father was brought up in the old days behind the silken curtain. The crown prince, who is now the emperor, it's a new generation and one that was

different from his father's generation. His father was really still a hangover from the old days where the emperor, you know, when he passed along the street everybody had to put their eyes down so they didn't look at him and all that stuff. It was changing when I was there, but the crown prince grew up in a different era, post-war era. He was a very nice young man. I enjoyed my trip with him and his wife, who is charming. I attended their wedding banquet.

Q: Hirohito was still alive the whole time you were there?

MACARTHUR: Yes, he was emperor.

Q: Through the mid-70s or something?

MACARTHUR: I beg your pardon?

Q: Was it through the 70s that he was, he just passed away not that long ago.

MACARTHUR: I beg your pardon?

Q: Hirohito?

MACARTHUR: Yes.

Q: He was there . . .

MACARTHUR: Oh, he was there for seventy-some years or something like that.

Q: Did he, he passed away in the last several years or how long ago?

MACARTHUR: Oh, it was just a few years, short years ago. Last several years, a few years. I'm so old now I can't remember, the years pass so quickly. But it has not been very, very long. I think maybe four years, something like that, three or four, something like that. I still have the little silver thing with the imperial crest, my wife and I each got one when we attended the wedding banquet of the crown prince. That's a habit they would do when they had special occasions. But President Eisenhower was a friend of Japan, a man of great stature. And, of course, with the Japanese, even though they demilitarized and everything else, there was admiration for his war record. He was known as a courageous and gallant leader. On top of that, the man had deep understanding so he was a very well-seen figure there.

Q: Was his age, you could use for venerating him too because he was a little older, or is that more of a myth?

MACARTHUR: No, it isn't a myth insofar as the Japanese go. It's changing now but when I was there the average CEO of a company . . .

Q: You were a young ambassador probably?

MACARTHUR: . . . in their seventies, these guys that you dealt with. Nakasone was later prime minister whom I saw when I was over there four or five years ago. He was the youngest cabinet minister Japan had had. He was forty-one, I think, when I was there. He was head of the Science and Technology Agency and then later became head of the Self-Defense Forces Agency and eventually prime minister. But the average age of the, you know, the leadership is in the sixties and in some of the industrial companies it'd be in the low seventies. Sony was an exception with Asio Morita and Ibuka, but they founded it as relatively young men after the war.

Q: I think that you covered this very well.

MACARTHUR: Will you take care of editing it?

Q: Yes.

MACARTHUR: Because it'll, you know, there are a lot of um's and uh's and there may be some repetition.

Q: Right.

[End of Transcript]