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GERARD C. SMITH

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
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This is an oral history interview conducted by Mack Teasley of the Eisenhower Library with Ambassador Gerard C. Smith in Washington, D.C. on May 8, 1990.

MR. TEASLEY: Well, thank you very much, Ambassador, for agreeing to an interview with us, and maybe we should start by asking when you came to the Eisenhower Administration and how that came about.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: In 1954 I had been working for the Atomic Energy Commission and a fellow name of Arneson, A-R-N-E-S-O-N, who had been involved with the Manhattan district was [Dean] Acheson's special assistant for Atomic Energy affairs and I think when Dulles took over he wanted to have his own man in that spot and he asked Lewis Strauss, who was chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, if he would recommend somebody and Lewis Strauss recommended me for the job. I went over and was interviewed by Dulles in April 1954 and that's how I got started.

MR. TEASLEY: I guess one of the first things that you worked with then was the Atoms for Peace proposal, probably. There's been some debate on whether that was a serious proposal or whether it was for the propaganda effect. Do you have a feeling on that?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: First, let me tell you about my first contact with it. I was still with the Atomic Energy Commission, it was December of '53 and Beetle Smith, who the deputy secretary of state, called me up and said that the President was going to talk on atomic energy questions at the U.N. and it fell to my lot to read

the speech just as he was giving it to the Atomic Energy--the five commissioners. They hadn't been consulted at all about it except for Strauss. He had gone up from Bermuda with the President and I think worked on the speech and he was well acquainted with it but the others were flabbergasted. They hadn't heard about it. One of them, Harry Smythe, who wrote the Smythe Report after the Manhattan History. I'll never forget his observation was a thoroughly dishonest speech. Years later, I asked Harry about that and he didn't recall ever having said that because he became a part of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], I think. He was the U.S. representative over there and he wanted to forget that. But he was a wonderful, very knowledgeable physicist, but his first reaction was, it was dishonest because it did not look at the question about how do you separate peaceful uses from military uses of atomic energy. And the first thing I heard about it after I got in the State Department in April of the following year, Dulles called me in and he said he had just had a meeting with Molotov who asked him, "What do you Americans think you're doing proposing to spread stockpiles of bomb-grade material all over the world under the Atoms for Peace?" And Dulles said, "That isn't true, is it?" I had to say, "Mr. Secretary, I'm afraid Molotov is better briefed technically than you were because there is a real problem about what you do with a lot of fissionable material that will be needed in reactors that they're proposing to set up all over the world." So he said, "Well, draft a telegram to Molotov." And Phil Farley, who

was my deputy, and I sat down and we scratched our heads and we finally wrote a telegram to Molotov saying that "ways could be found", and we're still trying to find those ways! You asked was it done just for public relations? I don't think so. I think that Eisenhower felt a very heavy burden of the terrible destruction of atomic energy and he wanted to show that there was another facet of the whole problem, that it could be used to the benefit of mankind. And so he was intrigued with this idea. I think it was probably C.D. Jackson or Nelson Rockefeller, that's the sort of mentality that's, "Oh, this is a great way to get rid of all this bad publicity that we were getting." I think it was about that time that we, or shortly thereafter perhaps, that we dusted that Japanese fishing boat with a big explosion, the Fortunate Dragon, I think that was . . .

MR. TEASLEY: The Lucky Dragon or the . . .

AMBASSADOR SMITH: The Lucky Dragon. Things were getting pretty rough on the public relations front, but it was certainly not exclusively that. I think Eisenhower felt that there were tremendous benefits for mankind, which has proved to be the case. In medicine, atomic energy has been a tremendous help. In nuclear electric power. I happen to believe in nuclear electric power although after Three Mile Island and Chernobyl it's not very popular. But if we're really interested in cutting down on the environmental effects of generating electricity, this is the answer,

where you get a clean product. If enough care is taken in the design and operation of nuclear power plants, I don't think they should be more dangerous than coal-fired plants. A great many people as you know are killed each year in connection with the coal cycle and nobody has ever been killed in the atomic energy cycle. The United States Navy has been running submarines now and surface ships for thirty-three years, I guess, and never had a serious accident which is a pretty good record. So Atoms for Peace got off to this rather shaky start and then we negotiated the convention, the IAEA set up a specialized agency in the U.N. in Vienna.

MR. TEASLEY: And you were the deputy chief of the U.S. delegation for that, weren't you?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: That's correct. Jerry Wadsworth was the head of it and we negotiated with the Soviets and a lot of other countries for about a year, I guess. And that has turned out to be, I think, a great success. It's been the most efficient of the U.N. agencies. It has a large safeguarding group of inspectors who go all over the world to try to make sure that there are no diversions from peaceful uses to military purposes. As a matter of fact, the proliferation that has occurred has not been from peaceful uses programs. Although some countries tried to use that argument. Indians, for instance, said their explosion in '74 was for peaceful uses purposes. Well that didn't fool anybody, that was a rationalization. But as far as I know there have been no

significant diversions from Atoms for Peace programs to the military. You can't completely separate these things because if an engineer is trained in a nuclear power plant context, he's bound to pick up a lot of technology information that he could use if he wanted to help make weapons. But countries like Israel, for instance, that have weapons didn't get them by diversions from a peaceful program. Except for a research reactor they don't have any nuclear electric plants in Israel. Pakistan the same thing.

MR. TEASLEY: Well, when you went to the State Department were you immediately involved with the IAEA business or did that come several months later?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I don't recall when we started that negotiation. I think it must have been probably in 19-, sometime toward the end of '54. It would have taken a long time to gin up an international negotiation like that. I think we met here in Washington and . . .

MR. TEASLEY: Was there always the expectation that that would be the result, that the President's proposal would indeed inspire an international organization like that?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I don't recall that the original speech had anything in it about an international agency, but it just seemed natural that if we were going to spew this technology around we ought to have an agency that not only would safeguard the material but would in effect promote the peaceful uses. And those are the

two functions of that agency, to promote peaceful uses and to safeguard against the diversion to military purposes.

MR. TEASLEY: Did Secretary Dulles, as far as you know, have--did that agency have his support? Did he view it as more of a necessary result of the President's proposal or was it something that was, indeed, a priority with him?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: No, I think Dulles always felt this was a very important part of American foreign policy and he certainly gave me a hundred percent support on it. And I heard that after we had finished that negotiation he was very pleased with the way it had gone and I felt that that was one of the reasons he promoted me to head up the policy planning staff because of the smoothness with which this negotiation had gone.

MR. TEASLEY: Well, can you describe your relationship with Secretary Dulles, and it may have changed over your years in the State Department as your position changed, but what kind of a man did you find him to be and what kind of relationship did you have?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, he was one of the great heroes in my life. I never could understand this prejudice against him, as a pious, moralistic sort of person, I didn't detect that at all. He was a first-rate lawyer, he was very self-confident and knew he was good at this business. He'd been brought up to be Secretary of State, I guess since the Versailles conference. I always felt that

I had a very warm relationship with him. He knew something about my background. I went on many trips with him and he seemed to rely on my atomic energy judgment at least. I'll give you one anecdote, I don't know if it's been written up any place, maybe it's in the book I wrote. After one NATO meeting he asked me to draft his remarks before the American people, on radio I guess it was in those days. At one point I quoted Saint Luke [Luke 11:21-22], I think it was, saying in the words of Saint Luke, "When a strong man is armed, his camp is in peace." That was sort of saying that as long as NATO kept up a strong defense we could deter war, and Dulles looked at this and sniffed and he said, "Well, what does this mean?" I said, "It's perfectly straight forward. If you want peace you've got to parare bellum, prepare for war. You've got to be strong." And he said, "Well," he knew I was a Roman Catholic, he said, "why don't you check with some of your scripture scholars and see what this really means." So as soon as I got back I called up a Benedictine monk and he said, "Oh, Gerard, that's perfectly clear. That's a reference to Satan because the next line is 'But when a stronger than he comes along and deprives him of his good' that's a reference to Christ." And Dulles, I guess he must have known this because he used to kid me all the time afterwards. We'd go out to his house for dinner and he would say to my wife, "You know what your husband wanted me to say in front of all my Presbyterian friends in the United States?" [Laughter] So we had, I think, a very easy relationship. I think he paid more attention to Bob Bowie

than to me on larger issues than just atomic energy questions. And I noticed in this recent book that I told you about of Immerman's,* there are a number of references to Dulles' attitudes in the 50s but it looks to me as if Bowie's following a dead man has been very effective.

MR. TEASLEY: How about Dulles' relationship with Eisenhower as far as you experienced it or viewed it?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, I think it's as classically reported. He had a very close relationship with Eisenhower and he wanted to make sure nothing interfered with that access. He was on the phone all the time with Eisenhower; and one of his difficulties with [Harold] Stassen was because he was concerned Stassen was going to get in between him and the President and he didn't care for that at all. No, they worked very closely. As I said at lunch, I used to watch them drafting together and it was a pleasure to see each one trying to outdo the other in precise draftsmanship. Dulles was always called upon last in the NSC meetings to sort of wrap up the exchanges and give the final signal. I think Eisenhower depended on him more than anybody else in the government.

MR. TEASLEY: Did Dulles show an appreciation of Eisenhower's abilities in the foreign policy area?

* John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War edited by Richard H. Immerman (Princeton University 1990).

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, that's a difficult question to answer because Eisenhower had no special foreign policy experience other than that that he gained as a soldier and maybe while he was president of Columbia, and Dulles had been in this business all of his life. But I don't think he felt that Eisenhower was naive or ignorant. I had a feeling that he certainly wasn't going to cross the President, but on some issues I had a little bit of feeling that left to himself Dulles wouldn't have handled things the way the President finally decided. But, he never would kick against the goad. He'd go on in good spirit. I can't identify any specific instances of that, but somewhere in the back of my mind I have one or two recollections.

MR. TEASLEY: Secretary Herter took over toward the end of the administration, and how would you compare Herter with Dulles? You probably worked with Herter for a year or two, didn't you?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, Dulles was basically a shy individual. He was an introvert, whereas Herter was an extrovert and much more easygoing. I would go up with both of them to Congress and Congressional committees, and there was always an element of hostility to Dulles and the feeling "this time we got him." And then he would always escape from their nets whereas Herter would go up, and everybody would say, "Chris, it's great to have you back." And he had been a member of Congress and it was always old home week every time he went up. But Herter was no match for Dulles in terms

of precise thinking or drafting. I don't think that Herter drafted many of his speeches himself. Dulles always used to give us a first draft that he'd spent many hours on and we'd polish it up a bit. But in Herter's case we would actually write the stuff for him. But he was a charming fellow and I think he was probably just what was needed at the end of the fifties. I think he was probably more disposed to try to make progress in the dialogue with the Soviets than Dulles had been.

MR. TEASLEY: Was that because of personal philosophy, do you think?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, I think it's sort of the difference in their political background. Chris had been governor of Massachusetts and in the Congress and politics is a matter of compromise and I think he probably felt, well, we can work out something with these people. But Dulles had been brought up on a pretty hard line on communism, and he felt a little differently.

MR. TEASLEY: There are some other personalities in the administration that I'd like to ask you to comment on, if you would, please. Andy Goodpaster?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, Andy was the most professional of the aides that Eisenhower had around, I mean, just wonderful in military matters. I remember, I guess it's an old chestnut, but each year come time about decisions about troop deployments in Europe Eisenhower would say, "Now, back in '45, '46, it was my

understanding that we were just going to have two divisions there and they would be withdrawn." He would always add, "But Andy tells me I'm wrong." [Laughter] Andy would bow his head solemnly. But Eisenhower was very fond of him. He was very precise, as he still is. The stuff that Goodpaster is writing now is as good as anybody's. A year or more ago, he was talking in terms of a 50 percent cut in our forces in NATO, which was radical then. And it still sounds pretty radical but he is courageous. I thought that he was one of the finest professional military officers I ever had anything to do with.

MR. TEASLEY: How about Lewis Strauss?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, as I mentioned before, Lewis had a devious aspect to him. He was very clever and very knowledgeable and had been in and out of government with Herbert Hoover after the first World War. He was a very, I gather, successful investment banker with Kuhn, Loeb. He accumulated a good deal of the world's goods. He was sort of independent. Most of the people who surround a presidential candidate, they have to depend on their future by gaining the good graces, where Strauss was independent. I was always very fond of him, but I had difficulty because the fellow I worked with in the Atomic Energy Commission, named Tom [Thomas E.] Murray, just couldn't get along with Lewis Strauss at all. And when I went over to the State Department, Lewis Strauss had more influence with Dulles than Tom Murray did. And Murray used to get

very upset that I wasn't sort of pushing his ideas. For instance, Murray was one of the first persons that I know of that was pushing for the test ban, especially the over one megaton hydrogen bomb. I was struck in reading this Immerman book that as early as '54 Dulles had made such a proposal to Eisenhower about a moratorium in testing, I'm not sure whether Murray had had any influence. Strauss would have been all against that if he'd known anything about it.

MR. TEASLEY: What was Murray's position at AEC?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: He was one of the five commissioners, he'd been appointed by Truman. Then he stayed on for some years in the first Eisenhower administration, and then he was an advisor to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy after that.

MR. TEASLEY: Another person, John McCone.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, I knew McCone socially more than I knew him in government. He must have been a very sharp individual. He was the one you know that called the truth in the Cuban missile crisis. He said they were deploying nuclear weapons in Cuba whereas all the rest of the government was saying, oh, they didn't think that was the case. He, again, was a very successful businessman. He had this independent attitude towards government, which helped him immensely. He had been, I think, assistant secretary of the Air Force, at one time. Then he was head of the CIA, and I guess between that he was head of the Atomic Energy Commission. So I knew

nothing but good about him. He was a good administrator and, apparently, a very smart individual. It's too bad we don't have people like that. The whole atomic energy thing is sort of spread around. In Congress we used to have one committee, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Now there are twenty-three committees. Most of the weapons problems are handled by the Department of Energy now. Reagan first appointed a North Carolina dentist to head that up. If the country out there had realized that they would have been pretty mad. But the one we have now, from what I gather, he's pretty good. But it's an awful mess.

MR. TEASLEY: James Killian?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, I used to see Killian when he was the President's scientific advisor. I gather he had a great deal to do with trying to get a comprehensive test ban. President Eisenhower was reported to have said, the greatest regret of his two administrations was that he was not able to get an ending of nuclear testing. That was no fault of Jim Killian's. I think he was a very strong helper to Eisenhower. In fact, in those days the science advisor had much more leverage on events than in the present time. They had something called PSAC, President's Scientific Advisory Committee, and from time-to-time some of these scientists didn't like the way decisions were going against them and they leaked to the press. I guess it was Nixon who said they would put an end to this, and he killed the PSAC. Which was unfortunate, they were very

useful citizens. Then Reagan appointed some fellow that nobody knew at all and had to find a job on the west coast as his science advisor [garbled] and the whole business collapsed, pretty much. So we haven't had a good science advisor in some years. Now they have a fellow, I gather, from Yale who's very highly thought of. So far I haven't seen any evidence that he's making any great decisions.

MR. TEASLEY: George Kistiakowsky, who followed Killian, I believe, didn't he?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Yes, I used to see Kisty and he was very much in favor of a nuclear test ban. He was much more voluble and talkative and a man of the world than Jim Killian. Jim was sort of a statesman, but Kisty was, well he was as you know, a Soviet citizen at one point. I sat next to him at a dinner one night with this Soviet scientist. The Soviet scientist said, "George, why don't you come back and work in your native land the way your cousin" He had a famous cousin who was a zoologist. And Kisty said, "Well, one reason is you tried to kidnap me in the London airport once," and then he turned to me and said, "Jerry, have I committed a diplomatic blunder?" [Laughter] Old Kisty was a very bright, light-hearted individual. I think he was a great science advisor. You've seen his book, I'm sure.

MR. TEASLEY: Yes. Did you work with the science advisors on the disarmament question a fair amount?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: You know, I don't remember that I did. I'm trying to think. See, after I left the Atomic Energy job in '57 and took over the Policy Planning Staff, I didn't have so much to do with the disarmament business. I think that that must have been about the time that Stassen came in and he had the brief for arms control.

MR. TEASLEY: Another personality, Robert Gray.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I just remember the name. I had nothing to do with him. He was secretary to the cabinet, or something like that.

MR. TEASLEY: Yes. Gordon Gray?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I used to work, well, closely with Gordon Gray. He succeeded Bobby Cutler as the head of the planning board, the NSC planning board. And he was very professional and he'd been in the government a lot. He'd been secretary of the Army, I think. Must have been in the Truman administration. I gather he must have been a Democrat--from North Carolina? He was a lot more easy going than Cutler. Cutler, ran a taut ship and was always complaining that we weren't working hard enough, that our debates weren't as brilliant as they should be, whereas Gordon was much more easy going. But I think you can learn much more about him from Karl Harr. You say you've talked to Harr? I'm a member of the Alibi Club, which is a lunch club here in town, and Gordon was a member of it for many

years. I never heard anybody that had as many anecdotes as he did, he'd just go on and on.

MR. TEASLEY: Robert Bowie.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, Bowie is one of my best friends, I would say. I have a very high regard for him, very courageous. He used to stand up to Dulles and take positions like, we have to do something about China. In those days, Dulles, when China was raised, he would say, "Not while I'm Secretary of State!" But Bowie kept hammering away and he kept hammering away about the necessity that we not have this great dependence on nuclear weapons but build up the conventional force structure. And he was a great draftsman. I remember Dulles asked me to prepare some testimony for him before the Joint Committee and I think I went through five drafts and gave it to him and he looked at it and he said, "Take this to Bowie and have him help you out with it." Bowie was one of the greatest draftsmen I ever knew. He had a clear idea of where he wanted to see Europe go, he was a devotee of Jean Monet and he thought Europe's integration was the wave of the future for Europe, and still does. He had quite an effect on Dulles' mind, because when I took over I used to follow the same line about massive retaliation, didn't make any sense anymore, if it ever did, and we shouldn't rely on that the Soviets were building up their nuclear weapons . . .

[Interruption]

AMBASSADOR SMITH: . . . I went over with Dulles. Just the two of us and all the hierachy of the Defense Department was there, Secretary of Defense, the Deputy, all the service secretaries, and all the top military and Dulles started in with a heavy heart. He felt he had been the father of massive retaliation, and he thought it had worked for years but now it looked as if that was going to change. The military had better get cracking on planning for some other alternate strategy. I got a great kick when that day came around.

MR. TEASLEY: Do you remember when that was? I'm sure it was . . .

AMBASSADOR SMITH: It was in November of '58. I wrote long memos of the conversation which I think they ought to be able to be declassified now, but I've never seen any evidence in any of the literature where anybody's picked this up. I don't know if it's in my papers that you have that got out to the Archives or what.

MR. TEASLEY: I don't know. We have about a thousand pages of your material there at the Library so it could be, could be in them. James Wadsworth?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, he was basically a political type of animal. He enjoyed life tremendously and liked to play his mandolin or some sort of guitar, and he had a very light-hearted attitude but quite an effective diplomat. I remember Cabot Lodge telling Dulles how pleased he was with the job Jerry was doing, he was Cabot's

Deputy up at the U.N. He didn't really have any great feel for the issues that went into that negotiation about IAEA and he relied very heavily on Phil Farley and myself, but he got along well with everybody. The Soviets liked him and on the whole I thought he did a very good job. He was not what I would call a very serious man. I don't think of him as the sort of fellow who would draft his own speeches. His father had been a great politician, he was Senator from New York I believe. And they all, the Wadsworths, came from Geneseo and had thousands and thousands of acres in upstate New York. I went to Yale with his brother. You know, I think that, I'm trying to think whom you could get a better feel for him. This fellow that I told you at lunch, Larry Wyler, used to work with him and Phil Farley, he's down at Stanford now, he used for work for them.

MR. TEASLEY: You mentioned Phil Farley, now he was your deputy? He worked . . . What do you have to tell us about him?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, I had worked with him in the Atomic Energy Commission, he was sort of on a little staff, the Policy Planning Staff there, and very knowledgable and a modest person. I brought him over to the State Department and he did very well. He became a career ambassador or career minister, I guess they call it. Paul Nitze had picked him up apparently when he was a corporal in the army, I think, and ran through their computers to find someone who wrote good English. He had been a professor of English out in

California. Paul was on the strategic bombing survey after the war and so he brought Phil into that and Phil stayed with the government I guess, ever since then. Until he went out to Stanford. But he was a tremendous help because he knew much more about the technical side of things than I did. He was much more sensible than I was, he was calm, and I would get excited. He would write things properly and I wouldn't. He was, I think, the finest fellow I have ever had working for me, and I think Dulles and Herter felt the same way. And I think the people who succeeded him, I think, that [Dean] Rusk thought very highly of him. But basically he was not a political animal. He had no great ambitions. But he had a very highly-developed moral sense. And some of the things we were going through must have been very difficult for him. He never showed any sign of fatigue or disagreement and after I came back in the Carter administration, I brought him back to be my deputy in the non-proliferation talks and spent two years with me on that job.

MR. TEASLEY: That's a lot of practical knowledge and level-headed advice, I guess.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Yes, and on top of that, a great modesty, never, no pretense or building himself up about being an official of the government.

MR. TEASLEY: I have another name here, V.S. Emelyanov.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Emelyanov, I guess. He was a metallurgist and he was, I guess, the Soviet fellow in the IAEA negotiations. Whether he was the head of it, I don't think he was, but he was the technical man. And I never thought very much of him, he was the sloppiest looking fellow and maybe it was the language problem, but he just struck me as a rather pedestrian type. I remember one little anecdote about him. After we finished the negotiation, I said to, the head of the Soviet delegation was a man named Zarubin, I think. I said, "Well, how do you go about picking representatives for this new agency in Vienna." He said, "Oh, we just notify all the ministries and they come up with the candidates and then we pick the best man." He said, "Of course, we have to think of their private considerations," he said. "Now you take Emelyanov he would be an excellent candidate for the Soviet group in Vienna, but he wants to go back to his laboratory and of course, we have to respect that." Within six weeks, Emelyanov had gotten the tap to take this job in Vienna and he stayed at it for years. I remember one story, I guess it was Wadsworth told me. One night he'd had too much to drink, Emelyanov, and he said, "How times have changed." He said, "Here am I, a simple metallurgist, now I'm an ambassador of the Soviet Union and Molotov is working for me." They assigned Molotov as a disgrace. [Laughter] "And Molotov is working for me." I must make a note of that, I'm trying to put together a lot of vignettes and I'd forgotten all about that.

MR. TEASLEY: That's interesting.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: But he must have had a lot more stuff than I ever saw him, because he went on for years as head of the Soviet group in Vienna. I've heard a lot of people speak very highly of him.

MR. TEASLEY: Is that the arms negotiations?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: No, this was the IAEA.

MR. TEASLEY: IAEA. Sir David Ormsby-Gore?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I just knew him socially. Kennedy, I think, asked to have him appointed as ambassador because he had known him, I guess, during the war. He was a very bright fellow. I guess his wife died driving down a certain road in England and some years later he drove down the same road and was in an auto accident in about the same spot.

MR. TEASLEY: Well, you assumed your duties as director of the Department of State's policy planning staff in '57, and then continued in that through the Kennedy administration, I believe. Can you describe what the duties would have been in that position?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, I don't remember there was any job description. I think we were supposed to try to get out of the day-to-day, attention to reading telegrams and try to see long-range trends which most people ignored. There was so much attention paid to the day-to-day things in the State Department but occasionally we would have some effect. Now this fellow whose office I wanted to

use today [for the oral history interview] came up to me one day, in the fall of 1960 and he said, "You know, you really got to do something about Latin America, it's a terrible mess down there." He said, "You're going to attend the NSC meeting with Herter tomorrow, why don't you see if you can't get something started." So I saw Herter and I said, "I think we ought to come out with a big new program for Latin America. We can have [unintelligible] and if I remember the figure was half a, half a billion dollars, 500 million dollars and Herter proposed it and I remember Maurice Stans was the director of the budget at that time. His face grew redder and redder. Nobody had checked this with him. Eisenhower said, "I think that's a great idea," and this was the real predecessor of the Alliance for Progress. Kennedy came in, and there was a big new pot of money but that was one case where the policy planning staff had had an impact. Then I remember we had a fellow named George Morgan, who was my Deputy, he had been minister in Tokyo. Dulles was going to make a speech, this was towards the end where he was pretty weak. Usually we would write speeches for Dulles. Either he prepared the first draft or he would send it back completely changed, but Morgan had this notion that the real role of Taiwan would not be to fight their way back into the mainland, but to be the cultural custodian of China's values for the post-Mao Tse-tung generation. And Dulles thought very highly of that, gave his speech without any changes. I don't know if it had any impact on Chian Kai-shek but it was the most elegant little piece of long-range policy planning that I

remember. Then we had a fellow named . . . , he lives out in California now, but I put him to work on the Panama Canal problem. And we got a lot of statistics showing the Canal was not going to be able to handle traffic in twenty years, which didn't prove to be the case. But he went all through the necessity of some easing so that the Panamanian sovereignty became the issue, and when Bunker started negotiating with the Carter administration he told me how helpful this groundwork--that we had done almost twenty years before--had been when he and Lenowitz started negotiating about the Panama Canal treaties.

MR. TEASLEY: Those files were still available at the State Department, apparently.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Which is unusual. I think most of the stuff just goes down the drain.

MR. TEASLEY: How did the planning staff contribute to the formulation of national security policy?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, you know, the national security document in those days was a pretty general document. I think deliberately so, and people could make whatever they wanted out of it. But I used to brief Dulles every Thursday when this matter would come up three or four weeks in a row in the NSC. Then I would go to Dulles and sit by him and listen to the NSC discussion. And then every afternoon after those meetings I used to go over and talk with the director of

the joint staff, General Buzz Wheeler, who became chairman of the Joint Chiefs after that. We had a very good relationship because, I guess, usually the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs wouldn't take notes, it was sort of [unintelligible]. I had made extensive notes and I could give the military fellow a pretty good feel as to how the President was thinking. So that went on for a couple of years. But, I can't tell you at this distance specifically how the policy planning staff effected national security. There have been a number of articles written on this subject. I guess in the State Department publication, whatever it's called . . .

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I think that Nitze must have written something and I wrote something. I think George McGee, who was my successor, wrote, not anything profound, but how the policy planning staff operates.

MR. TEASLEY: Were you generally just developing plans, long-range planning, for the State Department and giving your input to the Secretary's office? Or were you dealing with the intelligence community? We talked about, already, your personal relationship with this DOD person--the Joint Staff man.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, we were in contact with the CIA, yes. I used to know Allen Dulles very well. He'd come home from cruising in the Caribbean, so we had a very happy relationship with him. I don't remember any real day-to-day connection, although I was off on

a ship last month and there was a fellow who had been on the policy planning staff named [unintelligible].

MR. TEASLEY: The FRUS volumes?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I hadn't seen him in, I guess, thirty years. It turned out that while he was working for me, he'd been on the payroll of the CIA, which I had never known. And I think they just parked him in between assignments so he was with us a short time but I thought that was curious. I don't know what he reported to his principals.

MR. TEASLEY: Did you select your own deputy for this job as well, or was the staff pretty well already in place?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: The first deputy I had was a man named Bert Matthews, who was a Middle Eastern expert, and I always thought highly of his judgment during the Suez Crisis for instance. I relied very much on Bert Matthews. Then Bert Matthews, he left or died, I forget which, and George Morgan was suggested to me. I didn't know enough about foreign service officers to have a judgment as to whether they were really good or not. Morgan was quite a philosopher, he'd studied under, who was that famous philosopher at Harvard, I guess he was a mathematical logician. George had a great feel for philosophy, as well as being a first-rate Japanese expert. As I said, he'd been minister in Tokyo and he lives down in Florida now and has just finished a book on some obscure French philosopher

that he'd been working on for ten years, I think. I think those were the only two deputies I had and I don't recall if I picked them. I think the personnel people in the State Department said, "Wouldn't you like to have so-and-so?" Some of the people on the staff were very good, some obviously were there, parked between jobs, and it just seemed like a place to put them with some prestige in between assignments overseas. But we didn't have a precise planning process the way, I guess, the military go contingency planning. We would sort of hit the ball out of the batting practice fence. People would come in saying, reunification of Germany is just out of the window. We had a great German expert who would sit down for a month and figure out all the angles. I tried once to get what was called sequential analysis, where you would take some problem and try to work it out, A does this, so B does that. This fellow worked on it for months and came back with a completely useless jigsaw puzzle for which we thanked him very much. Bill Taft was on our staff. He'd taught [unintelligible] at Yale and he was Senator Taft's son. And therefore he had a good relationship with the State Department. I figured out we didn't know anything about Africa so I asked him to take a tour of Africa. This was when we had very few diplomatic posts there. I just saw him before lunch today. I forget, I don't know if I ever read his report that discussed all this. He ended up as Consul General in Mogadishu, I guess it is. Which was a great spy place during the war.

MR. TEASLEY: Well, Nixon made a trip to Africa too, didn't he? In was it '58, '57 or '58, was that

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I don't recall that. I remember when he went to Latin America and got mobbed almost. La Guaira or someplace like that.

MR. TEASLEY: Caracas?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Yes, La Guaira is the port of Caracas.

MR. TEASLEY: Oh, okay. Did the policy planning staff get involved in strategy for basically nuclear weapons planning and . . . ?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, in this general sense that I felt very strongly that we had gone overboard in Dulles' first years and I used to hammer away at the importance of building up conventional forces. And the fact that nuclear weapons were really not usable force, and if it every came to a crunch we would not use them. We lost the war, the Vietnam war and never used them. The Soviets lost the Afghan war and never used them. There's a very strong international taboo now, which I hope persists. And I think that the buildup of the conventional forces started then and then Kennedy was very keen on that. Sometimes I wonder if we hadn't built up our conventional forces would we have been so gung ho to get into Vietnam.

MR. TEASLEY: But Eisenhower's massive retaliation policy I guess was motivated in large part because of the economics of

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Yes.

MR. TEASLEY: . . . more bang for the buck theory. They gave us flexibility, but it also gave us less potential for mischief I suppose.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: And whenever it came to a crunch Eisenhower would back away from using them. He threatened to use them in Korea but I don't think he would have. Taiwan, Quemoy-Matsu. No, I think it was a combination of Dulles and Eisenhower that stood out against Radford in order to go in there and use nuclear weapons. It's a curious thing most of the people had no idea what it was they were talking about. I don't think there is a single high-ranking officer in the armed forces today that has ever seen a nuclear explosion.

MR. TEASLEY: I know at lunch you talked about an anecdote where somebody was invited to go see a test and it changed their view . . .

AMBASSADOR SMITH: That was me, I had changed my view.

MR. TEASLEY: When did you go out? Was that when you were . . .

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I went out in '51 and in '52.

MR. TEASLEY: Okay.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: It was perfectly clear to me that these were not weapons. They were tremendous explosions which had little relevance to fighting a war between two major super powers and I kept that position consistently. To such an extent that when I joined in the gang of four article in '83 I guess it was, no first use, it aroused a storm. General Haig said we would have to go on a war-time basis and double the expenditures for conventional forces.

MR. TEASLEY: There was another anecdote you related at lunch about Quemoy-Matsu and the desire to use, the suggestion that they be used there and how, somebody got a briefing and that changed their view on that, could you relate that?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I got some military people to come over and brief Dulles on how much would be involved if they wanted to take the batteries out at around Amoy. And they were very glib about surgical strikes and I finally said, "Well, now what is your estimate of casualties?" And I will never forget, this Major said, "Well, we think about 186 thousand casualites." Dulles never mentioned the use of nuclear weapons for that purpose again.

MR. TEASLEY: Harold Stassen enters the picture, what about 1955 maybe, as the disarmament . . . ?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I think it was probably a little later than that, I forget. He was certainly there in '57, '58.

MR. TEASLEY: What was your view of his role and him as an individual?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, he had a very strong position with Eisenhower because it was his action at the '52 convention that got the nomination for President Eisenhower and Eisenhower never forgot that. And Stassen was a brilliant, very self-confident individual. He wanted this brief for arms control because he believed in it and also, I think, because he felt it would be a good springboard for him to become President, if he negotiated an agreement. So he was very gung ho in getting an arrangement at one point he sort of got out ahead of the instructions, while he was in England and that caused a great furor because the British were very upset about it. Dulles decided he would have to go over and head up the delegation and take the leadership away from Stassen and he asked me to go over and join him to give him technical advice. I remember Dulles was reported to have said, "We must bring this man to heel." He was very concerned that Stassen maybe wanted to become Secretary of State and was getting in between him and the President. Stassen had a sort of a steam roller approach to life. He just got a momentum behind an idea and he would push a little too fast for comfort. But he was a brilliant fellow and I felt that we need somebody with that political stature in our negotiations with the Soviets who could then go up on the hill and really sell the treaty. I always felt that when it came my turn with SALT I these fellows must have said, "Well, who's this fellow Smith? We've never heard of him." Whereas

if it had been a politician, they would have, I think, paid much more attention. Although we got a fine vote on that treaty, eighty-two to two, I think it was. But it was apparently very difficult to get a politician to take that job. I remember once Dulles asked me to go up and brief Lyndon Johnson about, there was a possibility that an arms control agreement was going to be made in London and he wanted me to brief Johnson so he wouldn't be surprised. I did that and Johnson said, "Don't you tell another Senator, they'll all be packing their bags to get over there to London tonight." [Laughter] So maybe it would have been easier to get a senator to head up the negotiation than I suggested.

MR. TEASLEY: Did you have any personal dealings with Harold Stassen?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: No, I think I had a good relationship with him. As I mentioned my brother-in-law, Bernard Shanley, and he had worked closely together to try to get Stassen to be President in '52 and I think he always felt I was sort of part of his group, which I wasn't politically but I admired him.

MR. TEASLEY: So I guess Stassen was kept at arms length by the State Department then during...

AMBASSADOR SMITH: To say the least. [Laughter]

MR. TEASLEY: What about the committee of principals? Can you explain the work of the committee of principals?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, I think that was after I had pretty much left the SAE job. I don't think I ever had anything to do with the committee of principals. I think they were Defense, and State, and CIA and Joint Chiefs, and I think it was just an ordinary sort of high-level group that would meet and check on what we bureaucrats were trying to do. But I never attended any of the meetings. All their records must be declassified by now.

MR. TEASLEY: Do you know anything about the Administration's plans and studies concerning limited war?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, as a general principal I think that the Joint Chiefs felt that if they had forces adequate to handle the general war with the Soviets, they could handle any limited war sort of with their left hand. I thought that was a mistake because the forces needed for a limited war would be quite different from a general war. Presumably, you wouldn't go in for large nuclear explosions. We would need lightly-armed forces. We would need Naval Force projections. We would need tactical aircraft, not great, bang bombers. The national security documents used to always saysomething about a capacity to fight. I guess in those days it was two and half wars and now we are down to, what is it, one and half? But Dulles had a great reluctance to get into military matters below the general principals. I think he felt if he did that it wouldn't be long before the military would be getting into State Department matters, so he wanted it clearly separated. He

wasn't going to set a bad example for the military. So we never I used to go over and get briefed from time-to-time. It was always a sort of a snow job--dog and pony show. And they'd tell you what they could do. But most of my interest in those days was in the strategic capability. I would go out to SAC and they'd give me what I thought was a real briefing and I'd go out in submarines. I used to work with Admiral Rickover a great deal and he'd very kindly let me go out on nuclear submarines. I remember once we participated and tested the Poseidon missile. It was quite a thrill, get down there. About four minutes after you could feel the boat shudder as the missile was firing. They would get a report it was on target fifteen hundred miles

[Interruption]

MR. TEASLEY: . . . briefly about the U.S.-British relationships and nuclear weapons and I know that in the post-Suez era the British were pushing more and more and I guess the Eisenhower administration was more eager than it had been to share its nuclear capability. Were you involved in that negotiation?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Yes, I think that after Suez, Eisenhower was very interested in restoring the special relationship with the British. He also thought it had been a great mistake after the war to choke off the exchanges that we had in the war and which we'd promised to continue with the British after the war. Then the Congress stepped in and they hadn't heard anything about the wartime agreements.

They passed the McMahon Act. And so Eisenhower was looking for an opportunity to restore that relationship and it fell to my lot to negotiate with Lord Plowden, who was the head of the British atomic energy authority, a new agreement. And we did. I thought it was a very generous, broad-scale agreement. Lewis Strauss tried to block it. I told Dulles, "You told me to negotiate this, I have done so. Would he please talk to the President about Strauss' opposition." He got on the phone and Dulles said, Eisenhower said, "You go ahead just the way you have it." That agreement is still operating. It is a surprising thing because the British talk about their independent deterrent but the steel of the hulls on those ships had to be supplied by the United States because the British couldn't make that steel. The power plant was an American-pressurized water reactor. The missile itself was an American design and the warhead was an American design so those British folks maybe changed now but in the sixties it was made in the United States and that griped the French because they had to go through this whole thing themselves.

MR. TEASLEY: I was going to ask you about the French, and De Gaulle and the force de frappe? What was the Administration's policy on the French nuclear force?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, I think that Eisenhower would have been inclined to help out the French but the Congressional attitude was very strong against nuclear sharing with the major exception of the

British because we had this special relationship. But on the one or two occasions where an effort was made to open up relations with the French on nuclear exchanges, we never got very far. Farley can tell you all about that, he negotiated with General [Paul] Ely, I think his name was, and they thought they'd work something out but it never came to pass. De Gaulle was a very proud man, he didn't want to appear to be asking for any help. It would have been immensely helpful to him. I saw an article last year by a fellow from Princeton, I forget his name, who said, "In spite of that we have been cooperating with the French with regard to weaponry." I think this is probably in safety measures but it was apparently suppressed, nobody wanted to talk about it. I thought when I read this article it was going to raise a storm, but just silence. A little bit like the Israeli situation.

MR. TEASLEY: The U.S. wasn't invited to leave France until, '66 maybe, so NATO headquarters moved to Brussels.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Yes, sometime in the middle sixties.

MR. TEASLEY: Did you see when De Gaulle came in, was there a change in the U.S.-French relations?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I don't think so. I think that the French had always been troublesome. Even before DeGaulle and they were just a little more sticky when he came in. He proposed this triumvirate, you know, the British, French, and Americans to run the world and

that didn't appeal to us. The decision of the French to go for nuclear weapons antedated De Gaulle's return. The Fifth Republic I guess it was, Mendes-France had been dabbling in nuclear weapons. But they I think then got a full-speed ahead signal of their own. Pretty soon they were building nuclear submarines. They pride themselves on having this independent deterrent. At one point their targeting doctrine was described as tous dans les sens, which means "We can hit targets in any direction." Which you can imagine didn't sit very nicely in certain quarters in Washington. [Laughter]

MR. TEASLEY: Did you work with Lauris Norstad when he was at NATO?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Yes, he was a great general and tremendous glamour. He once said to me, "I'm the only person that can call up the Chancellor of the Federal Republic in the middle of the night and he'll answer the telephone." I think that was true. He had great flair. More so I think than any SACEUR that I ever saw. He was very sensitive to the European point of view. He wanted to set up some sort of a joint atomic stockpile in NATO. That was one of the origins of the multi-lateral force that I was in charge of the negotiations for but it never came to pass and Lyndon Johnson torpedoed that and I don't blame him. I read recently in that book of [unintelligible] where Johnson said, "Well, the Germans are not enthusiastic about this." This was largely addressed to their ambitions in the nuclear field. He said, "The Senate is going to murder me if I come up with this sort of proposal so what's in it

for me?" He stopped it so I resigned. But I thought it was a perfectly reasonable position that he took.

MR. TEASLEY: Speaking of Johnson, he would have been the majority leader during part of this time, after Rayburn . . .

AMBASSADOR SMITH: No, Rayburn was in the House.

MR. TEASLEY: Okay, the House, that's right. How were your dealings with Johnson? Or did you . . .

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, Dulles had a very high regard for Johnson. Whenever we had a crisis, one of the first things he would ask, "What does Lyndon Johnson think?" Bill Macomber, who was the Congressional advisor would give him a treatise on how Lyndon Johnson felt. I had very few relations with him. I went up once as I told you at lunch at Dulles' request to tell Johnson that it looked as if there might be an arms control agreement signed the next day in London. And Johnson's reaction was, "Don't tell another Senator or they will all be packing their bags to get to London before morning." The only other time I remember him, in the MLF [Multilateral Nuclear Force] days we were having an informal meeting in the Cabinet room. We were sitting with our coats off, and Kennedy was chairing the thing and I sat across the way from Kennedy and I saw Johnson come in the room and walk towards me. I realized I was in the Vice-President's chair. Just to be polite I said to the Vice-President, "Do you want to sit in your chair?" thinking

he'd say, "Oh no." Because everybody was scattered around. He said, "Yes, I do." So I got out of there pretty fast. No, I had very little to do with Lyndon Johnson. My successor, Walt Rostow, on the policy planning staff was very close to Johnson all through that Vietnam tragedy.

MR. TEASLEY: I guess in closing, we might want to just ask what your overall assessment would be of the Eisenhower administration foreign policy viewed from your role in the State Department?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, I have a recollection that the foreign policy in those days was handled in a much tidier fashion. The President wanted to have papers prepared with general principles that could guide the various departments. I don't remember that there was anything like the surreptitious, sub-rosa approach that we saw in the Nixon administration or the Reagan administration. It would have been incredible to have a kind of Iran-gate sort of thing during the Eisenhower Administration. The President would go to elaborate lengths to make sure everybody had a chance to express their views on things. I remember when we had to decide whether to go into Lebanon, what was that? '58. He had all the heirachy in there and I thought it was one of the tensest meetings I ever went to because some of the military said, "Now, basically we may be here for a generation in Lebanon." I'll never forget the fellow who was headed up the--Don Quarles, was deputy secretary of defense and he said, "What's the situation in the U.N. going to be?" Which I

thought was peculiar from a fellow from the Pentagon and nobody else raised that subject. And Eisenhower said, "Well, we've signed a blank check to [Camille] Chamoun, I guess it was, we've just got to go through with it." No doubt in his mind. He made up his mind very quickly. But that must be all written up in a lot of places. No, that's my recollection, that he was, as a management proposition, was much better run than the other presidents I worked for.

MR. TEASLEY: Are the indications there also that Eisenhower was setting the policy, or aware of the policy?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, he certainly was aware of it. I don't know to what extent. In the military field, yes, I think he was pretty much saying what we ought to have and he didn't mind talking to Radford or whoever was the chairman. I remember in connection with the, when we were going for ICBMs and it looked as if we couldn't have them very quickly. We decided to build IRBMs and MRBMs and after they were built we had a problem with where we would deploy them. We had all sorts of problems in Italy, Turkey, England. I can remember Eisenhower said, "It would've been better if you'd just thrown them into the sea." And he had that sort of a very shrewd approach to some of these weapons problems. And he was very concerned about the tremendous increase in the price of weapons. I remember, [Robert B.] Anderson, who was secretary of the treasury in those days, almost with tears in his eyes would say, "Fellows," to

all the Cabinet members, "Fellows, it just can't go on." He almost had tears in his eyes, "the way these prices for weapons are going up." And then as you know [Malcolm] Moos wrote that piece for the President, his valedictory when he talked about the military-industrial complex. I thought that was one of the greatest speeches he'd ever made. No, I think with each passing year his reputation shoots up. And I think that Greenstein book has a good deal to do with it. All right, anything else?

MR. TEASLEY: Well, thank you for your time, sir.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, it's always a pleasure.