All of these proposed amendments would make it clear that the authority granted must be exercised only in accordance with conditions prescribed by the President to protect the common defense and security.

PROTECTION OF ATOMIC ENERGY INFORMATION

A special category of "restricted data," so defined as to include virtually all atomic energy data of security significance, is now established by law. "Restricted data" are protected in the law by special espionage provisions, provisions relating to the control, dissemination and declassification of such data, and by requirements for personnel security clearances.

Personnel Security. The provisions of the Act relating to security clearances of personnel need improvement in several respects. The Act does not recognize degrees of sensitivity of "restricted data." The same clearance requirements apply to any type of "restricted data," whether it be access by the unskilled construction laborer to "restricted data" of only marginal security significance, or access by a scientist to the secret of atomic weapons information. The Atomic Energy Commission lacks sufficient latitude under present law to determine the extent of personnel investigation needed for adequate security. Many costly background investigations required by present law are unnecessary. The Atomic Energy Commission should be permitted to relate the scope of investigation required under the Act to the significance of the access to "restricted data" which will be permitted.

This amendment is especially pertinent to the proposed broadening of private participation in the development of atomic power. While such private participants will require access to "restricted data" on reactor technology, full investigations of all their employees who will have such access are not warranted because most of the data involved will not have significant security importance. Moreover, such investigations would impede and discourage the desired participation and would be unnecessarily costly both to government and to industry. Where access to more sensitive "restricted data" is involved, the Commission must, of course, require full investigations.

Another security clearance problem relates to personnel of Department of Defense agencies and to the personnel of contractors with those agencies. The Atomic Energy Commission may now disclose "restricted data" to such of those personnel as have security clearances from the Department of Defense. But "restricted data" so disclosed by the Commission are thereafter protected in accordance with Department of Defense security regulations. And yet, contractors of the Commission are precluded by law from granting the same personnel access to the same "restricted data" until they have had AEC clearances, based on investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Civil Service Commission.

As applications of atomic energy become increasingly widespread within the Armed Services, the necessity increases for communication of "restricted data" between AEC contractors and participants in related Departments of Defense programs. The present fact that personnel engaged in military programs who have military clearances must be denied access to "restricted data" by AEC contractor personnel impedes cooperation between the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission in areas of mutual interest and causes unnecessary reports in time and money. I therefore recommend that the Atomic Energy Commission be enabled to authorize its contractors and licensees to afford access to "restricted data" to personnel engaged in Department of Defense programs who need such data in their work and who possess the proper military security clearances.