

TRANSCRIPT OF MEETING WITH GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Tuesday, August 25, 1964, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania

EISENHOWER: I believe that so far as my relations with Charles de Gaulle are concerned, not only during the war, but in SHAPE days and then as President, they were not ever rough or unpleasant in a personal way. This man and I have always been very good friends, although the start of our relations was not a really very promising start, because in London, in 1942, they were more or less of a formal thing. It wasn't until he came into Africa, and I have forgotten the exact time, but let's say in about June -- maybe a little earlier -- in 1943, that we really got to know one another personally. Now, the difficulty with our relations then were his troubles with Giraud. General Giraud came as a rival for leadership with the blessing of the allies, and, of course, this was an anathema to General de Gaulle. Here and there there were some little unpleasant scenes, but the fact is it was only before Giraud made clear his distaste for politics and then accepted without question de Gaulle's pre-eminence in the political field. Giraud wanted to command the French troops in the field -- that's what he really wanted to do. Well, of course, it didn't really work out in the long run and finally Giraud disappeared from the scene. He was a gallant man but he had no interest in politics whatsoever. So, from there on, General de Gaulle and I got to know each other well. Now, you mention one incident in your book where we had the trouble or the difficulty about Strasbourg, Now this was because of a honest difference of viewpoint. I was just interested in winning a battle. De Gaulle, however, with his troops already in Strasbourg, having liberated it, had special interests over and beyond a particular military problem. Strasbourg has a very special significance for the French public. He was very adamant that the city must not be surrendered. Well, I said, now look, we're in a battle where I want to capture the whole German Army if I can do it and, therefore, I want to get all the strength in my counter-attack I can. By the way, I told him this at



a dinner conference in Versailles at which Winston Churchill was with me, and, I think also Mr. Caffrey, the American Ambassador. After the whole thing was over and de Gaulle had gone, Churchill said: "Well, I think, General, you've made a very wise decision". What impressed me was that he allowed this to be a question between de Gaulle and myself. The Prime Minister said not one word in the discussion, didn't open his mouth. But to get back to the discussion, the whole question was this: We were talking from two different angles entirely -- one was French morale and national interests on de Gaulle's side -- and the other one was the winning of the battle against the German Armies. And I said, all right now, General, I won't pull out of Strasbourg. But I must take out some of the American covering troops I need in the region. But I promise you we'll hang onto this town if we possibly can. In other words, you'll never lose Strasbourg by our abandoning it. De Gaulle had pointed out to me, you see, that there could be a lot of reprisals made by the Nazis on the people of Strasbourg if we evacuated it. But everything turned out happily and there never was any recriminations that I know of. I will say this, it was a very hot argument that night at Versailles. You were right to say that Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt had both practically washed de Gaulle off because Roosevelt constantly said that sovereignty rests in the French people and he was not going to recognize General de Gaulle as a sovereign. But there's something you ought to know about the effect on me. I said to Roosevelt, well, you've got to recognize that the views of the French people cannot easily be expressed in time of war, but, after all, I'm occupying their country. Now, what am I to do about this? We've got to deal with some popular authority. Roosevelt said he'd let me know but I never saw Roosevelt again after January, 1944. I got my orders from the Chiefs of Staff. They said, you are going to have to get along with de Gaulle, diplomatically, politically and militarily, and so on. I said, all right, if that's the way it is, I'll do it my own way. Now, the Prime Minister never felt the same sort of antagonism towards General de Gaulle that Mr. Roosevelt did. Oh,



he would, once in a while, get off a wisecrack, as you said, but with Mr. Roosevelt, for some reason or other, it would look like he was trying to be tough with de Gaulle, not just wisecracking. Roosevelt did make it tough.

On the problem of liberating Paris, well, our troops got to the outskirts of Paris on August 25 and I was anxious to have French troops as the spearhead. That's what de Gaulle wanted most of all. It was also my hope that it would help create French unity. So I decided to give the honors on liberating Paris to the Leclerc Division, but it was quite a problem. As soon as the people saw the French Division at the Gates of Paris, they were all over the place -- you know, flowers, girls -- all over the damn area. It took us a real time to get them back together, but we got the Leclerc Division on the way and I forget what other one -- we had another assigned -- I'd have to recheck the records. Then I was told our own troops were up there too. So I went to see our Fifth Corps Commander, General Girow and I said: Where is General de Gaulle? I hear he's set up somewhere in Paris. Well, Girow said he was over in the War Office -- that's in the Rue Saint Dominique -- not the Presidential Elysees Palace. I went over to call on him promptly and I did this very deliberately as a kind of defacto recognition of de Gaulle as the provisional President of France and he was very grateful -- he never forgot that. It was really something. After all, I was commanding every damn thing on the continent -- all the troops -- and all that de Gaulle could count on, troops, equipment, every damn thing supplied by America and under my recommendations and orders. And so he looked upon it as what it was, and that is a very definite recognition of his high political position and his place, and that was, of course, what he wanted and what Roosevelt had never given him. By the way, that was on the 27th of August. I got to Paris about 11 o'clock on the 27th and I called on de Gaulle, as I recall, 2 o'clock in the afternoon -- anyway, as soon as I could.



SCHOENBRUN: It's a very great honor and pleasure to hear you telling about this on this particular day, General.

EISENHOWER: What is today?

SCHOENBRUN: Today is the 25th of August. It's the 20th anniversary of the liberation of Paris, sir.

EISENHOWER: Is that so! Is that so! Well, I'll be darned! Twenty years ago today! I guess there's a big celebration going on in Paris right now. Well, to get back to that day 20 years ago when I went to call on de Gaulle. General de Gaulle needed something that day to show to the populace that he was quite a fellow, and another thing that was bothering him was the armaments that the maquis had. Some of them were of a doubtful loyalty, you know, and some were dedicated communists. So de Gaulle wanted some help from us. So, I said, well, the first thing we'll do is this. We'll give you a review of allied troops. You know, Mr. Schoenbrun, this is as strange an incident probably in all military history because I got General Bradley and I said: Now, Brad, you go down and stand with General de Gaulle on the reviewing stand on the Champs Elysees and remember that the review is for him as the provisional President of France. Now, those troops that he reviewed were American troops actually deploying for battle but they first put on a military parade on the way to combat and that was a very unusual thing. I proved to de Gaulle that we would support him and his efforts to disarm the people he wanted to disarm -- the doubtful ones and the communists. And so he knew he could go ahead and take over the maquis irregulars and put them into units if he could, and we would do what was necessary in arming them, but only after they were inside the regular army. Never once did I forget that we did have a mutual respect for each other and this carried on into the Presidency many years later when we were both President of our countries. Our biggest argument as Presidents came out of this idea he was sold on, to have a publicly proclaimed triumvirate. You've got that right in your analysis, Mr. Schoenbrun,



that tripartite business and public recognition of France as a great power. That's right -- that's what he wanted. And you see I said look, I'll do everything else. I'll do everything else you are asking. I'll consult you as you request. I'll promise to make no move and neither will the British unless we've all agreed that we'll do this thing by study, but let's don't proclaim it publicly as a three-power directorate. But de Gaulle would have none of it, nothing less than his demands. I'd say to de Gaulle, now, Mr. President, this is trouble. I can't do it. I'd say that I believe that in the long run we've got to have the support of West Germany, of Italy and of the rest of Western Europe, as well as France. Now, Mr. President, if we are going to just tell them that they are going to have to do such and such -- while we are going to do so and so -- why pretty soon they are going to say, now hold on there, you are making us second-class citizens and then they will desert us. And de Gaulle said, well, Mr. President, France, Britain and the United States have world-wide responsibilities and these other nations do not. That was always de Gaulle's argument. Well, he was sort of forgetting, at that time, that Holland and Portugal were powers with pretty big world interests. I guess Portugal's got the biggest colonial possessions left now in Africa -- bigger than almost any other country. But de Gaulle just never could see the sense of this. I look at his reactions in this way: de Gaulle's one obsession since 1940 has been to restore what he referred to as the honor, the glory and the prestige of France, and I don't think it's fair to put this always down just to his personal ambitions, as a lot of people do. He is a patriot. His proposal to set up a three-power kind of triumvirate was designed to demonstrate that France stands as an equal, along with Britain and the United States and that France must be recognized by the world as such. Now, we did recognize him in his position as President of an important ally. After all, geographically France is very important, even if it weren't very important and strong as a nation -- that is, as a real power in the world. So my relations with him were



personally very good and we never had occasion to make critical speeches of each other publicly and so on. But there were many arguments on honest differences of conviction, and particularly that triumvirate obsession of his. There were also many areas of agreement between us. Now I want to be sure you say this and stress this. For example, he outlined for me the statement he was going to make about Algeria on September 16th, 1959, I believe. I was in Paris visiting him on September 1 and 2 at that time. And I said, General, the minute that you make that statement I am going to come out with a public statement praising your statesmanlike qualities. And I did so promptly. I helped him everywhere I could. But we had a lot of problems. I tried to get him to have the French representative to speak up and defend France in the United Nations debate. I said, now these resolutions are coming up for independence and there's nothing we can do to stop it. We can abstain, which we have in the past, from approving them and prevent a two-thirds majority necessary to inscribe the darn thing on the Agenda, but, I told de Gaulle, you make it impossible for us to do much for you because you refuse to defend yourself at the U.N. Your man walks out. Well, he said, it was because Algeria was an internal affair and none of the U.N.'s business and because, for so many years, Algeria had been an integral part of metropolitan France. He said he just couldn't take any other attitude at the U.N. and, therefore, he wouldn't let his representative enter the debate. Now, de jure, that is strictly, legally, under the French Constitution, he was right, but when it came down to practice, why it was just unreal, and I told him this. I said, here is one place, on the basis of this statement of yours, which is very democratic and just, where I can get my delegates to stand up and praise this thing before the whole world, in a very definite and meaningful way. But if you won't do anything to defend yourself in the debate, even after you make this statement on September 16, how do I make my argument for you?

Now, you know, it was at that particular time that Senator Kennedy was making his speech on Algeria. You know -- the one on how we ought to really go in



and kick France out of there. I thought that was a bad thing for Kennedy to do. As far as all foreign policy is concerned, he was nuts, that's all. But he began to learn -- I'll say that for him -- after he was President, after he made a few blunders, why, he'd learn. But I'll tell you that during his entire term he made public speeches -- or he had his Secretary of State do so -- that are just inexcusable in diplomatic exchanges. For example, his Secretary of State made a public speech in which he said our neighbor to the North -- Canada, that is -- was not doing her duty, not carrying her fair part of the burden. Well, if you do a thing like that, damn it, you do it in private by diplomatic channels. You don't talk that way about alliances. Kennedy, himself, then made a speech about Diem and said that Diem had lost his people to the communists and so on and so on. Now, Diem was our ally, and God-dammit, you can say these things privately but to go out on this publicly -- well, this is the worst thing a President can do.

(Break here for a moment)

But, you know, after all, de Gaulle and I got along fine personally. There are some people who misunderstand this. They raised questions on why I didn't call on him when I revisited the battlefield of Normandy last year. Well, I had a hurried trip and I had to catch the ship back out of Le Havre only four or five days later. So I wrote de Gaulle a little advance letter to tell him about my tight schedule. I said, now, I'm coming over there, but I am ashamed to just come down and just say hello and then run. I wanted to pay my respects, I said in the letter, but it's not proper just to run in and out of his office. So I said, I hope you will take this note as my hello, and that's that. That's the truth. And, by God, I got the nicest letter from him, from this old friend of mine and, why hell, he said, the place is yours. He ordered the Prefect and everybody around the region to do everything I wanted, and hell, we could have had the whole town. That's the way it always was, and I was the same with him -- I liked the guy. I really did, you can believe that.



Now, of course, he and I were never Charles and Ike -- never -- not like with Winston, for example. Winston and I -- why, we were just as warm, personal friends as we could be under the circumstances. De Gaulle never was that. He never had time, for one thing, and, for another, he's rather remote and I think he believes that his position requires it. He tries to create this feeling of a remoteness, of mystery -- or you might say mystique -- and that whole business. But, what I mean, is there was also a good feeling, not only of respect and admiration, but of a very measurable degree of affection. And, as for his family, well, I remember once he came, during the war, to Washington, while I was still in Paris, and, like a friend, he made it a point to call up Mrs. Ike and tell her I was fine. And he had never met her, didn't know her, but he acted simply and naturally, like a soldier calling up a soldier's wife to reassure her.

JOHN EISENHOWER: The remarkable performance, I thought, was when he came down to our house, down here at Gettysburg. He came to my house, as well as Dad's, and he talked English to us, which is a very rare thing and he talked to the children. I remember Mary Jean, my little one. Well, she kept staring at him because he had on these very thick glasses, after his cataract operation. And, of course, you know a little kid -- why, she came right up to him and she had to see those glasses. Well, de Gaulle took them off and showed them to her and he said to her, "Oh, poor me." And Mary Jean giggled and examined them and then he put them on again.

EISENHOWER: Well, he's a character. Now, I'll tell you how I felt about de Gaulle. About two years before de Gaulle came back into office I began to tell Dulles, I said, now look, Foster, our only hope in Europe is to get de Gaulle back in. He is the only man that will save that country. Now, let's make no mistake -- this man is not easy to deal with and, I said, as a matter of fact, that I was probably the only American that was welcome in his house. But the thing is, only he can save France, and France is going down the drain. Every economic index we have is pointing this





out and on top of that these troubles with Tunisia, Morocco, and later Algeria, and, of course, they'd gone through this terrible Gethsemane of Viet Nam -- it's going down the drain and, by golly, you've got to do something. Well, Dulles said: Look, I agree with you Mr. President but, now don't forget, when we get him back you're going to have to be the one to deal with him.

Well, you see, they had never gotten over the shock of Viet Nam. You see, I went through it before with him. Why, in 1951, before I went back home, I said to ~~them~~, look, you people have got to convert this war from one of colonization, of reasserting colonizing power that the public sees it as. You've got to convert it into a war between freedom and communism and you've got to make the Vietnamese people understand this. That's what I told them. Of course, de Gaulle was still in retirement then. Well sir, finally they made a few little gestures but they never got down to doing the right thing, and I'll tell you the one Frenchman who knew it, that understood it, was General de Lattre de Tassigny, and he came over, on my request, to America and made a speech and a television statement on this very thing. But it was because of the French refusal to do anything, and then their blunders made by their military people at Dien Bien Phu -- that was inexcusable -- I sent them advice through my advisors. I said, do not lock your troops up here. They're going to be surrounded. You just can't do it. You know what they said? They said this is the only way we can get these people out here where we can strike them in mass -- they're too elusive.

(Break in conversation - then it picks up again)

De Gaulle was difficult, yes, but hell, everybody has some rough edges, I don't care who it is. His were just a little bit more pronounced, that's all. So, while I don't object to your title, "The Uncivil War", because a great deal of it was that -- an uncivil war -- there were, I think, interludes in it. Let me put it this way -- in my own memory, as I look back over my relations with General



de Gaulle, during the whole time, I would class them as much more pleasant than they were with some people, and they were more fruitful. Roosevelt's relations with him were, of course, very different. Well, Roosevelt -- you see, he would make a pronouncement and that would be like the laws of the Medes and the Persians. And he said to me, de Gaulle is not a sovereign -- the sovereignty rests with the French people. I am not going to recognize him in anything until the French people do. I said, we're at war you know, Mr. President, but he just sort of threw it off I guess. He had made his pronouncement and that's that. Now, I had disagreements with de Gaulle but I never insulted him or fought him personally. And Winston, you know, he had to stay close to the President, he had to go with Roosevelt when de Gaulle kicked the traces. Now, I don't believe that he, himself, would have been so tough on de Gaulle if he had been free to act his own way and handle things his way. But in any event, that's between those two, Winston and de Gaulle. Finally they became good friends, very good friends. And that's important in an alliance. I've constantly argued you cannot have really good allies unless there is at least a mutually felt good faith. I have to have faith in you and you in me. Now, you can't do that unless you're pretty good friends. And if you're good friends you will show your good faith even on the most sensitive issues. That's the reason I was always for giving my allies some nuclear capability. I always said: Why should I treat them like second-class people? I just don't believe that they're going to start wars just because they got a weapon that we have, and after all, the principal adversary has the weapon and all the so-called secrets, so why are we withholding from a friend secrets an enemy already has? Look, I could have reached a satisfactory agreement with de Gaulle on the atom thing except for the law. I told de Gaulle time and again. I said, look, Mr. President, I'll go as far as I can today and I'm going to try to get Congress to change some of the provisions in the atomic energy law. He believed me and I did do it. I changed the law twice, but we never did get



all we needed. The damn thing ought to be repealed, because it's a futile damn thing -- those restrictions on the President. But there's a Joint Committee down there, a very powerful one, and it became an emotional issue. Now, of course, the atomic weapon is not only bigger, it is different in kind from any weapon in history. And, of course, there is the terror aspect of it. So, the greatest care should be taken in how it is handled, not just the bomb, but the whole atomic business, politically, in the world, the whole thing, atoms for peace -- I started that program, the search for disarmament. But, damn it, that doesn't mean turning against an ally who is going to be with you in the fight, if there is one. I think of it this way: If three men go into a bar-room and know they are going to get into a fight -- well, now, let's say I've got a good, thick pool cue, but all I've given you to fight with is a rotten stick and let's say John here the same. Well now, what the hell, we're not allies on equal terms. I wouldn't blame you if you said: Let the SOB go and fight his own battles. Now, when I go into battle I want the guys with me to feel they've got the same chance I've got. After all, your ally has as much to lose as you have and not only as much to win. That's why I think we ought to help de Gaulle on his nuclear programs.

Now, de Gaulle knew where I stood on this question of being a loyal ally and good friend, so He did not doubt my motives when I disagreed with him on the big pitch he made for the three-power triumvirate. He knew I was sincere and not just being, well, selfish or trying to monopolize power, because he knew I was trying to help him on atomic power. But the three-power thing -- I just couldn't see it. Well, he finally made his biggest pitch for it when we were alone together -- at Rambouillet, it was. Just the two of us and one interpreter -- nobody else. That's when he took up all the world issues, you know, Viet Nam, Laos, and so forth, and French interests and influence there, and how we really needed to work out tactics and strategy together and how he could help us there, too, because we were going to have one hell of a big problem there.



De Gaulle, of course, was not President of France during the Indochina War. He was not personally marked by that French failure and he felt he could talk objectively about the problem and had influence there. Well, I told him how I felt about that Viet Nam problem. We Americans had to move into a vacuum there after the French pulled out in 1954. When I talked to de Gaulle in 1959 -- by this time we were just really trying to find the kind of government in Viet Nam that would do the job for itself because my theory has always been there's no saving a country that doesn't want to be saved and won't fight for itself. It can't be done, and that's the reason I was trying to find a government where they could really inspire people. The failure of Diem was that he got all his damn relatives into power and isolated himself from the people and he just wouldn't or couldn't lead the fight for freedom against communism. He couldn't inspire the people, couldn't win their confidence. Now, when the Vietnamese people themselves say we know what we want, and we want these bastards out of here, and if you will help us we'll take care of ourselves, why, then we will get somewhere. But what's been happening there? Why, we have gone to these little villages and fortified them -- you know, the fortified hamlet program. Well, you give them the arms and then three communists come along and the villagers take out the arms and say: "Here they are and we don't want any part in this war", and give the arms to the communists, because they have no confidence in their own leaders. And look what has been happening recently -- ambushes -- ambushes of a whole damn battalion. Now, dammit, that's crazy, that's criminal, to lose a battalion of soldiers to a guerrilla ambush. And just think of an American Secretary of Defense -- McNamara -- going to Saigon and ducking around back roads to drive into the capital. My God, that's humiliating. There was a political symposium about two months ago in Philadelphia, and I talked about this Vietnamese war. I said, we're not going to win this war no matter how many people are there until we finally fire the South Vietnamese people up with a morale that is based on their



own desire to be free. Now, if they really get to the point that they want to be free and live under freedom, like we want to, when they once understand that, then we will have no trouble, because then we will have the right intelligence information and there will be the people, and they will have the arms and keep them and use them in self-defense and drive back the communists. It can't be done any other way. But right now the damn truth is that there isn't a big majority to fight for freedom.

What bothers me most about de Gaulle's policy is that he does not give enough weight to the vital importance of this whole Southeast Asia struggle and what would happen if we let the thing go, not only Indonesia, but what is India going to do then. India would become totally isolated. I think that really the defense of Southeast Asia today, in my opinion, is the defense of India, and if that whole sub-continent of some 400 million people and more falls to the communists or breaks with the West, well, brother, I'll tell you, then we become more and more isolated in this world.

Now, de Gaulle is pretty good and clear in saying what we do that's wrong and how Viet Nam is in a mess, but we don't get much from him on how to clean it up, or any offer to help on it. And then, of course, he's got this obsession you are writing about -- this Anglo-Saxon thing -- you know, the special relationship he thinks we have with the British. Now, that's just not true and the record proves it. Why, the British wanted us to agree in advance with them on certain plans in Suez, for example, and we wouldn't do it. Now, that Suez thing -- it was the British and French together. So where was this Anglo-Saxon thing de Gaulle always talks about? And de Gaulle knows I always tried to give him everything he needed and wanted to conduct the war and to help him unify the French. And I spoke out for his Algerian policy and tried to help him on the nuclear program when I was President.

Why, back in the war we talked about this allied relationship problem all the time. He brought this up with me many times -- this thing about the British



special relations. What happened was in the war itself. We and the British had the only supplies and resources. When France did come back in the war, after its surrender, why, it came in by the back door, you might say, and with the things we gave de Gaulle and his Free French. They were dependent completely on us. They had no manufacturers or factories or anything else because they were occupied and then their factories were destroyed. And, of course, I can't blame Roosevelt and Churchill for just keeping the combined Chiefs of Staff as a British-American combine, because that was the reality -- the fact of life. But de Gaulle always resented that he wasn't brought in to it. But, after all, it was my influence, more than anybody else's, that got the French sector in Germany, because I believed already that they had to have something to help them up after the war. And I believed in de Gaulle and in his own belief that the French needed grandeur, that they needed to restore self-respect by a sense of greatness and mission. Yes, de Gaulle was right on that and he knows I backed him up all the way and did everything I could to build up their morale. I worried more about the French and helped them more than I did for the British. Dammit, there never was any special English-speaking favoritism, and de Gaulle should know that. And then, much later in NATO we set up the Standing Group of the French, British and American military advisors meeting in Washington. We brought them in. But I do admit that no matter what we did de Gaulle had this fixed misconception and he would never forget it. But he's wrong and I told him so, over and over again.

You can't have just two or three pals acting as a self-contained unit in the diplomatic and strategic world without just losing all your other friends and that's all there is to it. And I just couldn't go along with this plan of his for joint global strategy -- what you call in your articles here his veto on our strategic air power. You're right, that's what joint planning as de Gaulle requested would amount to -- a veto. Why, he said we shouldn't use our nuclear weapon



anywhere in the world without consulting him, and his sharing in the policy decisions. Now, he must know we couldn't do that. Dammit, the British haven't got any such kind of deal. That's where I stood on this business and I told him so as often as he brought it up. I was willing to recognize him as an important world figure but he didn't have any means of exercising real world power. He had no real air force, he had no fleet, he had nothing else, so when we were trying to defend ourselves in Formosa, in Korea, Viet Nam, or carrying out things all around the world, my God, I wasn't going to be saying to my Commanders: Are you going to consult now with these people and wait for them to do something. My God, if you try to conduct our United States foreign and defense policies on the basis of not being able to do anything until you want and consulted everybody and said, here now, they've got to agree before we do it -- well, brother -- you'd be in an awful lot of trouble, I'll tell you that. But short of just delivering our initiatives over to him and submitting ourselves to his judgments, well, short of that, I really did try to meet his desire and need for some kind of world position and prestige. I'll tell you how far I went. I said to de Gaulle: Now, this is the way we can do it, Mr. President. We'll set it up in London -- you've got a big Embassy there and so have I. I'll make special appointments -- I'll strengthen the Embassy with special people, high-ranking people, both in the political and military world, and you can do the same. Britain can do it, of course, because they're right there in London. We will have all these top people there and we will put them, if you want, under a Director, or some such title, and they will be authorized to take current plans, current problems, emerging problems -- and we will give them authority and plenty of time to coordinate our views so we can plan to be in a position to operate in unison, anywhere in the world, on any problem, or at least not to act in disunion. We can map out broad areas of agreement, for there are many, and can identify and contain the disagreements. I tell you I was offering him everything it was possible to offer



and very far towards his requests. But he wouldn't have it. It was all or nothing with him. He wanted it at the top, all the way, like Cicero and Pompeii and Caesar. I recognized what he wanted to do and why. I knew that there were some things you just couldn't get through to him -- that you had to ignore -- but I still think it's a damn good thing we had him because there wouldn't be any France today without him.

SCHOENBRUN: Well, that was when you were President and he came back to power. What about de Gaulle today? Is it a good thing to have him now?

EISENHOWER: Well, I don't know what's going on now. You'd better put that question to the fellows dealing with him now. But you make it clear that he and I were always friends, even when we disagreed. The disagreements get a lot of publicity, of course, but we got along personally very well and there were a lot of areas of agreement, too. Be sure you put them on the record because that's part of the whole truth about what you call the Uncivil War. Now, as I told you, I don't object to that title -- it's right enough -- but it should be all right, not just the truth, but the whole truth.

