

BIGOT

T01055

OVERLORD-ANVIL [papers]

Allied Forces, Supreme Headquarters.

370.2/2 Vol. I

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Authority J.C.S. MEMOS
Date 1/17/73 by D 1/4/74
By ajh, NARS Date 3/25/74

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HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME ALLIED COMMAND

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COPY NO. _____

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Date: JAN 232300 A TOO

From: SHAEF

Originator: COS

To : AGWAR (B-33)



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Info: British Chiefs of Staff London (M-37)

E

U R G E N T

U.S. SECRET - BIGOT

"Edited Literal Text"

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J.C.S. MEMO

To : AGWAR and TROOPERS
For : Combined Chiefs of Staff rptd Brit Authority
From : SC, AEF
Signed: Eisenhower

Date 7/5/72

By DJH, NARS Date 11/19/73

1. I have now had an opportunity of discussing the 'OVERLORD' plan with my Commanders-in-Chief. We are convinced that in all discussions full weight must be given to the fact that this operation marks the crisis of the European war. Every obstacle must be overcome, every inconvenience suffered and every risk run to ensure that our blow is decisive. We cannot afford to fail.

2. In this light we have reviewed the 'OVERLORD' plan and we are fully convinced that it is, as the Chiefs of Staff have already asserted, on a narrow margin. The present plan is limited to a three divisional assault. To ensure success we consider it essential to increase the assault force to five divisions. Nothing less will give us an adequate margin to ensure success.

3. Our reasons for this view are that an operation of this type must be designed to obtain an adequate bridgehead quickly and to retain the initiative. Three divisions are insufficient for this. The present frontage of assault is consequently too narrow. It will be essential to extend the front to give us a greater opportunity of finding a weak spot through which to exploit success. Moreover, the chances of success of the operation will be greatly increased and the capture of a port speeded up if we could extend our assault to the EASTERN beaches of the COTENTIN PENINSULA WEST of the barrier formed by the RIVER VIRE and its marshy estuary. Further, the securing of the EASTERN flank, and the early capture of the important focal point of CAEN with the vital airfields in its vicinity will be facilitated by the extension of the assault to the beaches just WEST of OUISTREHAM.

4. With five divisions we should carry out our assault as follows. We should land one US and two BRITISH assault divisions on the CAEN beaches each on a two brigade front as already planned. We should land one additional BRITISH division with one brigade up on the beach just WEST of OUISTREHAM and a US division with one brigade up at the SOUTHERN end of the EAST COTENTIN beaches. The whole assault would thus be made by five divisions with eight brigades up. These would be followed on the second tide of D day by the equivalent of two divisions in landing ships and craft

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as in the original plan. To assist the assault on the COTENTIN an airborne division would be landed on D day to seize the exits from the beaches; followed probably by a second airborne division in approximately twenty-four hours.

5. I understand that COSSAC has previously stated that additional craft becoming available for 'OVERLORD' should be used to strengthen the follow-up on D plus 1 by embarking in landing craft units at present carried in ships. While I agree as to the desirability of this, I am convinced that the first necessity, as stated above, is to widen the frontage of the assault in order to obtain a larger initial bridgehead.

6. I have had examined the additional resources required to fulfill these proposals. By cutting down the scales of vehicles carried in the assault and follow-up I can find enough craft from within those already assigned to me to provide lift for one more assault brigade in reserve. The balance required will have to come from resources outside my control.

7. To carry out the revised plan will require an addition of the following:

1 L.S.H.
6 L.S.I. (L) or A.P.A.
1 L.S.I. (H)
(All with full complement of L.C.A. or L.C.T.)
72 L.C.I. (L)
47 L.S.T.
144 L.C.T. (see paragraph 16 below)



8. The following additional naval forces will be required above those already requested:

(a) ESCORTS:

24 destroyers
28 motor launches

(b) MINESWEEPERS:

4 flotillas

(c) BOMBARDMENT FORCE:

5 cruisers
12 destroyers
1 or 2 monitors or old battleships.

9. The majority of the naval forces, including the assault shipping and craft, must be formed in the UNITED KINGDOM by D minus 42, the last ships and craft joining their naval forces by D minus 28 at the latest.

10. The following additional BRITISH land forces will be required to start training in the UNITED KINGDOM by D minus 42:

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- 2 beach groups
- 1 beach sub-area headquarters
- 2 dock operating companies.



11. An additional eight fighter squadrons will be required to ensure the necessary cover over the extended assault area and wider shipping lanes, and two hundred troop carrier aircraft to ensure reasonable provision for the dropping of two airborne divisions within approximately twenty-four hours. These air forces must be available in the UNITED KINGDOM by D minus 60.

12. To allow an increase in the rate of follow-up and build-up proportionate to the increase in the assault, an additional 64 MT/Stores ships will be required for the first month.

13. The problem that must be faced at once is the provision of these additional forces.

14. I regard 'ANVIL' as an important contribution to 'OVERLORD' as I feel that an assault will contain more enemy forces in SOUTHERN FRANCE than a threat. The forces both US and FRENCH are in any case available; and the actual landing of these forces will increase the cooperation from resistance elements in FRANCE.

15. 'OVERLORD' and 'ANVIL' must be viewed as one whole. If sufficient forces could be made available the ideal would be a five divisional 'OVERLORD' and a three divisional 'ANVIL' or, at worst, a two divisional 'ANVIL'. If insufficient forces are available for this, however, I am driven to the conclusion that we should adopt a five divisional 'OVERLORD' and a one divisional 'ANVIL', the latter being maintained as a threat until enemy weakness justifies its active employment. This solution should be adopted only as a last resort and after all other means and alternatives have failed to provide the necessary strength by the end of May for a five divisional 'OVERLORD' and a two divisional 'ANVIL'.

16. As regards the target date, it is preferable from the army point of view that the early-May date should be adhered to if possible in order to obtain the longest campaigning season. I should prefer, therefore, to adhere to the existing date if it were possible. Rather, however, than risk failure with reduced forces on the earlier date, I would accept a postponement of a month if I were assured of then obtaining the strength required. Such a postponement would give an additional month of good weather for preparatory air operations and for training the additional troop carrier aircraft crews. It would also make available an extra month's production in the UNITED KINGDOM of about 96 L.C.T.

17. An immediate decision on the plan to be worked to and the date is a vital necessity. I request this decision at the earliest possible moment in order to allow time for the transfer of the additional resources to this theater and to enable planning and training to be completed in the limited time still available. The recommendations contained in this message have been made after consultation with my commanders and my own staff, but with no outside agencies.

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7. - Lt. Gen. Morgan
8. - General Montgomery
9. - Lt. Gen. Bradley
10. - Maj. Gen. Brownjohn
11. - Maj. Gen. J.C.H. Lee
12. - Lt. Gen. Spaatz
13. - Maj. Gen. Barker
 General Ismay
 Adm Creasy

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INCOMING MESSAGE
C O S S A C

COPY

From: WAR

Ref. No.: 29

To : SHAEF

Dated: JAN 252249Z Precedence: URGENT

Rec'd: JAN 260115A Security: ~~SECRET~~

"EDITED LITERAL TEXT"

Interior Addresses: For : EISENHOWER
From : THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF



Joint Staff Planners are working on your B-33 as a matter of urgency. In order to obtain a complete solution to the problem, we must have the basis you used in arriving at the additional resources required in order to make certain we are using the same assumptions. Request that you furnish immediately information on the following.

a. Your estimate of craft and ships which you will have according to present allocations, broken down to show availability, service-ability, and explanation of landing craft which you consider will be on station but not available for use in the operation.

b. Whether or not you consider as already available to you all or part of the 92 LCT's and 25 LCI(L)'s shown as non-operational in appendix "B" to annex 5 of CCS 428 (Revised), and comments on their serviceability.

c. Data on which you have based your outline plan for loading to include:

- (1) Capacities of different types of craft
- (2) Vehicles you plan to lift per RCT and per Division in the assault
- (3) Assault shipping and craft which you plan to use in the assault for other purposes than lifting men and vehicles

d. Can you use LCT in place of LST and if so, at what ratio?

e. Confirmation of statement in Para 16 of your message that an extra month's UK production would give 96 LCT's. Available information here does not check this estimate of UK monthly production.

f. Could you accept any other type of personnel-carrying ship or craft as a substitute for part of the additional LCI(L)'s listed in your Para. 7.

g. Reference request for 8 additional fighter squadrons - has consideration been given to the employment of units now assigned to the Strategic Air Force in UK during the critical states of OVERLORD. Information is desired as to what US and British fighters you already consider will be available for OVERLORD. Was consideration given our A-5249 to Eaker of 5 January?

h. Reference your request for 200 additional Troop Carrier aircraft, what British and US units have you already considered will be available for OVERLORD including reserve planes and combat crews. Do you intend to operate them with single or with double tow? What

Ref. No. 29
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Authority J.C.S. Memo 116

Date 1/4/74

By DSH, NARS Date 3/25/74

DOD DIR. 52009, Sept. 27, 1958

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NE by WGL Date 1-16-69

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PAGE TWO CONT'D: Cable from WAR, dated Jan 252249Z, Ref. No. 29

What are your recommendations concerning using bombers as tugs?
Are crews to be included with the 200 additional transports?

i. With reference to your requirement for additional MT/Store ships in your Para 12, please furnish the number you now estimate will be available under present allocations and their sources. We understand that any additional requirement is the total to be furnished on a combined basis by the WSA and the BMWT.

j. Your estimate of the total Naval combatant forces broken down to show British and US types required.

DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION:

1-3 Maj Gen Bull

INFO;

4	Gen Eisenhower	10.	Lt Gen Smith
5	A.C.M. Tedder	11.	Gen Montgomery
6	A.C.M. Leigh-Mallory	12.	Lt Gen Bradley
7	Admiral Ramsay	13.	Maj Gen Brownjohn
8	Maj Gen Whitefoord	14.	Maj Gen J.C.H. Lee
9	Lt Gen Morgan	15.	Maj Gen Spaatz
		16.	Maj Gen Barker
		17/18.	S/GS
			Gen Ismay
			Adm Creasy

Ref. No. 29

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O U T G O I N G M E S S A G E

C O S S A C

Action to : AGWAR Date JAN 280030A Ref. No.: B-55
Information To: Originated by G-3 (WBS) Precedence: URGENT
Subject : Security: ~~SECRET~~

Approved for transmission by E.E. Beach

Reference: WAR 29, 25 Jan (Same Distribution)

"EDITED LITERAL TEXT"

Interior Addresses: To : MARSHALL
For : JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
From : EISENHOWER
Sgd : EISENHOWER



The replies to your questionnaire are given below. But I would emphasise that there is one main question to which an answer is required now. Will the additional lift asked for OVERLORD be provided? All plans and training considerations hang on the answer to this one question. Moreover a considerable degree of re-organization of our forces is entailed in changing from a three to a five divisional assault and first steps must be taken now and are, indeed, already overdue.

Your paragraph a.

CRAFT	AVAILABLE	SERVICEABLE
LSI (various sizes)	42	42
LST	192	173
LCT	636	540
LCI (L)	133	113

We have gone into this matter carefully and as far as we know every serviceable landing craft that is worth having is allocated to OVERLORD.

Your paragraph b.

Admiral Cunningham says that if he had been approached through the proper channels he would have answered the question as follows:- "The 92 LCT and 25 LCI (L) shown as non-operational are the percentage of the total number of these types of landing craft which at any one time will from past experience be out of action due to one cause or another. This is the agreed QUADRANT percentage un-serviceability figure. Any of the above craft which prove in fact to be operational on the day will of course be used in the operation." You will note that the same percentage figure is used in my reply to your paragraph a.

Your paragraph c. (1)

LST	60 vehicles - 300 men
LCT	11 vehicles - 55 men
LCI (L)	-- vehicles - 200

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Authority J.C.S. MEMO

Ref No: B-55

Date 7/5/72 000105
By DJH, NARS Date 11/19/73

Your paragraph c. (2)

It is planned to lift in assault 2,530 vehicles per assault division whether assault is made on a one or two-regimental front and 550 vehicles per assault RCT. You must note that these figures allow for the vehicles of four field regiments and one tank brigade per division as both British and American assault divisions will be reinforced to this strength. In the Commanders opinion this composition of assault divisions is essential to success.

Your paragraph c. (3)

48 LCT (5) armoured) Support craft each carrying specially
21 LCT (5) unarmoured) mounted 17 pdr and 25 pdr guns.

36 LCT converted to rocket ships
9 LCI (L) converted to headquarters ships.
3 LST (2) converted to fighter direction ships.



Your paragraph d.

Yes, up to a limit of about 100 LCT in place of about 17 LST. But if we do this they must be included in the follow-up forces, as berthing precluded using additional LCT's in the assault force area. As follow-up forces have a longer sea passage, any increase in the number of their LCT, although possible, is undesirable. Furthermore LCT are less efficient than LST in the build-up.

Your paragraph e.

The figure of 96 in paragraph 16 of my B-33 referred to an estimated monthly production of 25 LCT (4) and to a specific order for 71 LCT (3), petrol driven, scheduled for delivery during April. Delivery of the later was expected to be late, but it is estimated that they will be available for a target date in early June and every possible effort is being made to ensure this.

Your paragraph f.

32 LCI (L) are at present planned to carry personnel in the follow-up force. Personnel ships could be substituted for these but would entail the following disadvantages:-

(i) Added escort commitment.

(ii) Large size of ships involved and hence vulnerability. No more small personnel ships available in this theatre.

However, if necessary, we are prepared to accept any reasonable substitution or expedient that will provide us with extra lift.

Your paragraph g.

Our air plan envisages the fullest possible use of all available air resources in the United Kingdom in support of Operation OVERLORD. Fighters at present assigned to Strategic Air Force will be used in the general fighter pool, the employment of which will include escort for strategic bombers. Our Order of Battle therefore, includes all US and British fighters estimated to be operationally available in the United Kingdom on 1st May, 1944. Availability given in your A-5249 to EAKER of 5th January was noted. Our Order of Battle, however, includes the three strategic air force fighter groups expected to be transferred from North Africa. Total US and British fighters included in our Order of Battle as follows:-

- (i) Eighth US Air Force
Fighter day 45 squadrons.
- (ii) Ninth US Air Force
Fighter day 63 squadrons (includes above-mentioned 3 groups
(9 squadrons) expected from North Africa)
- (iii) British.
Fighter night 3 squadrons.
Fighter/recce 4 squadrons.
- Fighter day 42 squadrons.)
Fighter/bomber 16 squadrons) (to be reinforced by maximum
of 9 fighter and 2 fighter/
bomber squadrons from ADGB)
- Fighter night 6 squadrons (with 2 ADGB night fighter squad-
rons in reserve)
- Fighter/recce 5 squadrons (with 2 squadrons of Hurricane IV's,
and 1 Spitfire V squadron in
reserve)



Your paragraph h.

Aircraft and trained crews available for airborne operations made up as follows:-

US:	12 Groups (52) plus reserves (10) equals	744
British:	No 38 Group (190) plus reserves (48) equals	238
British:	Transport Command (150) equals	150
TOTAL:		1132

The thirteenth US Group (No 442) has not been included in above, as under present arrangements it is not due in United Kingdom until latter half of April.

It is not planned to use double tow with glider tugs. Both US and British troop carrier experts consider that under operational conditions envisaged here double tow is unwise. In view of this opinion I do not consider it advisable to take the risk.

In regard to bombers as tugs. Crews cannot be trained, or aircraft modified in time without excessive diminution of bombing effort and all available bomber effort is required in bomber role to give full support to OVERLORD. Excessive wear of engines would also be involved.

The 200 troop carrier aircraft are required as formed operational units, complete with crews fully troop carrier trained. They should, as nearly as practicable, arrive in the United Kingdom by D minus 60 to complete operational training for this operation. The three remaining US Troop Carrier Groups in Mediterranean are a possible source plus additional separate aircraft with crews to complete total.

The additional eight fighter squadrons are required under the changed plan to meet increased fighter commitments involved in extended frontage of assault, wider shipping lanes, extra spotting requirements for naval bombardment, and longer hours of daylight for later target date. It must be borne in mind also that certain fighter types included in our total available are not operationally interchangeable.

The additional troop carrier aircraft are required to provide the necessary margin to meet the increased airborne operation commitment involved in lifting one airborne division simultaneously followed by a second in about twenty-four hours, and probably followed later by a third and fourth; also for additional commitments such as the dropping of SAS Brigade, probably at the same time as the first airborne division.

Your paragraph i.

Existing allocation of shipping is that authorized at SEXTANT. This was a total of 160 ships to be provided on a fifty-fifty basis by WSA and BMWT after making allowance for British coaster contribution. The additional requirement of 64 ships is an estimate, and as no formal demand for these ships has been made on WSA or BMWT we cannot give the exact allocation as between these two agencies nor the sources from which the shipping will be drawn.

Your paragraph j.

An estimate of the total Naval Combatant forces required has been given to the Admiralty, who now have it under consideration.



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- | | |
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| 5. Admiral Ramsey | 13. Lt Gen Spaatz |
| 6. Maj Gen Whitefoord | 14. Maj Gen Barker |
| 7. Lt Gen Morgan | 15-16. S/GS |
| 8. Lt Gen Smith | |