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UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

September 30, 1960

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Authority NLE 2011-26 #1
By MLK NLDDE Date 10/28/11

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN McCONE

THROUGH THE GENERAL MANAGER - 2

SUBJECT: TEST CESSATION NEGOTIATIONS AND TENTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS
FOR PRINCIPALS MEETING

Now set 11:00 a.m. Tuesday, Oct. 11.

As you know, the Conference resumed on September 27. The outstanding unresolved issues, both internally in the US Government, and between us and the UK remain unresolved.



On the opening day of the resumed talks, Mr. Stelle introduced the US proposal for the length of the research program - i.e. 2 years plus 3 months for review, to begin when the US so announces. He stated that the moratorium would become effective upon treaty signature and would run for the remaining portion of the 27 month period. Stelle expressed hope that agreement could be reached on the coordinated research program which would mark the beginning of the 27 month period but that if this was not possible the US would remain free to announce and proceed with its own research program. Before hand, the UK had raised some objections to these statements and would have preferred that the research program not begin until there was tripartite agreement on it. Fortunately, they were not successful in bringing about any such change.

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OR CHANGED TO: C-1
BY AUTHORITY OF DOE/DPC
JOHN K. HARRIS
REVIEWED BY
DATE 8/14/78

On September 29 the UK introduced the new phasing plan which had been agreed with the British during the recent discussions here. As presented by the UK this plan calls for installation of the system in 3 phases with Phase I now being 4 years in length, and broken into 2 sub-phases. Installation of control posts in both of these sub-phases would begin within three months after the treaty becomes effective, with Sub-phase Ia being completed within 2 years and Sub-phase Ib within 4 years. The first sub-phase in Phase I calls for installation of 10 control posts in the Soviet Union (including one on a USSR island), which should provide a location capability within that period such that on-site inspection could begin.

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INFORMATION

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With respect to the Principals' meeting Mr. Farley has informed us that while no firm date is yet made it seems likely that it will have to be later in the week, perhaps Friday, October 7, since Secretary Herter is definitely returning to New York for the first part of the week. I have set down briefly below some of the possible agenda items, but since the agenda is still highly tentative we will furnish you more detailed material later in the week as plans become more specific. Mr. Farley suggested the first two items below as possible agenda items and I mentioned to him the possibility of some discussion on the third item below although I told him I was not entirely certain how you felt about discussion of this matter.

1. New "Quota" Proposal. The unresolved question of a "ceiling" if we present the alternative ("escalated") quota proposal. As you know, we discussed with the UK a possible formula which would be consistent with the position we have taken in Geneva but would be stated in somewhat different terms. It would call for, during each year, a number of inspections in the Soviet Union consisting of beginning with a "bank" of two inspections. These would be increased by one for each additional five events occurring (20% of the events occurring) or, alternatively one for each three additional unidentified events occurring (30% of unidentified). The question is whether this total should have a ceiling or not. State has suggested (primarily Stelle) that the proposal should include a ceiling of 20. We have argued that it should not, because this would represent a needless retreat from the present US position in that it would mean 20, or fewer, inspections in the Soviet Union; even if the actual number of events were twice as many as we estimate for an average year (our present proposal of 20 per year with a review and adjustment on percentage basis after two years is both a floor and a ceiling). In addition, inclusion of the ceiling would seriously detract from our often stated principle that inspections must be directly related to numbers of events and system capability.

We believe that DoD will support your position on this. State will argue that since we have said we would accept 20% of the events and would also accept a flat 20 for the first 2 years we should be willing to have a ceiling of 20.

2. US High Altitude Research Program. Farley believes that the DoD may wish to bring before the Principals the question of proceeding with the high altitude (Vela Hotel) research program. This is separate from, but certainly related to, the US position with respect to treaty provisions on high altitude. I believe that Secretary Gates wishes to have the judgment of the Principals as to whether the DoD should embark upon this US research program

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prior to committing funds for this long range effort. I personally believe that we must find answers to these questions and that the program should be undertaken.

3. Date for Start of US Seismic Research Program. As indicated above, I raised with Mr. Farley the question of a possible discussion as to a beginning date for the seismic research program. Obviously this is a serious question since it would fix a specific date for the end of the moratorium now that we have said in Geneva that our research program was to be of 27 months duration, and I do not know whether you wish to have this question specifically raised at this time or not. It also implies that we are proceeding with the shot program whether or not it is a "coordinated" one. We believe it would be desirable for this question to be resolved at this meeting and would argue for as early a starting date as possible to avoid stretching out the moratorium. In addition, plans for the first nuclear shot are based on a detonation date of November 15. Postponement of this date for longer than several weeks may cause a delay of several months because of the scientific undesirability of winter firing when noise levels are increased.

It is certain that the UK will strongly oppose an early unilateral announcement. State will probably also oppose it, though not as strongly as the British.

Related to this is the question of what use, if any, should be made of the opening of the US prototype Geneva station at Ft. Sill which you are intending to visit during the week of October 9.

There probably will be a Working Group meeting during next week prior to the Principals' meeting and we will supply you with such additional information as we are able to get on the matters to be discussed at the Principals' meeting when plans have become more definite.



S. G. English

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Special Assistant to
the General Manager