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PURPOSE AND USE OF THE OPERATIONS PLAN

This Operations Plan sets forth agency programs, courses of action, action responsibilities and timing consideration in order to carry out NSC policy with respect to Antarctica for which the President has designated the OCB as the coordinating agency.

This Operations Plan does not encompass every U. S. agency program or course of action but it does include those considered as important which are being implemented or definitely planned.

Each agency has agreed to carry out the programs and courses of action contained in the plan subject to modification or review should a change in circumstances so indicate. Such changes will be agreed through normal interagency coordination, where appropriate, and will be made in accordance with usual procedures, and not necessarily with any immediate formal amendment of this Operations Plan. A new plan will be prepared as soon as practicable following approval of a new or revised NSC statement of policy or a major change in circumstances.

Department of State will transmit appropriate sections of the text of this plan to U. S. Chiefs of Missions in the countries affected by U. S. Antarctic operations, e. g., United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, France, Norway, Argentina, Chile, and the U. S. S. R. The Department of Defense will furnish appropriate sections to the Commander, Task Force 43. The National Science Foundation will furnish appropriate portions of the Annex to the U. S. National Committee for the International Geophysical Year. Other agencies may transmit the complete plan on a strict "need-to-know" basis to senior field representatives whenever such distribution is desirable for effective implementation. However, agencies and the mission can communicate individual courses of action to officials concerned, if all references to the NSC policy and to the OCB plan are eliminated, with a classification determined by the agency concerned.



Concurrence in this plan by the responsible agencies represented in the OCB does not automatically constitute authorization to operating officials to undertake new programs or modify existing programs, but does serve as a basis for appropriate operating instructions to be developed by each of the participating agencies. All figures contained in the courses of action should be viewed only as planned program levels. Those figures are subject to priority changes and other factors. Appropriations and expenditures not already authorized which are needed to finance the programs set forth are subject to determination in the regular budgetary process.

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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD

September 6, 1957

OPERATIONS PLAN FOR ANTARCTICA (NSC 5715/1)

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Reference: U. S. Policy on Antarctica (NSC 5715/1)
Approved by the President June 29, 1957.

B. Special Operating Guidance

1. Objectives. U. S. operations should be developed in accordance with U. S. objectives which are: orderly progress toward a peaceful solution of the territorial problem of Antarctica which would improve the basis for the establishment of sovereignty over the area by the United States and interested friendly powers; freedom of exploration and authentic scientific investigation throughout the Antarctic and maximum interchange of Antarctic mapping and scientific data (consistent with the previously mentioned objective); and access by the United States and friendly powers to the natural resources of the Antarctic.

2. Area of United States Interest with Respect to Claims and Rights. The extent of U. S. territorial aspirations and discussion of these with friendly foreign claimants should be dealt with in three stages:

a. With respect to the area from 90°-150° W. Long. and the present New Zealand (150° W. -160° E.) and Australian (160° E. - 142° E. and 136° - 45° E.) claims.

b. With respect to the Norwegian claim (45° E. - 20° W.), its unclaimed hinterland, and the French claim (136° - 142° E.)

c. The remainder of the Antarctic Continent, and adjacent islands, including the Chilean, Argentine, and British claims, largely overlapping, within the sector 20° W. - 90° W.)

3. The merging of potential U. S. claims with those of New Zealand and Australia in the area to be dealt with in the first phase above appears attractive and should be adopted as a first position.



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The greatest United States interest is in this vast area, which covers approximately 5/8 of the Antarctic Continent. Our rights are virtually unchallenged in the Unclaimed Sector (90° - 150° W.) adjoining the Ross Sea area to the East.

4. Rather than to reach an immediate determination as to the exact locations within the area where our interests and activities justify our challenging the existing New Zealand and Australian claims, the United States should approach those governments with the proposition that our rights and interests be merged and that the creation of a tripartite condominium be agreed upon in principle. Discussion with representatives of New Zealand and Australia should commence as soon as possible with the view to reaching early agreement but with any public announcement of United States claim or recognition of claims to be deferred until after the IGY, and in accordance with the expressed desires of the other governments concerned, and after NSC review of the proposed actions.

5. Inform the British of our immediate intentions. As to our ultimate intention with respect to the British claim, tell them it may be expected to depend in considerable degree upon the success of the United States-Australian-New Zealand condominium proposal. An obvious and perhaps ideal ultimate solution, which would be the logical sequel to the first phase of our plan, would be accession of France and Norway first, and the UK, Argentina, and Chile, eventually, to a greater Antarctic condominium. The bargaining power and the persuasive arguments which may ultimately bring all interested countries into the arrangement may be expected to grow as the accession to the condominium grows.

6. Do not inform the governments of Argentina and Chile, at this stage of our conversations with the other countries. This is not because we necessarily consider their claims invalid. In fact, it must be recognized that their geographical situation and their recent history of active participation in Antarctic exploration and research gives them a solid basis for permanent participation in Antarctic affairs. Their national policies and temperaments would make it extremely difficult, however, for them to agree at this stage to yield any of the sovereignty they have so proudly proclaimed. Eventually, however, if faced with the "fait accompli" of a vast condominium embracing the United States, New Zealand, Australian, French, and Norwegian sectors, the idea of settling their long-standing dispute with one another and with the British through participation as members of a greater Antarctic condominium, on equal standing with the others, might possibly have some appeal. If not, the United States can arrive at an understanding with the Palmer Peninsula powers whereby we neither recognize nor challenge their claims and reserve our own rights pending a solution to be reached among them.

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7. Subjects which appropriately can be combined with the matter of claims in our conversations with other governments might include joint operation of airstrips and other facilities, weather stations or observers, exchange of military and scientific information and personnel, and the continuation, expansion, or perpetuation of existing joint undertakings, whether related to the IGY or not. This may be particularly applicable to the Knox Coast area.

8. In undertaking these conversations, it should be kept in mind that a breach of secrecy prior to full agreement with the other powers might require a prompt Presidential decision as to immediate public announcement of United States claims.

9. Contingency Guidance. If, before completion of action noted above, the USSR makes a claim, or if UN action or other developments make it necessary or desirable, the United States should assert a claim to the unclaimed sector of Antarctica and to such of the presently claimed areas regarding which agreements have been made with the Free World claimants concerned, and a reservation of United States rights within other presently claimed sectors, with advance notice, if at all possible, to friendly claimant powers.

10. Operations in Support of the IGY. The sequence of operations for the next two years is built around logistic support required for the IGY program and these operations have been planned primarily in support of scientific programs of the IGY. In addition, certain other scientific activities of a limited cost which are of interest to United States Government departments and agencies, and which can be supported within the limitations of the forces assigned, are not precluded.

11. United States Antarctic activities in the post-IGY period should be reduced to a minimum essential to support United States interests. Subject to budgetary and personnel limitations, scientific, logistical and financial preparations for a continuing United States presence in Antarctica should be undertaken, since preservation of United States rights and protection of our potential interests will require United States activity in Antarctica for a long time to come. Operations should be conducted at a level that is feasible from the bases retained and the forces and equipment programmed.

12. Substituting Expeditions for Permanent Stations. While periodic seasonal expeditions served to establish United States rights and interests in Antarctica prior to 1956, the year-round occupation of Antarctic bases by the Soviets and other nations since that time makes it advisable from the political standpoint for the United States to maintain permanent stations lest its rights in Antarctica be diminished by the year-round

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presence of other nations, particularly the Soviets. From the scientific standpoint, the highest values are assigned to continuity of observations, and sporadic seasonal visits to the continent would be of negligible scientific worth. Valuable geologic work, however, might be accomplished. The most effective work which has been done in recent Antarctic exploration has been made possible by the use of aircraft, and much of this work requires aircraft so heavy that to date no means has been found to operate them on skis. If U. S. activity is confined to expeditions sent into Antarctica during the Antarctic summer, some of the most effective use of aircraft must await the construction of a landing strip after arrival of the ships in November or early December. If year-round bases are maintained, airfield construction and maintenance take place during the winter months and aircraft can fly to Antarctica and operate in early October. This has the effect of doubling the effective length of the working season, with consequent increased scientific gains. In the light of the positive political disadvantages and the limited scientific gains, it does not appear that the overall requirements of U. S. national policy would be served effectively by annual expeditions alone.

STATE, COMMERCE, INTERIOR, CIA AND NSF RECOMMENDED THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH:

13. Post-IGY Antarctic Program.

a. Although there is a requirement for a reduction of Antarctic activity, a continuation of a substantial program in the region is considered essential to support U. S. interests. Bases kept in commission will serve political and intelligence purposes and make possible a variety of scientific activities of practical importance to the understanding of our physical environment and the nature and value of the region. For example, in the field of meteorology, it is expected that IGY research will show that meteorological data from the Antarctic region is of immediate practical importance for long-range weather forecasting. Similarly, upper atmosphere studies will undoubtedly lead to improved long-range radio communication. To obtain these data, it will be essential to continue meteorological and other observations from a number of fixed points widely separated, including inland bases in the Antarctic.

b. Those disciplines which relate to the electrical nature of the upper atmosphere require bases selected with respect to features of the geomagnetic field, and those disciplines relating to earth physics require locations selected on the basis of terrain and other geological features.

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Stations with good synoptic records are desirable. Geophysical, geological, and biological investigations supported by systematic aerial photography of the areas investigated can be expected to result in a better evaluation of the resources of the continent and of the surrounding seas. Further, scientific activity in a variety of fields will provide the basis for exchanges of data with other nations which may be active in the region after the IGY and will multiply the scientific benefits of the United States program.

c. The program to be pursued at existing bases will utilize, to the extent possible, all laboratories and scientific instruments now at the bases. Modest programs in geology and biology will be added within the operational capacity of the bases.

d. The interrelation of various factors makes it impractical to provide a precise order of priority base by base. Nor is it possible until further results of the IGY are available, to define with precision the level of scientific activity at each base. We may assume however, that the number of year-round personnel at each base retained after the IGY will be no greater, and in most cases will be less, than the number at present.

e. The present United States Antarctic Program consists of five major scientific stations plus a logistics operating base with one aviation weather station operated jointly with New Zealand. In accordance with the instructions to reduce the program in the post-IGY period to a minimum essential to the national interest the Weddell Sea station may be eliminated. As discussed below, it may be possible to eliminate or drastically reduce activity at a second station (Little America) and, depending upon future developments, a third station (Knox Coast) might be turned over to Australia or operated jointly.

f. Because United States Antarctica activity is to continue for some time to come and because the United States may announce claims during the post-IGY period, it should be recognized that the national interests might best be served by planning for some of the reductions in 1959-60 and deferring others until 1960-61.

g. The following network of bases is considered essential in terms of the United States national interests:



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(Millions of Dollars)

(1) Base of Operation	Estimated Scientific Costs ^{1/}	DOD Estimated Direct Support Costs ^{2/}	DOD Estimated Indirect Support Costs ^{2/}
(a) Pole Station	\$.2	\$ 1.3	\$.9
(b) Byrd Station	.3	1.5	1.0
(c) McMurdo Base (with Cape Hallett)	.1	3.2	3.6
(The following are conditional and are included for convenience of reference:)			
(d) Little America V Station ^{3/}	.6	1.8	3.7
(e) Wilkes Station ^{4/} (Knox Coast)	.2	1.1	1.0
(f) Expedition to pene- trate to Marie Byrd Land Coast (provided this is not accomplished during DEEP FREEZE III or IV as presently contemplated)	.07	.3	.7



1/ The map compilation program (see para. C. 25.) is not included in the above since the program will be carried out in the United States.

2/ Defense estimates for logistic costs are based on activity at approximately the present level at each base retained. Some reductions in direct costs, with corresponding reductions in indirect costs could be achieved by reduction of activity at the stations. Direct costs include all those expenses incurred as a direct result of the establishment and operation of the Antarctic bases. Examples of direct costs include transportation equipment, buildings, petroleum products used ashore, communications equipment, special clothing and similar items required to establish and make a base operable. They also include costs of special equipment required by ships and aircraft for Antarctic operation as well as the repair of damage incurred in such operations. Indirect costs include pay and subsistence of military personnel, fuel, routine maintenance of ships and aircraft, and other supporting costs, which have in the past been borne by the armed services.

3/ The largest scientific station today is Little America. The McMurdo base, which is in the same general area, was set up solely as a logistics operating base. It is possible that the scientific activity at Little America could be continued at McMurdo, provided geophysical, physical and political conditions are satisfactory, and similar scientific facilities were made available and Little America is not necessary for support of the Byrd Station. This consolidation would depend upon feasibility and the reduction in costs and forces which would result.

4/ See discussion in paragraph 13. g. (3), page 8.

(2) Pole-Byrd-McMurdo-Little America Stations. The essentiality of this combination of stations ((a)-(d) above) is based upon the geographical coverage of three areas represented by the Pole Station, the Byrd Station, and McMurdo-Little America combinations; and from this standpoint, activity at Little America and McMurdo may be subject to consolidation.

(a) Political Interest (State). The Pole Station has top priority for maintaining a strategic U. S. position in the Antarctic, pre-empting the USSR and for prestige purposes. Our continued presence in this location would also serve to protect any future assertion of U. S. rights in the unclaimed hinterland of the Norwegian claim. The Byrd Station is necessary for maintenance of U. S. rights within the Unclaimed Sector and to forestall USSR activity in this sector.

(b) Intelligence (CIA). Similar to (a) above. Maintenance of the Pole and Byrd Stations would provide opportunities for surveillance of any USSR activity in the adjacent Norwegian claim, the interior of the Australian claim, and the Unclaimed Sector.

(c) Scientific.

i. Geology (Interior - Geological Survey). From the geological standpoint, the Byrd Station has the highest priority. It is in the area of expected U. S. claims and Marie Byrd Land is geologically, virgin territory. Bedrock is exposed in the region and is known to be metamorphic with a chance for mineralization. The McMurdo-Hallett area lends itself to detailed geologic study, both as a refinement and as an extension of previous work.

ii. Meteorology and other sciences (Commerce - Weather Bureau, National Bureau of Standards, Coast and Geodetic Survey - and National Science Foundation). The three areas above were originally selected for sites for IGY stations. If the other nations continue to provide the U. S. with



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meteorological data from certain existing bases, the above bases are the bare minimum necessary for a meteorological research and observation program. In general, the same situation exists with regard to certain other geophysical disciplines, such as ionospheric research, geomagnetism, seismology, and gravity measurements.

(3) Knox Coast Station. The Knox Coast Station is a special case, and its value depends upon future developments. Costs based upon the current level of U. S. activity are estimated as follows: Scientific costs \$.2 million; direct support costs \$1.1 million; indirect support costs \$1. million.

(a) Political Interest (State). Continuation of the Knox Coast Station provides an important opportunity for cooperation with Australia and for forestalling USSR expansion. It is possible that negotiations with Australia could result in agreement that Australia take over the station or operate it jointly with the United States, thus reducing the cost to the United States and providing the United States with the use of air facilities at Mawson.

(b) Intelligence (CIA). With air facilities available through cooperation with Australia, U. S. activity in this area would provide a means of observing USSR operations.

(c) Scientific.

i. Geology (Interior - Geological Survey). With air (helicopter) support, geologic investigations of the exposed bedrock on the Knox Coast can be expected to contribute materially to the geologic knowledge of the continent.

ii. Meteorology and other sciences (Commerce - Weather Bureau, National Bureau of Standards, Coast and Geodetic Survey - and National Science Foundation). Scientific observations from the coastal area between 60° and 120° E. are essential to the meteorological program. If such data can be made available only through U. S. operation of the Knox Coast Station, top scientific priority is attached to this station. However, if adequate data is gathered at Mawson (Australia), Mirny (USSR), and other cooperating stations and the data is readily available to the United States, the scientific priority is reduced.



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h. In view of the above, it is concluded that:

- (1) the Weddell Sea Station be discontinued;^{1/}
- (2) alternatives with respect to maintenance of the Knox Coast Station be explored with the objective of reducing or eliminating U. S. support;
- (3) the feasibility and desirability of eliminating the Little America Station be determined;
- (4) the Pole, Byrd and McMurdo Stations be retained.

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDS THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATE PARAGRAPH:

13. Post-ICY Antarctic Program.

a. The U. S. policy is to reduce U. S. Antarctic activities in the post-ICY period to a minimum essential to support U. S. interests. In reducing U. S. Antarctic activities in the post-ICY period, consideration should be given to reducing the number of U. S. stations in the area. In line with the guidance as stated above, the Department of Defense recommends that the program be limited to support of the following stations only and to proceeding with one new project, providing the latter is not accomplished during the ICY:



^{1/} The Defense Department estimates that the total cost of maintaining the remaining stations, i. e., Pole, Byrd, McMurdo (with Hallett), Little America and Knox Coast is \$20.5 million.

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(Millions of Dollars)

<u>Base of Operation</u>	<u>Estimated Scientific Costs^{1/}</u>	<u>Estimated Direct Costs^{2/}</u>	<u>Estimated Indirect Costs^{2/}</u>
(1) <u>McMurdo Base (with Cape Hallett)^{3/}</u>	\$.1	\$ 3.2	\$ 3.6
(2) <u>Wilkes Station (Knox Coast)</u>	.2	1.1	1.0
(3) <u>Expedition to penetrate to Marie Byrd Land Coast (provided this is not accomplished during Deep Freeze III or IV as presently contemplated)</u>	.07	.3	.7



1/ The map compilation program (see para. C. 25.) is not included since the program will be carried out in the United States.

2/ The above amounts are based on activity at each station at approximately the present level. Some reduction in direct costs, with corresponding reductions in indirect costs, could be achieved by reduction of activity at the stations. Direct costs include all those expenses incurred as a direct result of the establishment and operation of the Antarctic bases. Examples of direct costs include transportation equipment, buildings, petroleum products used ashore, communications equipment, special clothing and similar items required to establish and make a base operable. They also include costs of special equipment required by ships and aircraft for Antarctic operation as well as the repair of damage incurred in such operations. Indirect costs include pay and subsistence of military personnel, fuel, routine maintenance of ships and aircraft, and other supporting costs, which have in the past been borne by the armed services. In 1959 these costs will be approximately equal to one and one-half times the direct costs.

3/ The McMurdo Sound base is the principal supply base in the Antarctic. It is the most economical one to support, has an airfield suitable for large aircraft, and has extensive facilities which would permit its

development into a scientific station. It is also desirable to continue the supply of Hallett Station in order to provide weather information for flights from New Zealand to McMurdo, without appreciable additional effort. The penetration of the Marie Byrd Land Coast is desirable in order to increase activity in the Unclaimed Sector and to determine the feasibility of landing a party in this area.

b. The Knox Coast Station is a special case, and its value depends upon future developments in that its importance will diminish in the event scientific data are available from Mirny and Mawson. Specific considerations which affect its retention are as follows:

(1) Political. Continuation of the Knox Coast Station provides an important opportunity for cooperation with Australia and for forestalling USSR expansion. It is possible that negotiations with Australia could result in agreement that Australia take over the station to operate it jointly with the United States, thus reducing the cost to the United States and providing the United States with the use of air facilities at Mawson.

(2) Intelligence. With air facilities available through cooperation with Australia, U. S. activity in this area would provide a means of observing USSR operations.

(3) Scientific.

i. Geology. With air (helicopter) support, geologic investigation of the exposed bedrock on the Knox Coast can be expected to contribute materially to the geologic knowledge of the continent.

ii. Meteorology and other sciences. Scientific observations from the coastal area between 60° and 120° E. are important to the meteorological program. Advantage should be taken of such data as can be made available through U. S. -Australian cooperation at Mawson (Australia) and Mirny (USSR). If the data is readily available to the United States from these latter sources, then the importance of observations from the Knox Coast Station and the importance of retention of this station is reduced.



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c. The retention of any inland base requires heavy transport aircraft with a pronounced increase in direct costs, and a corresponding increase in supporting costs as well.

d. Any program which is approved will be dependent, to some extent, upon the Department of Defense (Navy) for assistance. There are no civilian icebreakers in the United States and no significant U. S. -owned ships that are reinforced for ice navigation. Landings and parachute drops might require participation by the military. The Navy is now in process of decommissioning 60 ships, and is undergoing severe reductions in personnel. These reductions increase the difficulty of meeting the Navy's primary commitments in the field of defense. The ships, the aircraft, and particularly the personnel used in Operation DEEP FREEZE, are needed elsewhere. The program outlined above appears to be the maximum that is feasible without unwarranted reduction in the forces available to the Navy for the defense of the United States.

e. Conclusions. Active U. S. Antarctic stations should be limited to McMurdo Base (with Cape Hallett) and with scientific facilities added, and possibly Knox Coast. The maintenance of inland stations will require an extensive air lift effort, the expense and hazards of which are out of all proportion to the benefits to be gained. The extent of the program and the feasibility of its individual projects, then, will depend upon the ability of the Department of Defense or other designated agency to provide logistic support within its capability.

14. The following chart is illustrative of departmental and agency interest in a network of Antarctic stations:



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	State	Defense	CIA	Commerce	Interior	NSF
Pole	x		x	x		x
Byrd	x		x	x	x	x
McMurdo (Hallett)		x		x ^{1/}	x	x
Little America ^{2/}				x ^{3/}		x ^{3/}
Knox Coast	x ^{4/}	x ^{4/}	x ^{5/}	x ^{1/6/}	x ^{5/}	x ^{6/}
Weddell Sea (Ellsworth)			x			
Penetration to Marie Byrd Land Coast ^{7/}	x	x	x	x	x	x

1/ If Pole and Byrd Stations are not operated, then the remaining stations would not be a satisfactory network of meteorologic research, and of very little value in a scientific program.

2/ This station is essential to support of Byrd Station unless Air Force Globemasters operating from McMurdo are used.

3/ Scientific activities at Little America can be eliminated if they can be consolidated at McMurdo.

4/ Providing arrangements cannot be made for operation by Australia.

5/ Provided air facilities are available. (Helicopters would be satisfactory for geologic work but not for intelligence purposes.)

6/ If satisfactory scientific data is not made available from Mawson and Mirny.

7/ Provided not accomplished during Operations DEEP FREEZE III or IV as presently contemplated.



15. Executive Agency and Budgetary Responsibilities. Department of Defense will act as the executive agent of the U. S. Government through 1959 in supporting scientific and other expeditions in Antarctica. Consideration of the need for a separate Antarctic Commission will be handled through the legislative reference process of the Bureau of the Budget. In the absence of legislation, recommendations with respect to the designation of an executive agent and assumption of budgetary responsibilities will be developed by the Working Group for early CCB consideration.^{1/} In addition, consideration will be given to conducting logistics operations in the Antarctic in the post-IGY period by commercial contract or by MSTS and MATS facilities, bearing in mind that costs of such operations cannot be ascertained until the scope of the U. S. Antarctic program in the post-IGY period is agreed upon.

16. Soviet Antarctic Activities: 1956-57

a. Soviet activities in Antarctica increased on land and sea in the 1956-57 season, following the delivery by three vessels of additional personnel, fuel and equipment. Two new stations were set up, but one of these had to be placed 400 miles short of its planned location at the South Geomagnetic Pole. Other stations were enlarged and observations were expanded. Glaciological, aeromagnetic and "aerogeophysical" surveys, and geological traverses were undertaken. Systematic mapping operations covered more than 23,000 square miles along the coast from Gaussberg to Bunge Hills. A topographic and geologic map of the Mirny area at the scale of 1:10,000 were compiled. A winter staff of 189 persons has replaced the 92 of the previous season. Hydrographic and oceanographic surveys of coastal and adjacent waters were made by two vessels through 73 degrees of longitude west of Mirny. Eighteen hundred miles of coastline were mapped and charted, using astronomic control, aerial and radar scope photography and echo soundings. Aircraft from the Lena made 94 initial landings.

b. The political motivation of Soviet activities is indicated in a report of the 1955-56 operations, which declared that Soviet participation in Antarctic exploration, together with the asserted discovery of Antarctica by Russians, secured the right of the USSR to participate in any settlement

^{1/} Department of Defense feels that in the post-IGY period, in accordance with the concept of performance budgeting, each department of the Government should budget for its own share of the costs of the over-all program. This would include both direct and indirect costs.

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of the legal status of the continent. The continuing publicity given to Soviet activities is believed to be for the purpose of laying the groundwork for future assertion of Soviet rights.

c. Earlier Soviet plans have now been expanded to include a "coastal oceanographic exploration in the Amundsen and Bellingshausen Seas." This would be in the general area of U. S. interest in the Unclaimed Sector, particularly the Marie Byrd Land Coast where the United States will attempt an icebreaker penetration during the IGY period if possible. If these plans are carried out the Soviets will have surveyed much of the coastal perimeter of Antarctica, and they will have been the first explorers to make detailed investigations of the coasts of the Unclaimed Sector. Such a development would serve to impair the generally recognized and nearly undisputed U. S. rights in the Unclaimed Sector. The Soviet member of the Bureau du CSAGI has supported plans to examine the merits of a post-IGY program. The Soviet plan to launch 30 high-altitude (200 kilometer) rockets for upper air studies also constitutes an expansion of original Soviet projects.

C. U. S. Commitments for Funds, Goods or Services

17. U. S. assistance to other countries in the Antarctic in various phases of the IGY consists in general of limited logistic aid, principally with New Zealand in the joint establishment of the Cape Hallett Station. Instrumentation and construction at that site is mainly of U. S. origin.

II. CURRENT AND PROJECTED PROGRAMS

A. Political

18. (17) - Commence diplomatic conversations with Free World claimant countries as appropriate to make clear to them U. S. intent to advance at an appropriate time, a formal claim to the unclaimed sectors of the Antarctic and to certain other areas in which the United States has rights from discovery, exploration, or other activity. Negotiate with the Free World claimant countries the possible extent of their and U. S. claims, the mutual recognition of claims, and the method of exercising sovereignty, and the proposed merging claims, creation of a condominium, and joint operation of stations.

Assigned to: State

Target Date: Continuing

19. (16) - Concurrently with these discussion, continue to study the historical basis for American claims, and likewise to compile data on the physical, environmental, and economic characteristics of the areas where it

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is determined to assert such claims, either individually or through participation in a condominium with friendly claimant powers.

Assigned to: State
Target Date: Continuing

20. (18) - If, before completion of action under paragraph II A. 18. above; the USSR makes a claim, or if UN action or other developments make it necessary or desirable, assert a U. S. claim to the unclaimed sectors of Antarctica, and to such of the presently claimed areas regarding which arrangements have been made with the Free World claimants concerned and a reservation of U. S. rights within other presently claimed sectors. If at all possible, advance notice should be given to the friendly claimant powers.

Assigned to: State
Target Date: When appropriate

21. (19) - To minimize the political gains of anticipated Soviet activities in the Unclaimed Sector at the expense of U. S. rights, undertake in the 1957-58 season, if feasible, an icebreaker penetration of the Marie Byrd Land Coast, and extend systematic aerial photography as far toward the Amundsen Sea coast as practicable.

Assigned to: Defense
Target Date: 1957-58

B. Logistics

22. (23) - Support Scientific Operations at the current level through the International Geophysical Year and provide support to selected stations. to insure a continuing U. S. presence in Antarctica after IGY. (See Annex)

Assigned to: Defense
Target Date: Continuing

23. (23) - Reduce U. S. Antarctic activities in the post-IGY period (beyond April 1959) to Antarctic stations indicated in paragraph 13 above.

Assigned to: Defense
Target Date: Continuing

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C. Scientific

24. (22) - Undertake geological studies in areas of maximum U. S. interest and conduct a program of systematic aerial photography for each area to be investigated including the taking of both reconnaissance and detailed aerial photography at appropriate scales in order to support and strengthen U. S. rights.

Assigned to: Interior, Defense
Target Date: Immediately

25. (22) - Continue to seek legislative authority to conduct mapping in Antarctica and seek budgetary authority to conduct this program.

Assigned to: Interior
Target Date: Immediately

26. (22) - Continue a program of map compilation and preparation from unprocessed aerial photography and other mapping data obtained by U. S. expeditions.

Assigned to: Interior
Target Date: Continuing

27. (21) - Continue scientific programs, through the IGY, in support of U. S. policy.

Assigned to: NSF
Target Date: 1957-58

28. (21, 23) - Conduct scientific program(s) in support of U. S. objectives during the post-IGY period outlined in paragraph 13 above.

Assigned to: To be determined
Target Date: 1959 and thereafter

D. Information and Cultural

29. (17) - Disseminate information overseas on U. S. Antarctic activities to reflect both historical and current interest in the area while avoiding political issues relating to the status of claims and assertion of rights.

Assigned to: USIA
Target Date: Continuing

Enclosure:

Annex - Schedule of Proposed
Antarctic Operations through 1959.



ANNEX

SCHEDULE OF PROPOSED ANTARCTIC OPERATIONS
THROUGH 1960

1. The Department of Defense as the Executive Agency for U. S. operations in the Antarctic is providing the logistic support for the planned scientific program. The Department of the Navy has been designated by the Department of Defense as the Executive Agent for the Department of Defense's responsibilities in this regard.

2. The present Antarctic operations were initiated by the reconnaissance made by the USS ATKA, January to March 1955, to determine the areas best suited for base construction. During DEEP FREEZE I an Air Operating Facility was established at McMurdo Sound and a station at Little America was partially completed. Preliminary reconnaissance to determine sites for other stations was conducted, and teams were left to winter-over in Antarctica so as to be able to commence work on certain stations in October of 1956.

3. During October and early November 1956, long-range Navy and Air Force aircraft flew into McMurdo Sound, and the first phases of the establishment of Pole Station, Byrd Station and the Scott Glacier Air Facility were undertaken. A landing and the initial air drops were made at Scott. A landing was made at the Pole, and final preparations were made for the departure of a tractor train from Little America to the site of Byrd Station at 80° S latitude, 120° W longitude.

4. The ships of the Task Force arrived in Antarctic waters in early December, and the task of establishing the remaining stations was begun. In the Weddell Sea area the Task Force experienced considerable difficulty with heavy ice concentrations. The base was ultimately established near Gould Bay, considerably to the eastward of the intended position at the base of the Palmer Peninsula. All IGY stations have been given appropriate names, which are listed in the table below:

<u>Station</u>	<u>No. of Scientists</u>	<u>Location</u>
Little America V	29	Ross ice shelf
Byrd Station	16	Lat 80°S long 120°W
Amundsen-Scott Station	9	South Pole
Wilkes Station (Knox Coast)	10	Vincennes Bay Knox Coast
Ellsworth Station (Weddell)	10	
Cape Hallett (Adare)	4	Cape Hallett near Cape Adare



Cape Hallett is a joint station with New Zealand. In addition, the Task Force assisted the New Zealand Expedition by transporting material for a New Zealand base at Hut Point at McMurdo Sound.

5. In late December a special Electronic Test Unit, consisting of 10 men and 2 R4D aircraft, flew to Puntas Arenas, Chile, with the intention of flying into the Ellsworth Base. Due to the delays experienced in establishing Ellsworth Base and its final location, about 300 miles farther to the eastward than intended, this unit was unable to fly into Antarctica.

6. The Task Force was successful in establishing all the IGY bases, and returned to the United States during April 1957.

7. October 1957 - Operation DEEP FREEZE III commences.

a. Long-range aircraft fly in to McMurdo. The following aircraft will be flown in:

2 R5D

2 R4D

4 F2V

8 C124

A picket ship and one icebreaker will be on station for this flight.



8. October-November 1957 - Task Force ships depart CONUS for Antarctica.

Operation DEEP FREEZE III is primarily a resupply mission. The principal effort will be the transportation of supplies and relief personnel to the various stations. All personnel who have wintered-in will be relieved, and supplies for the following winter brought in. Figures for each station are as follows:

a. Little America - 82 military personnel and 29 scientists as relief personnel. 5000 measurement tons of cargo. Supplies for Byrd Station will be landed here and sent on by air or tractor train.

b. Byrd Station - 10 military personnel and 16 scientists, 300 tons of cargo.

c. Weddell Sea Station - 33 military personnel and 10 scientists, 2600 tons cargo.

d. Knox Coast Area - 16 military and 10 scientists, 1800 tons of cargo.

- e. Cape Adare - 10 military personnel, 4 scientists, 900 tons of cargo.
- f. Pole Station - 8 military personnel and 9 scientists, 130 tons of cargo.
- g. McMurdo Sound Air Operating Facility - 57 military personnel and 4000 tons cargo. Supplies for Pole Station will be landed here and sent on by air.

In addition to the provision of necessary supplies and relief parties, Operation DEEP FREEZE III will take advantage of the Antarctic Summer to assist the scientific effort. Parties of scientists and tractor crews will also be airlifted in, and trains of tractors radiating from Byrd Station, Weddell Sea Station and Little America, will be supported by aircraft as necessary.

- 9. These activities will require ships as follows:
 - a. One icebreaker and one cargo ship to Weddell Sea.
 - b. Three icebreakers, 3 cargo ships and 1 gasoline tanker to Ross Sea.
 - c. One escort destroyer (picket ship) between New Zealand and Antarctica.
 - d. Ships of the Ross Sea group will supply Knox Coast Station and Cape Hallett as well as Pole, Byrd, and Little America Stations, and the Air Facility at McMurdo.

- 10. The following aircraft will be required:
 - a. 2 R5D
 - b. 8 R4D
 - c. 10 UC (Otter)
 - d. 4 P2V
 - e. 3 Helicopters (ashore)
 - f. 8 Helicopters (on icebreakers)
 - g. 8 C-124 (USAF)



11. With the exception of 3 Otters, which will base at Little America and Weddell Sea, all planes will be based at McMurdo. The ski-equipped R4D's will be able to land near some of the distant stations. The C-124's will be used to air-drop supplies at Byrd and Pole Stations.

12. The total personnel who will leave U. S. waters for Antarctica will be 2224 of whom 296 will remain in Antarctica, relieving an equal number who have been there for a year. Two hundred eighteen military personnel and 78 members of the USNC-IGY will winter-over.

13. Late February 1958 - Task Force ships and long-range aircraft depart for CONUS.

14. October 1958 - Operation DEEP FREEZE IV begins. Task Force ships and long-range aircraft arrive to resupply stations that will be retained and to evacuate personnel from those which will be decommissioned.

15. February 1959 - Task Force ships depart Ross and Weddell Sea areas

16. October 1959 - Operation DEEP FREEZE V begins. Resupply of remaining Antarctic Stations.

