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preclude landings and will possibly even permit reasonably effective gunfire support from the Navy, the picture from the air viewpoint is not so good.

Probably no one that does not have to bear the specific and direct responsibility of making the final decision as to what to do, can understand the intensity of these burdens. The Supreme Commander, much more than any of his subordinates, is kept informed of the political issues involved, particularly the anticipated effect of delay upon the Russians. He likewise is in close touch with all the advice from his military subordinates and must face the issue even when technical advice as to weather is not unanimous from the several experts. Success or failure might easily hinge upon the effectiveness, for example, of airborne operations. If the weather is suitable for everything else, but unsuitable for airborne operations, the question becomes whether to risk the airborne movement anyway or to defer the whole affair in the hopes of getting weather that is a bit better.

My tentative thought is that the desirability for getting started on the next favorable tide is so great and the uncertainty of the weather is such that we could never anticipate really perfect weather coincident with proper tidal conditions, that we must go unless there is a real and very serious deterioration in the weather.

4. Since last February the enemy has been consistently busy in placing obstacles of various types on all European beaches suitable for landing operations. Most of these are also mined. Under ordinary circumstances of land attack these would not be particularly serious but because they must be handled quickly and effectively before the major portion of our troops can begin unloading, they present a hazard that is a very considerable one. It is because of their existence that we must land earlier on the tide than we had originally intended. This gives us a chance to go after them while they are still on dry land because if their bases were under water they would be practically impossible to handle. If our gun support of the operation and the DD tanks during this period are both highly effective, we should be all right.

The under-water obstacles, that is, the sea mines, force us to sweep every foot of water over which we operate and this adds immeasurably to the difficulties in restricted waters in which we are operating. The combination of under-sea and beach obstacles is serious but we believe we have it whipped.

5. Because the enemy in great strength is occupying a country that is interlaced with fine communication system, our attack can be looked upon as reasonable only if our tremendous air force is able to impede his concentrations against us and to help destroy the effectiveness of any of his counter attacks. Weather again comes into this problem, because it is my own belief that with reasonably good weather during the first two or three weeks of the operation, our air superiority and domination will see us through to success.

6. Lately we have been studying earnestly the question of future organization, assuming that we have established a beachhead so firmly that we

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