

**EYES ONLY**

**TOP SECRET**

**INCOMING MESSAGE  
COSSAC**

**BIGOT**



From : AGH  
To : SHAET  
Dated : 162145A  
Ref. No. : 314  
Precedence : URGENT  
Rec'd : 170037A  
Security : ~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR : GENERAL EISENHOWER'S EYES ONLY  
FROM : GENERAL MARSHALL

The news from the Italian Front indicates that there is no probability of a decisive tactical change in the situation from that which existed at the time you met with the British Chiefs of Staff to represent the United States Chiefs of Staff in the OVERLORD - ANVIL matter. The operation at CASSINO which started yesterday may bring about within a reasonably short time the amalgamation of the beachhead with the main line but there is nothing to indicate a sufficient break in the German resistance to permit a further advance on ROME during March.

Our concern here is over the possibility, if not the probability, that the Germans in taking desperate measures which they will certainly do to crush OVERLORD, will endeavor to hold up our troops in ITALY and recall from Southern FRANCE, from ITALY, and from the BALKANS, and by withdrawal on the Russian Front to the RIGA Line obtain from that Army, a large reserve of divisions available for the operations in Western FRANCE. Both DILL and I have had this fear and it was accentuated by General HULL's conversations with General ALEXANDER in ITALY, the latter stating, in reply to HULL's query, that 6 or 8 divisions could materially delay his, ALEXANDER's, advance to the PISA RIMINI Line. ALEXANDER now has 21 divisions in ITALY and is proceeding with movements to increase this number to 28. The Germans have 24 divisions in ITALY of which 19 are in the south. So it would appear that if ALEXANDER can be materially delayed, the Germans in a series of planned withdrawals to, and maybe through, the APENNINES, could free 10 to 15 divisions for FRANCE not to mention those from Southern FRANCE and elsewhere that I previously mentioned. In connection with ALEXANDER's statement, DILL's people worked up an estimate in which they conclude that 19 German divisions would be required to hold us in check in ITALY.

We know from MAGIC that the Germans are fearful of a landing in the Northern ADRIATIC or on the coast of Southern FRANCE. However, if they once become aware of the fact that the facilities for such a landing are not available they could rearrange their forces to your great disadvantage.

We must of course connect up the ANZIO Beachhead with the main front of the Army in ITALY. Under present conditions, however, I see no great purpose to be achieved in ITALY aside from maintaining pressure on the enemy to prevent the transfer of his forces to your front.



DECLASSIFIED  
Authority J.C.S. M/MC  
Date 1/9/74  
By OJA, NARS Date 3/3/74

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**INCOMING MESSAGE  
COSSAC**

**BIGOT**

From: AGWAR

Ref. No.: 314

To : SHAEF

Dated: 162145A

Precedence: URGENT

Rec'd : 170037A

Security: ~~TOP SECRET~~

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During the month since COOKE and HULL visited LONDON your examination and detailed development of plans should have made clear whether or not you have a critical shortage in landing ships and craft. Estimates here would indicate that all presently allocated LST's should close in to the United Kingdom under the present plans prior to the 30th of April except perhaps 7 from United States production which may not arrive until about May 15th.

We are about to open discussions with the British Chiefs of Staff concerning ANVIL and they have requested WILSON to let them have his estimate on the Mediterranean situation on March 18th. The basis for a final decision appears no better than a month ago. The only clear-cut decision would be to cancel the ANVIL operation.


I should greatly appreciate your personal views concerning this whole situation including your present appraisal of the landing craft situation and the latest dates that you can accept craft for use in OVERLORD.

It is my intention with which ARNOLD agrees that we will support your desire regarding the ANVIL decision, whatever it may be. So the foregoing statement of my views is not to be accepted by you as a pressure from me to have matters arranged other than the way you would wish to see them set up.

DISTRIBUTION:

1. SUPREME COMMANDER
2. CHIEF OF STAFF
3. SGS
- 4.

Ref: IN OUT  
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