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PAPERS

TRIDENT CONFERENCE

MAY 1943

PAPERS
AND
MINUTES OF MEETINGS

DECLASSIFIED
Authority JCS Regrading Memo 52-73
By ARK NLE DATE 12/29/73

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By ARK NLE DATE 10/29/73

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

TRIDENT

MINUTES

1ST MEETING, THE WHITE HOUSE, 2:30 P.M., 12 MAY 1943

PRESENT

British

The Prime Minister
Field Marshal Sir John Dill
General Sir Alan F. Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles F. A. Portal
Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay

U. S.

The President
Admiral Wm. D. Leahy
General G. C. Marshall
Admiral E. J. King
Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney
Mr. Harry L. Hopkins

SECRETARIES

Brig. General J. R. Deane
Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob

THE PRESIDENT welcomed Mr. Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff. He recalled that it was less than a year ago when they had all met in the White House, and had set on foot the moves leading up to *TORCH*. It was very appropriate that they should meet again just as that operation was coming to a satisfactory conclusion. The meeting at Casablanca had set on foot operation *HUSKY*, and he hoped that this would meet with similar good fortune. He thought that the keynote of our plans at the present time should be an intention to employ every resource of men and munitions against the enemy. Nothing that could be brought to bear should be allowed to stand idle.

He then asked the Prime Minister to open the discussion.

THE PRIME MINISTER recalled the striking change which had taken place in the situation since he had last sat by the President's desk, and had heard the news of the fall of Tobruk. He could never forget the manner in which the President had sustained him at that time, and the Shermans which had been handed over so generously had made their reputation in Africa. The British came to the present meeting adhering to the Casablanca decisions. There might have to be adjustments made necessary by our success, which also enabled us to take a longer forward view. *TORCH* was over, *HUSKY* was near, what should come next? He would put forward some views which had been formed by careful study. These would not be in the shape of fixed plans, but rather of ideas for the common stock. We had been able by taking thought together to produce a succession of brilliant events which had altered the whole course of the war. We had the authority and prestige of victory. It was our duty to redouble our efforts, and to grasp the fruits of our success. The only questions outstanding between the two Staffs were questions of emphasis and priority. He felt sure that these could be solved by mutual agreement.

He did not propose to deal with the U-boat war, and the aerial bombardment of Germany. There were no differences of opinion on these subjects, though there might be a few points of detail to be cleared up between the two Staffs. He would like to put forward for consideration a number of objectives, and questions which might focus subsequent

study. The first objective was in the Mediterranean. The great prize there was to get Italy out of the war by whatever means might be the best. He recalled how in 1918, when Germany might have retreated to the Meuse or the Rhine and continued the fight, the defection of Bulgaria brought the whole of the enemy structure crashing to the ground. The collapse of Italy would cause a chill of loneliness over the German people, and might be the beginning of their doom. But even if not immediately fatal to Germany, the effects of Italy coming out of the war would be very great, first of all on Turkey, who had always measured herself with Italy in the Mediterranean. The moment would come when a Joint American-Russian-British request might be made to Turkey for permission to use bases in her territory from which to bomb Ploesti and clear the Aegean. Such a request could hardly fail to be successful if Italy were out of the war, and the moment were chosen when Germany could take no powerful action against Turkey. Another great effect of the elimination of Italy would be felt in the Balkans, where patriots of various nationalities were with difficulty held in check by large Axis forces, which included 25 or more Italian Divisions. If these withdrew, the effect would be either that Germany would have to give up the Balkans, or else that she would have to withdraw large forces from the Russian Front to fill the gap. In no other way could relief be given to the Russian Front on so large a scale this year. The third effect would be the elimination of the Italian fleet. This would immediately release a considerable British squadron of battle-ships and aircraft carriers to proceed either to the Bay of Bengal or the Pacific to fight Japan.

Certain questions presented themselves in relation to the Mediterranean. Need we invade the soil of Italy, or could we crush her by air attack? Would Germany defend Italy? Would Italy be an economic burden to us? He did not think so. Would arguments against a general conquest of Italy apply equally against a *toe and heel* operation to establish contact with Yugoslavia? Finally, there was a large political question for the British and United States Governments. What sort of life after the war should we be willing to accord to Italy if she placed herself unreservedly in our hands? He might observe that if Italy made

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a separate peace, we should have the use of Sardinia and the Dodecanese without having to fight for them.

The second objective was the taking of weight off Russia. He was much impressed by Stalin's attitude, in spite of the stopping of the Arctic convoys. For the first time, in his recent speech, Stalin had acknowledged the efforts and victories of his Allies. But we should never forget that there were 185 German Divisions on the Russian Front. We had destroyed the German Army in Africa, but soon we would not be in contact with them anywhere. The Russian effort was prodigious, and placed us in their debt - a position from which he would like to emerge. As he had already mentioned, the best way of taking the weight off the Russian Front in 1943 would be to get, or knock, Italy out of the war, thus forcing the Germans to send a large number of troops to hold down the Balkans.

The third objective had already been mentioned by the President in his opening remarks. It was to apply to the greatest possible extent our vast Armies, Air forces, and munitions to the enemy. All plans should be judged by this test. We had a large Army, and the Metropolitan Fighter Air Force in Great Britain. We had our finest and most experienced troops in the Mediterranean. The British alone had 13 Divisions in that theater. Supposing that *HUSKY* were completed by the end of August, what should these troops do between that time and the date 7 or 8 months later, when the cross-Channel operation might first be mounted? They could not possibly stand idle, and he could not contemplate so long a period of apparent inaction. It would have a serious effect on relations with Russia, who was bearing such a disproportionate weight.

The objectives he had so far mentioned all led up to *BOLERO*, *SLEDGEHAMMER*, and *ROUNDUP*. By *BOLERO*, he meant the administration arrangements necessary for the movement and reception of large American forces in the United Kingdom. He could not pretend that the problem of landing on the Channel coast had been solved. The difficult beaches, with the great rise and fall of tide, the strength of the enemy's defenses, the number of his reserves, and the ease of his communications,

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all made the task one which must not be underrated. Much, however, would be learned from *HUSKY*. The question arose whether anything could be done this year before the weather broke in August or September. All the British landing craft had gone from the United Kingdom to *HUSKY*, and owing to priority having been rightly given to *SICKLE*, only one U. S. Division was so far available in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, plans were being made for an operation to provoke an air battle, and we were standing ready to exploit a German collapse, should this by any chance take place. He wished to make it absolutely clear that H. M. Government earnestly desired to undertake a full-scale invasion of the Continent from the United Kingdom as soon as possible. They certainly did not disdain the idea if a plan offering reasonable prospects of success could be made.

The fifth objective was aid to China. As a result of Casablanca, Field Marshal Wavell had prepared the best plan he could for operation *ANAKIM*, and he thought that it had some prospect of success. The difficulties of fighting in Burma were apparent. The jungle prevented the use of our modern weapons. The monsoon strictly limited the length of the campaigning season, and there was no means of bringing sea power to bear. Should, however, *ANAKIM* be successfully carried out, he was advised that it would not be till 1945 that the Burma Road could be reopened, and even then its capacity would not be more than 20,000 tons a month. Nevertheless, he had not gone back on the status of *ANAKIM*. He attached the same degree of importance as before to activity in the Indian Ocean theater of war. Was there any means by which China could be helped in 1943 other than the air route? How could this be improved? The British readily shouldered their responsibility to establish and guard the air facilities required in Assam. If further study showed that it would be better to by-pass Burma, he was anxious that another means should be found of utilizing the large forces standing in India. He thought that this alternative might well be found in an operation against the tip of Sumatra and the waist of Malaya at Penang. He was most anxious that we should find in that theater some means of making use of those advantages which had been so valuable in *TORCH*. In that operation, sea power had played its full part; complete surprise had

been possible; we had been able to seize a territory of importance which not only brought in a new Army on our side, but forced the enemy to fight in a place most disadvantageous to him. These conditions might apply to an attack on the area he had described. The fleet to cover the operation would come from the Mediterranean after the elimination of Italy. This meant that the operation could not be launched before March, 1944, which would, however, be a suitable moment from the point of view of weather.

He felt that the time had now come to study the long-term plan for the defeat of Japan. He would like once more to state the British determination to carry the struggle home to Japan. The only question was how best to do it. He thought that the United States Chiefs of Staff should lead in a joint study, on the assumption that Germany would be out of the war in 1944, and that we could concentrate on the great campaign against Japan in 1945. If the underlying strategic conception was agreed, then operations could be planned to fit in, and the requisite specialized apparatus could be got ready in time.

If, of course, Russia could be brought in against Japan, that would prove the best solution of all. Stalin had shown plain indications that Russia would want to be in at the death, but the timing of Russian action must obviously depend upon what happened to Hitler, and when.

In conclusion, the Prime Minister said that he hoped his remarks would be of use in framing an Agenda for Combined Chiefs of Staff Conferences, and would be some guide as to the emphasis and priorities which should be assigned to the various theaters of operation as well as to their relationship and reciprocal reactions.

THE PRESIDENT expressed his gratitude to the Prime Minister for the open manner in which he had presented his views. He said that the Combined Staffs must approach their problems with open minds, giving full consideration to the priorities and relative importance of the many problems which they would consider in the course of the conferences.