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Authority NLE 2011-148 #2

By MMK NLDDE Date 7/5/12

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Accompanied by Thomas C. Sorensen, I met the Shah at Niravand Palace at 4:30 Sunday afternoon, December 1. After about 15 minutes wait in an anteroom, Sorensen and I saw Mr. Alam, the Minister of Court, for a moment in the hallway. He was dressed in a boy scout leader uniform and greeted us most cordially. We said good-bye there and arranged that I would return with the architect, Walter Netsch, of the Pahlavi Building on January 18, 1969.

Sorensen and I then walked into the Shah's office, a room about 60 feet long and perhaps 40 feet wide, decorated in the Persian style with mirrors. On the floor were a magnificent collection of carpets and the Shah's desk was at the north end of the room. He escorted us to the southern end of the room and asked me to sit beside him on a large sofa.

After introducing Mr. Sorensen, I was about to start telling him the purpose of my visit when he immediately asked what progress there had been on the building in Chicago. I told him that the building was going well and that I planned to bring the architect back with me with a painting of the completed building, the model he had requested and other drawings and perspectives on January 18. He was delighted by this. I then told him that we also planned to have a festival of Persian arts and music and an exhibition of Persian paintings on October, 1970 opening date. I indicated that I was working out the details of this with Hossein Nasr and that we hoped, additionally, to publish a book on Persian architecture at the same time. Again, he indicated his delight with this scheme. I told him that I thought it would be possible, relatively soon, to undertake the sort of sophisticated program in Persian studies we had originally discussed and that I was relying heavily on the help of Tehran University in moving in this direction.

Next I turned to a project which Mr. Sorensen wished to discuss with him.

Lastly, I told him that I was planning to give a talk to the Council on Foreign Relations and perhaps a report to friends of the Adlai Stevenson Institute in Chicago on my discussions with President Nasser of Egypt, President Azhari of the Sudan, His Majesty and the President of Turkey. He asked me how I had found President Nasser. I described the nature of my discussion with President Nasser rather briefly and he replied, "Of course, he may say that to you, but his past record shows that he will say one thing in adversity and when he gets out of the corner do quite another." Conversely, he went on to say, the Israelis must recognize that they must not push their luck too far. World opinion, which has opened many doors for them, would speedily turn against them if they appeared now to be the aggressors and the "bullies" of the

Middle East. Iran, he said, was opposed in principle to the occupation of territory of another power by force. He stressed that this must be the principle of Iran for purely egotistical reasons, since Iran would not tolerate, could not tolerate -- but he stressed would never have to tolerate -- occupation of Persian territory by the Soviet Union.

This led him to revert to a theme which he had mentioned earlier with Mr. Sorensen of his bitterness at what his father experienced at the hands of the great powers. His father, he pointed out, has been driven into exile "because he would not bend". He pointed out that while there may have been purely moral reasons, saying ironically that he was sure there were no factors of economics or great power politics involved in the Second World War, but that the intervention of one state in the affairs of another was always bound to be unhappy and potentially disastrous. "I was a puppet," he said in the early years of his reign because this was the only way he could survive. Then, as he gradually began to assert his independence, came the period of 1961 and 1962 when, he said, looking sharply and coldly at both Sorensen and me, the Kennedy Administration tried to force him too hard to undertake programs it thought wise for Iran. I intervened, at that point, to discuss some of the policy aspects of the Kennedy Administration and he dropped the point. He went on to say, however, that the issue of foreign intervention in Iran was now a thing of the past. "Today," he said, "they come to us, from all corners of the world, and we only have to consider which offer to accept." "We have taken off."

Nevertheless, he continued, the problems of external intervention in the affairs of another nation were by no means dead in the world today. He pointed to the Czech example and said, "Of course, they would not fight, perhaps they could not but they never have." With Yugoslavia, he pointed out, it was quite a different situation for the Yugoslavs would certainly fight and he made it quite clear that he would expect the Persians to do so too under similar circumstances. Tito was now a much better friend than he was of Nasser. Nasser, the Shah pointed out, not only maintained an aloof position on Yugoslavia but in fact loudly hewed the Russian line on Czechoslovakia.

The real problem, he pointed out, was what would happen in certain sensitive areas of the world. In the Mediterranean, he indicated, any move by the United States to withdraw the Sixth Fleet, even if matched by compensatory moves by the Soviet Union, would throw open the issue of Turkey. The only way out of this dilemma would be for the United States to establish missile bases in Spain. Both Sorensen and I had the impression that the Shah misunderstood aspects of the NATO and U.S. missile capability and its relationship to the Sixth Fleet. Sorensen pointed out that



the Polaris submarine would not be treated as a part of the Sixth Fleet or at least had not been so treated in the past. He questioned what the advantages would be of missile bases in Spain and pointed out the sensitivity of previous missile bases in Turkey. The Shah affirmed that he felt very strongly that compensatory moves would have to be taken in Spain beyond the present American air bases and the naval base at Rota. The United States, he pointed out, no longer treated the Mediterranean as a Western preserve but had in fact "cut in" the Russians at the time of the May-June, 1967 crisis. The real question was, therefore, how far the Soviets would go. He did not, he stressed, believe that the Soviets would in fact invade Yugoslavia because it was perfectly clear to them what the cost of this would be.

This led him to turn, to the second aspect of Soviet policy in the Middle East, the supply of armaments to certain of the Arab countries. If, he said, it is true that the Egyptians have in fact started to receive 200 MIG-23's, this introduced a very new element in the balance of power. I questioned him on this and his reply, true to character, was a heavy emphasis on the military technology involved.

The MIG-23, whose performance characteristics he recited, was not only capable of carrying a nuclear weapon but also was substantially faster than the Phantom jets on which he is now relying. I questioned whether this was really a significant issue and he projected a "scenario" in which Egyptian jets might be stationed, not at Helwan or Aswan but at Habbaniyah in Iraq. The real point of danger, as he sees it, is in Egyptian expansion into the Arabian Peninsula.

I questioned whether or not this was a serious possibility as long as the Arab-Israeli issue is outstanding but also pointed out the irony of the Egyptian and Israeli armament struggle and its effect on neighboring countries.

This led us into a discussion of his recent meeting with King Faisal of Saudi Arabia.

He described Faisal as "my friend. We embraced when we met. But, he pointed out, the issue of the continental shelf land and the mineral rights of the Persian Gulf, had been a nagging issue between them for a long time. That, he said, was at last resolved.

Saying that, "We did not ask the British to leave", the Shah emphasized that "Iran will not accept a situation in which the British leave by the front door and return by the back door." As I questioned him on this, he indicated that precisely, he meant that Bahrein, an area taken away from Iran, would have to have its

status reconsidered. Gesturing toward his telephone, he said, "Of course, I don't intend to send a few soldiers there" but he did indicate that something like a plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the people of Bahrein would be required. In general, he continued, Iran intended to develop the power to replace the British in the Persian Gulf. "We do not seek new responsibilities," he said, "but we do intend to control, whether with others or our neighbors or alone, the Persian Gulf area." "We are now developing the capacity to do this and we do not intend to have other great powers intervene there." Asked about the status of Kuwait, the Shah said, rather sharply, "We were the first to recognize Kuwait." It is probably that he was reacting to the attempted pro-Persian coup d'etat which took place during his visit to Kuwait recently and which he was at great pains to disavow.

Warning that it was very important for the United States to choose certain areas of the world and among potential friends to support, he said that of course the United States would continue to bear a heavy responsibility for the maintenance of independence in the world and could not avoid this. However, it was very important for the United States not to seek puppets and not to rely on those who could not maintain their own independence. This had been the disaster of our policy in Vietnam. While we were invited in by the government, that government spoke for no one. He had supported our policy in Vietnam, he said, until the Indonesian coup d'etat. There are, "some jobs which are dirty but which must be done and Vietnam was one of these until the Indonesian revolution." Stressing that he would not speak against his friend, President Johnson, he said that nonetheless he disagreed with American policy strongly in Vietnam.

As for the Middle East, he said, the United States would make a serious mistake on relying totally on Israel and that in default of Israel, Iran was the only power upon which the United States could rely for the maintenance of independence of the area. When I asked him about Turkey, in this connection, he dismissed Turkey with a wave of his hands, saying "Turkey is part of NATO." In any case, he went on, Turkey is separated from the real field of activity, the Arabian Peninsula, by Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel. Iran, to the contrary, has direct access.

Moreover, he said, the United States and Western Europe were heavily dependent upon Middle Eastern oil and its denial to Europe was clearly one of the remaining Soviet objectives in the Middle East. I questioned him fairly sharply on this point and he affirmed that the United States could only supply Europe with petroleum for a short period of time. When I suggested that in addition to domestic American reserves, Venezuela, Algerian and Libya might be usable,



he said, "The Algerians and Libyans are Arabs and you would not last long there." American petroleum reserves, he stressed, were good for only ten years. Meanwhile, European consumption is rising rapidly. In these circumstances, he stressed, the position of the Persian Gulf is practically vital. I indicated that I thought increasingly it might be more important for Japan than for Europe. He said that was true that it was important for Japan but again stressed its world wide importance.

Stressing that he "had a future here" he said that it was perfectly clear that it was to America's interest to rely heavily upon his regime as one determined and capable of maintaining its independence.

This led him to a discussion of domestic Persian affairs. He spoke with genuine conviction of "our revolution", saying that the maintenance of independence was merely only the means to enable the country to carry out a genuine social revolution. This had gone so far, he said, that even underground waters were nationalized so that any man digging a well on his own land would be told how much water he could draw so as not to deplete the national reserves or to unfairly sap the reserves of his neighbor. Free enterprise, he said, was a very important social system but that unbridled, it became a monster. "We do not intend to allow unbridled exploitation of man by man." Heavy stress, in our conversation, was laid on the establishment of a new sort of VISTA program for young women. It was decided, to make this voluntary and it was thought that 2,500 places would be a reasonable hope. However, he said, 10,000 girls had volunteered this year.

Turning, in conclusion, to the attitude of outside powers about Iran, he said that there are those who know what we are doing and approve and those whom we cannot reach no matter what we say. He was bitterly annoyed by the outside criticism of Iran. Walking us to the door, he shook hands gravely and told me that he would be glad to see me again in January.