



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
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From: Admiral Robert B. Carney, U. S. Navy
To: Secretary of State, the Honorable John Foster Dulles

1. Pursuant to plan and as announced by Navy Department release, I proceeded to Naples, Italy arriving the afternoon of Thursday the 13th of January, continuing on to Rome for courtesy calls on Minister of Defense officials, and visited Paris 16-17 January where I conferred with General Gruenther and Admiral Cassady.
2. The announced purpose of my trip was mildly questioned by one newspaper man in Rome; also one attache of the Italian Foreign Office indicated obliquely that the Italian Defense officials probably were not aware of the purpose of my visit; the latter remark was apropos of nothing but might be traceable to Minister Martino. Otherwise, the cover story was not questioned, although I believe that there was some curiosity both in Rome and Paris concerning my visit.
3. On my arrival in Naples, I received word from Durbrow that I had an appointment to call on Mr. Scelba at 1700, Friday the 14th. On my arrival in Rome, I asked Durbrow if his presence would militate against frank discussions and was informed that he was accompanying me at Scelba's request.
4. Durbrow's pouched chronology of the meeting covers the details of the discussion and reflects its tenor and the background information with which Scelba prefaced the discussion; I confine this report, therefore, to a review of the principal points, together with certain inferences which I draw from the conversations.
5. First, it would appear that Scelba has not confided the details of his thinking even to Martino. I consider this to be significant because the execution of his "plan" would obviously require considerable organization, delegation of authority to various elements, and confidence in all of those participating in the execution of the plan.
6. Scelba stated that he is convinced that mere containment of Communism is no longer enough and that Government action must pass from containment to aggressive action. In answer to questions, he indicated that the timing for initiating such a campaign depended upon certain prerequisites and that the trend of future political events would determine the degree of urgency of putting the plan into execution. In other words, he would appear to have no fixed conviction, at this moment, as to when more aggressive action can be

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initiated.

7. He places considerable emphasis on achieving certain prerequisites - a favorable climate for action. These are covered in Durbrow's memorandum and need not be repeated here.

8. In addition to the measures openly announced in his 4 December communique, Scelba enumerated three measures which, in his opinion, would destroy the Communist party:

- (a) Closing all Communist schools.
- (b) Dissolving local Communist administrations.
- (c) Arresting key Communist personnel and leaders.



He stated that whereas these measures should accomplish the purpose, there was the chance that they might provoke the most violent sort of action and this was a contingency which prudence required be taken into consideration.

9. Queried as to the timing he might have in mind, he attached particular significance to the forthcoming elections in Sicily which take place on the 5th of June. As related in Durbrow's memorandum, the nature of the outcome of these elections would have an important bearing on the degree of urgency of need for strong action.

10. From the foregoing, I concluded that he does not intend undertaking any radical new measures prior to his scheduled visit to the United States and he left me with the impression that the 7th of June (two days after the Sicilian elections), was the earliest that a drastic plan might be initiated. He also gave the impression that if the Sicilian elections did not turn out too badly, the need for strong action would be considerably lessened and might be deferred.

11. With respect to the adequacy and dependability of his resources for enforcing the measures of his "plan", he seemed confident of being able to handle the situation in Sicily and, for that matter, from Rome South. He did not - and this seems significant - give an affirmative answer as to his confidence in the ability of the security forces to take care of all contingencies in the North, although he specifically and gratuitously voiced his confidence in the Army in addition to the Carabinieri and other police.

12. With respect to Scelba's interest in the possibilities for United States support, the views that he expressed were, from a military standpoint, rather practical and not unreasonable. Although he appears to be thinking in terms of having some measure of United States military support ready at hand, he seems

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to envisage its being used primarily for the stabilizing effects of its presence, with the possible exception of actual assistance in the securing of certain ports. The sort of support which he appeared to have in mind would be within existing U.S. capabilities if DOD had about thirty days notice.

13. Toward the end of the interview, I asked questions concerning the measures set forth in the 4 December communique. In reply, Mr. Scelba stated that whereas a few steps had been taken, the principal value was psychological. I inferred that the measures set forth in the communique were not being pressed with great urgency and that there was no strong intent to do so.

14. In conclusion, I came away from the interview with the following principal impressions:

- (a) Most of the plan is still in Scelba's mind.
- (b) He does not contemplate any radical action prior to his visit to the United States in March.
- (c) He is not contemplating initiation of the "plan" before the Sicilian elections.
- (d) He wishes to be prepared, in advance, to move strongly and immediately if the Sicilian elections are won by the Communists.
- (e) If the Communists show considerable gain, even though they lose the elections in Sicily, he would be disposed to initiate the "plan" as soon as the proper climate could be prepared.
- (f) If the outcome of the Sicilian elections should be favorable, he might be disposed to continue, as at present, along strictly constitutional lines against Communism in preference to invoking stronger measures.
- (g) The legal measures announced in the 4 December communique will go forward as convenient and practicable, but will not be pushed, in toto, with any special vigor.
- (h) He ties in the economic problem with the problems of Communism (as described in Durbrow's report).

15. There is one more piece of information which I obtained, separate from my discussion with Mr. Scelba, which may have a bearing on his thinking and position. Pacciardi, former Minister of Defense, informed me that the forthcoming presidential elections might result in a shake-up of the Government with the possibility that Fanfani would be named Prime Minister with Pacciardi back in the government; he skirted around the subject but mentioned the importance of the Interior portfolio. Such possibilities might deter Scelba from taking any of his colleagues into his confidence at this time.

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16. If my inferences as to Mr. Scelba's intentions are correct, he could be expected to approach the United States Government with a strong plea for economic assistance, using the menace of Communism and his own Anti-Communist convictions, record, and intentions in support of his plea. He could point to a certain measure of accomplishment; he could cite reasons for not proceeding with greater vigor at this moment; he could point out the dire effects of a reversal in Sicily in June; and he makes a point of necessity for being absolutely sure of success if he is to initiate his "plan". He may have some additional accomplishments to recite along the lines which he has already undertaken, but there was no indication that he would undertake anything more drastic on the eve of his departure from Italy for Washington.

17. I am retaining one copy of this report in my personal and secure files and I am making no distribution other than to yourself. I am so informing the Secretary of Defense.

Respectfully
R. B. Carney
ROBT. B. CARNEY



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